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ABSTARCT 
Economic policies are basically the outcomes of the interaction between interest groups and 
institutional infrastructure of the governments. Political powers in each government exert pressure 
on political and economic institutions to influence the public policy choices. But in devising such 
policies, welfare of the individuals and society must be given high priority. Such welfare 
orientation on the behalf of Governments in trade policy formation is also required because trade 
policy is one of the most important tools in promoting the welfare of the whole society through its 
redistributive nature in case of revenues earned by governments.  This study has tried to analyze 
how much Government decisions regarding trade policy choices are promoting ‘welfarism’ in 
these societies and how these policies are ultimately affecting the economic performance of these 
developing nations. Overall this research has been partitioned into three parts. First part is about 
to deal with the political economy aspect of trade policy formation in developing countries. For 
the first time, such an empirical relationship has been developed for considering only developing 
nations. 56 nations have been included in the analysis and only those nations have been dropped 
from for which data was not available from relevant sources. Moreover developing countries have 
been further divided into two broad categories i.e. democratic and autocratic to analyze whether 
governments of democratic developing nations are more welfare concerned in policy making or 
governments of autocratic developing nations are designing such policies in which welfare of 
masses is being weighted much as compared to the vested interests of politicians. For this purpose 
a structural approach presented by Grossman & Helpman (1994) has been applied on data for 
arriving at the estimates of ‘welfarism’ in their trade policies. This model takes into account both 
industry wise and nation wise analysis. MFN tariff rates are being taken as trade policy tool and 
20 major industries using digit-2, rev3 ISIC classification have been chosen for making analysis. 
Time period is from 1995-2013 due to non-availability of output data beyond this time limit. 
Findings showed that democratic governments are more concerned to welfarism in their trade 
policy decisions as compared to the governments of autocratic nations. Both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis has been conducted in this regard.  Qualitatively results have been discussed 
by taking into consideration the nature of political systems of these nations like whether 
developing countries having parliamentary system are more concerned with nation’s welfare in 
their policy designing or nations having presidential systems are offering more efficient policies.  
After arriving at these welfare estimates, an attempt has been made in the second section to analyze 
quantitatively how political orientation in these developing nations, their political legitimacy, their 
state fragility and their governance performance is affecting the decision making process regarding 
trade policy formation. Same sample has been used as in the case of first section. Various types of 
pooled ordinary least square estimation techniques have been applied for cross sectional and time 
series panel. Results proved that constitutional distribution of powers in any political regime 
matters more in bringing more welfarism through policy choices as compared to any other 
institutional characteristics confirming the importance of de jure institutions. 
Lastly in the third section of this research, a triangular relationship between economic growth and 
trade policy has been developed by incorporating the role of institutions into this nexus.  A broad 
taxonomy of trade policy measures has been used for reaching at this conclusion whether the trade 
policy of developing nations are really contributing to their economic growth or not. Incidence 
based measures and outcome based measures of trade policy have been employed in this analysis.  
Moreover for the first time, endogeneity of trade policy is being tried to capture by using 
diversified institutional parameters i.e. how political, economic, de jure and de facto institutions 
affect decision making capacity regarding trade in a nation, which ultimately help in shaping the 
xvi 
 
right policy choice. Time span is again from 1995-2013 but the sample size has been increased to 
83 developing nations after trimming the collected 132 number of nations on the basis of non-
availability of data for various institutional and trade policy variables at initial stages. Instrumental 
variable technique SYS-GMM technique is being applied here for capturing the endogeneity 
problem of trade policies in Trade Policy-Growth nexus. Results are supporting existing theory 
and literature regarding the relationship between various measures of trade policies and economic 
performance. Moreover it has also been observed that institutional parameters are explaining more 
to the Trade policy-Growth nexus in developing nations as compared to fixed factor like 
geography. Role of integration, economic institutions, political institutions and their governance 
have been more conducive in this regard. The policy recommendations on the basis of all these 
results imply that neoliberal policies in trade can be decisive for developing nations if in nations 
system is well integrated with good governance along with political and economic institutions. 
These results also support ‘New Institutionalist’ school of thought which actually emphasizes not 
only upon the role of institutions but their governance as well for better economic development. 
Therefore this study suggests to policy makers that such a policy framework should be designed 
for  developing nation  which covers both of these aspects side by side ‘Neo-liberalism’ along with 
‘New Institutionalism’ in policy making. 
 
 Keywords:  Political Economy, International Trade, Institutions, governance 
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CHAPTER: ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1: Introduction 
 
Since 1990s developing countries are trying to follow a prescription of policies presented in the 
form of ‘Washington Consensus’ to liberalize privatize and de-regularize their policies. This 
formula of reform was based on ten points aiming at bringing policy reforms in developing nations.  
More specifically these policies were designed for Latin American nations to come out of financial 
and economic crisis which occurred in 1980s. But the speed of improvement was quite slow and 
it was also observed that the effect of the same policy prescription was different in different 
regions. Few benefitted more while the others less. This brought a new turn in the formulation of 
policies and made the whole world concerned about what went wrong with these ten point agenda. 
This resulted in the ‘second best solution’ presented by Rodrik (2006) in the form of ‘Augmented 
Washington Consensus (AWC)’ which focused more on the governance aspects for increasing the 
pace of development in developing countries. And these augmented ten points emphasized upon 
more on institutional reforms as compared to policy reforms. In contradiction with Williamsons 
(1990) ten points which promotes the idea of ‘one size fits all’, Rodrik forwarded a new approach 
of ‘Growth Diagnosis’ after AWC and attempted to provide answer to this question that why the 
same policy solution generates different results and related this to the difference in institutional 
frameworks which hinders or facilitate the policy implementations. This provided a more refined 
way for the developing countries to catch up developed countries by following only those policy 
reforms which are actually required after proper diagnosis.  From the last three decades, 
economists have provided greater than ever attention to the determination of trade policy.1 Neo- 
classical growth approach has been used by researchers in past to reveal the importance of trade, 
trade policies in nation’s economic performance. With the passage of time, it was being observed 
by political scientists and researchers tried to relate political science discipline with the actual 
economic outcomes. They forwarded an idea that economic policies are not only based on 
economic environment rather these are the outcome of political games in any system. This led to 
                                                          
1 Pioneering work by Findlay and Wellisz (1982). 
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the revival of an old discipline of ‘political economy’ 2 which had lost its actual spirit since 1900. 
But after 1970, the world started again to make connection between economic processes and 
politics like Adam Smith who also highlighted this fact that economic outcomes are the basically 
the outcomes of politics. Therefore according to his view, political economy actually deals with 
the management of available resources to produce more wealth in a nation.3 No doubt the Smith’s 
work ‘The Wealth of Nations’ in 1776 provides strong foundations for resource allocation but still 
it is hard to define this discipline. Political economists define it as the interplay of political and 
economic forces in policymaking like Drazen (2000) defined it these simplest words that ‘political 
economy is the analysis of the effects of political constraints on economic policies and economic 
outcomes’ which means the political motives behind the economic policies or how the interest 
groups providing different economic incentives are trying to affect policy preferences of 
politicians. So keeping in view all these varying perceptions, this study has incorporated the idea 
of Weingest & Wittman (2008) for defining this discipline  
“. . .political economy is the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political 
behavior and institutions. As such, it is not a single, unified approach, but a family of 
approaches. . ." 
                                         (p. 3) 
But recently this invention of the past times has been again replaced by ‘New political economy’ 
which is incorporating in itself not only with political economy aspects of the societies rather 
another more important branch known as ‘new institutional economics’ in it. This analysis is also 
aimed at to base on this ‘new political economy’ approach to evaluate the trade policy making 
process in developing countries. This new approach is comprised of three pillars i.e. Agents, 
Institutions and structure. Agents are those who try to seek and protect the interests in the society, 
institutions are actually the rules of the game in a system which will guide in reaching a specific 
policy objective and structures are related to the natural environments, endowments, demographic 
set ups and geographical conditions. Moreover the drastic shift in the political institutions of 
economies from authoritarian to the democratic ones, role of political parties in framing the 
politicians and voters preferences, modern bureaucracies and rational behavior of citizens, all of 
these factors are highlighting this fact that economic outcomes are the result of not only market 
forces rather these are much affected by the state actors. Politicians and political institutions are 
                                                          
2 Concept of ‘Political economy’ is having its roots back to the date 1615 to French book titled  économie politique 
translated Political Economy by Antoine de Montchrétien. 
3 Freiden et al. (2010). 
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the main tools of any state. Political institutions delegate powers to all state actors like politicians, 
political parties, pressure groups, judiciary, and common citizens. Hence in other words these are 
the political institutions which help in determining the de jure political powers in a state. Recently 
Daron & Robinson (2008) have remarkably designed a framework showing the importance of 
economic institutions in increasing the economic prosperity but economic institutions are 
themselves endogenous in their nature. As these institutions are the sources of distribution of 
resources in nation, a collective action occurs between citizens and interest groups which can give 
rise to a conflict that which group preferences will be followed to reach economic equilibrium. 
Again both of these eminent scholars have related the solution of this problem to the political 
powers i.e. the interest group which has more political patronage will be having more chances to 
win the policy or attain the capacity to build economic institutions benefitting to their interests. In 
this way economic institutions are also the result of political powers but political powers are the 
outcome of political institutions. All this shows that choice and performance of economic 
institutions is dependent upon the selection of political institutions whether democratic or 
autocratic. The motivation behind this study is also this logic that how the political institutional 
setups of developing countries are actually distressing their economic performance and policy 
choices related to trade policy. According to Rodrik (1997), 
“Perhaps no other area of economics displays such a gap between what policy makers 
practice and what economists preach as does international trade.” 
           (p. 1458) 
Trade policy is not a limited nature phenomenon. It’s getting extended with each passing decade 
travel. Various forms of protectionist policies have been introduced for selling them to the trade 
partners for extracting benefits in their returns. Recent focus has been diverted to a broad range of 
non-tariff measures (NTMs) in place of simple non-tariff barriers. Moreover trends are getting 
change for measuring the welfare aspects of trade policies. Now economists are not only relying 
on the statistics related to trade shares and elasticities to measure how much the given policy is 
welfare oriented rather new trade models incorporating the heterogeneity of firms have been 
developed to further observe the mechanism of welfare gains (Melitz & Regging, 2014). So social 
planners are trying to seek different ways to maximize welfare and minimize trade costs by 
incorporating all those ideas in to existing models and theories which are still absent or have not 
clear implications. When role of institutions are discussed, it doesn’t mean only domestic 
economic and political institutions rather it also involves the role of international organizations as 
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well like IMF, WTO and World Bank. The domestic institutions can never be fully successful if 
these are unaware of the policies pursued by these international institutions. Many times it has 
been noticed that these international bodies work on specific agendas protecting the economic and 
political interests of developed countries at the expense of developing countries. Examples of these 
are IMF conditional based loans policies for developing countries which are making them more 
handicapped nations rather coming out of their vicious circles. Similarly if the policies of WTO 
are analyzed then it is very clear that these are not indifferent between developed and developing 
countries. For example in case of distortionary agriculture subsidies, developed countries have 
been given exemptions on the use of their green and blue box subsidies giving the reason that these 
are not having much harmful effect as compared to those used by developing countries which are 
mainly price support subsidies.4 Presently, trends have been changed for deciding the appropriate 
trade policy for nations and trade and political economists have started extensively relying on 
‘New political economy approach’.5 According to this approach such choices should be based on 
the individual preferences which in turn are determined by how this trade policy is going to affect 
the income and welfare of these individuals. However in practice, it has been observed that the 
majority of trade policy decisions are taken by the political representatives or lobbies in a nation. 
It has been pointed out that understanding the formation of trade policy ‘individual preferences’ is 
a fundamental input into the modeling of trade policy outcomes.6 But mostly in many cases politics 
has been viewed as a type of market where such policy decisions are sold for political support and 
resource transfers. Economic agents enter political markets to manipulate trade policy, which 
ultimately helps them to make their positions strong in economic markets and get opportunities for 
influencing future trade policy. In case of democracies, governments form their trade policies not 
only in response to the concerns of the general electorate, but also to the pressures forwarded by 
special interest groups. These interest groups contribute in the political process in order to 
influence policy outcomes. Politicians act in response to the incentives7 they have, trading off the 
financial and other support that comes from heeding the interest groups' demands against the 
alienation of voters that may result from the execution of such socially costly policies. Researches8 
                                                          
4 These are also known as Amber Box subsidies.  
5 Mitra (1999). 
6 Rodrik (1995), Scheve & Slaughter (1999). 
7 Cox & McCubbins (1997). 
8 Baldwin (1995), Krueger (1997), Edwards (1998), Rodriguez & Rodrick (2001), Wacziarg & Welch (2003), 
Greenway et al. (2001), Yanikkaya (2002), and Ferreira &Rossi (2003).  
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on the political economy of trade policy actually try to seek equilibrium outcome of this political 
process and also finding out the equilibrium structure of protection. Governments have various 
policies of protection i.e. import and export taxes and subsidies to maximize social welfare of the 
society.  Sometimes the use of these policies creates a wedge9 between the domestic and world 
prices that reduces the potential gains from trade. On the other side the economists10 who prefer 
the classical trade theory adhere to the doctrine of free trade. Therefore it has been observed that 
there is a contrast between international trade theory and the reality of trade policy. In reality, 
mostly trade policy is governed by various forms of protectionism both in developed and 
developing countries. This trade policy paradox is related to the efficiency property of trade 
policy11 which explains that if a government pursues economic efficiency or social welfare 
maximization, then all trade policy instruments, whether they be tariffs, export subsidies, quota 
and license requirements or voluntary export restraints, should be eliminated. The theory of 
political economy of trade policy tries to provide the best solution of this conflict by giving more 
stress on income distributional aspects of different policies.  
After relating domestic institutions with decision making process of governments regarding trade 
policy choices, this study further aims to see the effect of such institutionally instrumented trade 
policies on the economic growth of these developing nations. This will be done by building Trade 
Policy-Growth nexus through the trajectory of political and economic institutions of these nations. 
Bigger theoretical growth studies point to a very complex and highly ambiguous linkage between 
trade and growth rates. In fact, the quite diverse endogenous growth literature supplies a different 
array of models in which trade restrictions may boost or reduce growth rates worldwide or in just 
a few countries.12 However, most of these theoretical models analyze the link between trade 
policies and growth rates rather than trade volumes and growth rates. Though both concepts are 
closely related to each other, but still one cannot conclude from growth models that changes in 
trade volumes themselves are necessarily associated with increasing or decreasing growth rates. 
For instance, the size and location of a country clearly affects trade volumes but not necessarily 
trade policies. Clearly, a landlocked country faces higher transport costs and therefore a lower 
                                                          
9 Pomfret (1991). 
10 Adam Smith & David Ricardo. 
11 Helpman (1995). 
12 Romer (1990), Grossman & Helpman (1990), Rivera-Batiz & Romer (1991). 
6 
 
trade volume even if it has a relatively open trading regime.13 Therefore whenever a nation’s trade 
performance is discussed in past even by the founder of economics Adam Smith, its natural 
endowment and geographical location was always being blamed for poor participation like in case 
of African and Central Asian nations. This is the reason that this important factor in determining 
the trade policy choices has also been incorporated along with landscape of institutions and their 
quality. 
Moreover this study is aiming to analyze the relationship between the determination of trade policy 
and economic performance in the context of different political regimes i.e. Democracy and 
autocracy. Mostly developed nations are democratic while large number of autocratic nations falls 
into developing nations’ category. According to recent survey14 almost more than half of the world 
non-democratic nations are in Asia and Africa. These nations are either completely dictatorial or 
partially free.15 In addition, governance indicators of these nations show poor performance in the 
form of political instability, excess of corruption, absence of Rule of Law and poor regulatory 
quality.16 So these factors also contribute in decision making process. Earlier efforts of researchers 
have been either to analyze the process of trade policy formation in developed nations only or a 
link has been developed to observe the effect of trade policy on economic growth but yet there 
exists a gap. So far not a single attempt has been made to analyze the political economy of trade 
policies specifically for developing nations keeping in view their poor institutional infrastructure 
at present times. This study aims to fill this gap by analyzing simultaneously both the policy 
choices made by their Governments and trade performance of through the prism of institutional 
and constitutional setups. 
1.2: Problem Statement 
Now it is well acknowledged that trade is an engine of growth in any economy. And the World is 
now focusing to relate the performance of this sector for achieving the objective of ‘inclusive 
growth’ as well. Since 1995 with the inception of WTO and its defined principles, the World is 
converting itself to borderless trade which resulted in open trade policies and more trade volumes. 
Developed countries have been successful impressively in achieving these two objectives but 
                                                          
13 Report by Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) (2007), Report by United Nations (2009). 
14 Freedom House Survey (2011). 
15 Here this term refers to those nations in which regime switching is quite frequent. Economic Freedom House 
introduced this term in its survey by dividing nations of the World into three main categories i.e. Free, Partially Free 
and Not Free nations.  
16 Kaufmann et al. (2010).   
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developing nations are hindered in this regard even being facilitated by this organization through 
its harmonized rules and regulations in case of extended periods for implementation of some 
designed policies. The direct reason of this has been explored by analysts either the primary nature 
of their products due to which these have less or restricted access to the markets of developed 
nations or perhaps indirectly the choices of trade policies by their governments through the 
interaction of domestic institutions. Direct reason can have quick remedy but the indirect cause of 
this problem needs more focus and it requires longer period of time to get set because institutions 
are basically defined as ‘set of rules’ which differ from society to society basing upon the cultural 
norms of these societies actually.  This is the reason that the same policy generates different policy 
outcomes if applied at the same point of time in various nations. In present era, not only the role 
of institutions rather their quality is being emphasized for the successful implementation of 
policies. Because if a nation has acquired well designed formal and informal institutions but if 
these are not regulated by their governments then there is a possibility that welfare of the society 
would be ignored behind the motive of self-interests. Therefore this study aims to find how trade 
policies use to get formulated in developing nations i.e. both in democratic and autocratic17 
developing nations. The reason for emphasizing both political regimes separately is that there has 
always been see-saw game between dictators and democratic leaders in these nations to acquire 
political power which has affected badly the economic performance of such nations. Moreover the 
domestic political institutions of both regimes differ in their policy designing and execution. As it 
has been empirically observed that democracies are more able to liberalize trade than autocracies18 
but it does not mean at all that growth will be higher in the countries having democracies. For 
example, the performance of Chinese economy through out and Pakistani economic system during 
its autocratic regime is becoming confusion for thinkers and analysts. The question arises why is 
this so? .i.e. whether it is due to the difference of political regime or the institutions of these 
political regimes which is influencing the economic outcomes of the policies of these nations.  
Keeping in view all this paradox of policy, this study tries to analyze deeply that how trade policy 
decisions are taken in both democratic and autocratic developing nations which are different in 
their institutional landscapes. It also attempts to explore the effect of not only of political regimes 
rather their constitutional set ups as well on such policy decisions. Furthermore as the overriding 
                                                          
17 In this study, the terms non-democracy and autocracy will be used interchangeably onwards. 
18 Mansfield et al. (2007). 
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objective of each economic policy in developing nations in present era is to improve their 
economic performance therefore not only the role of institutions has been planned to capture in 
case of decision making process of their Governments but also the effect these institutions have 
been taken into account in building Trade Policy-Growth nexus for these nations.  
 
1.3: Main Objectives of the Study 
 
From the above discussion the following three main objectives have been designed for this study: 
 
 To see how much governments take into consideration the welfare of their citizens 
regarding trade policies in democratic and non-democratic developing nations. 
 To analyze the role of institutional frame work of developing nations in decision making 
process regarding trade policies. 
 To examine the impact of trade policies on the economic performance of developing 
nations using different political and economic institutional parameters as determinants of 
trade policy making. 
. 
1.4: Main Hypotheses of Study 
 
Keeping in view the objectives given above, here are three main hypotheses which have been 
made for conducting the whole analysis. These main hypotheses have their own sub-hypotheses 
as well which will make it easier to reach at final conclusion. These are as follows: 
Welfarism /Public Regardedness 
H1: Welfarism is more in trade policies of democratic nations as compared to policies by 
autocratic governments. / Governments of democratic nations are more welfarist in decision 
making as compared to autocratic nations.  
Institutional landscape and Welfarism/ Public Regardedness  
H2: Governance, Political Regimes and Constitutional set up affect significantly the extent of 
Welfarism in the decision making of the governments. 
 
 
 
Trade Policy-Growth nexus: Institutions Versus Geography 
9 
 
H3: Institutions are more effective in explaining Trade policy-Growth nexus as compared to 
geography in developing nations.  
1.5: Design of the Study 
The main objective of this work is to study the role of institutions in designing the trade policies 
of developing countries. This whole study is based on twofold analysis. Because it not only tries 
to see how much trade policies of these nations are concerned with improving the welfare of 
masses not politicians but also it relates various forms of trade policies instrumented with diverse 
nature of institutions to the economic performance of these nations. As it is now being 
acknowledged that ‘we are all institutionalist’(Pierson and Skocpol; 2002) after observing the 
dynamic role of institutions from last fifty years therefore again political economists have started 
focusing on the role of this “black box” in policy making. Many attempts have been made to relate 
directly the institutional frameworks of nations with economic performance, income levels and 
growth of nations. But it is not so. Institutions affect indirectly to the performance of nations 
through effecting the main variable i.e. better policies can sometimes be never that much fruitful 
as has been in case of other nations and here the reason will not be the policy choice rather the 
factors which are hindering the actual process of implementation. This is the reason that whenever 
institutions debate is opened the governance issue is always being discussed.  
This study is comprised of three essays. The first essay which is chapter 2, addresses the degree of 
welfarism in trade policies of developing countries after making differentiation among them on 
the basis of their institutional infrastructures. This has been done by using Grossman & Helpman 
(1994) model19 which assumes the endogeneity of trade policy. This approach in literature has 
been used frequently for knowing the role of interest groups in the domestic trade policy making 
for single nations or developed countries specifically but has never been made a serious attempt 
that how actually in case of developing countries this approach provides the useful information. 
This essay aims to explore that whether trade policies in developing countries are public regarded 
in which welfare of masses has been highly weighted by their Governments or Governments are 
not concerned to protect special interests of politicians. Moreover the analysis is being made not 
only on the basis of quantitative techniques but also the qualitative aspects of each nation have 
been discussed in detail which helped us in knowing the authenticity of our results. To discuss 
these results qualitatively is important so that policy makers could know what can be the actual 
                                                          
19 Henceforth G-H model will be used in this study in place of Grossman-Helpman model. 
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reasons of different results of same policy in nations having almost same political structure and 
income status.  
The second essay, Chapter 3, is actually an extension of chapter 2. As it has been well accepted 
now that implementation of policies is more important at this time as compared to policy contents 
and implementation is a process which is affected by various characteristics of a nation i.e. 
governance structure, powers assigned to its leaders, constitutional rules which include presidential 
and parliamentary system of the governments, manifestos of political parties, military role, 
political violence, fragility of state and its political legitimacy. Unfortunately all of these 
characteristics are not in the favor of developing countries and have been proved many times a 
continuous reason of policy failures. So in this essay it has been examined empirically to see the 
role of institutional frameworks in making trade policy choice. Because such policies including 
industrial policies are seen much affected by the very own interests of leaders and political and 
economic institutions. Moreover this public regardedness in policies can also vary due to 
difference in ideology of political parties i.e. from liberal party leader to the conservative one.  
Chapter 4 combines various trade policy measures and institutional parameters in broader context 
for observing their effects on economic performance of these developing nations. Endogeneity of 
trade policy has been captured with the help of different sets of institutional parameters along with 
fixed factors. These variables have been used as instruments against trade policies and both long 
run and short run relationships have been explored in the analysis. Using 83 developing countries 
and time span from 1995-2013, the study not only attempts to develop the nexus between two 
desired variables for these developing nations collectively, rather the analysis in this chapter is 
threefold. Firstly for the whole panel, then making categories of nations on the basis of their 
political regimes, and third analyzing the same relationship region wise i.e. Asia, Africa, America 
and Europe, because of difference in quality of institutions in all these regions. 
Last chapter which is chapter 5 discusses and summarizes the conclusions drawn from various 
chapters. Moreover a light has been thrown on policy recommendations in the same chapter which 
can be used by political scientists and policy makers in future for addressing and overcoming the 
challenges, developing countries are facing actually in their path of development.  
1.6: Contribution of Study 
This study gives its contribution in the existing literature in a way that it’s a detailed analysis of 
trade policies of world’s developing nations and their institutional frameworks. As presently these 
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nations are suffering from political setbacks and lower institutional quality even after the third 
wave20 of democratic reforms in the world, therefore it is now believed that such drawbacks of 
these nations are actually the main hindrance in their lower performance. Moreover past literature 
has focused on either tariff-growth relationship or trade flows and economic performance without 
incorporating the role of various types of institutions in trade policy making. And if some studies 
have tried to relate institutions with trade policy then these are very general in nature. This study 
has aimed to capture the endogeneity of trade policy with various dimensions of institutions along 
with fixed factors like geography in trade. Furthermore for the first time the role of these 
institutions has been explored in case how these are actually affecting the decision making of the 
governments of developing nations related to trade policies. The analysis has been made both 
regime wise i.e. democratic and non-democratic and region wise i.e. Asian, African, American and 
European developing nations after examining the extent of openness and quality of institutions in 
all these regions graphically. This is the novelty of this research work as earlier analysis have been 
made either on selected nations or using single or two trade policy measures but this study has 
incorporated not only various dimension of institution but also a detailed taxonomy of trade policy 
measures. 
1.7: Limitation of the Study 
Time span of the study is from 1995 to onwards. The reason for this is the non-availability of data 
for many variables related to political, economic and governance factors before this year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
20 An idea given by Lindberg (2007) and Huntington (1991). First, Second & third wave of democratization are 
respectively as follows; 1828–1926, 1943–1962, 1974–continued.  
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CHAPTER: TWO 
 
A PARADIGM OF WELFAREISM IN TRADE POLICY DECISIONS: 
A QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS FROM DEVELOPING NATIONS 
 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 
“. . .sound economic policy should be based on a careful analysis of political economy 
and should factor in its influence on future political equilibria.” 
                        (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013, p. 1) 
 
“policy formulation and policy implementation are inevitably the result of interactions 
among a plurality of separate actors with separate interests, goals and strategies”.  
                                                                                          (Scharpf, 1978, p. 347) 
 
The debate over the choice of trade policies is quite old no doubt but unfortunately still indecisive. 
As trade policies have been considered as one of the most important instruments for redistribution 
of incomes into different segments of society. But many a times it has been observed that trade 
policies are quite different from being optimal policy. The reason is its biasness towards favored 
groups and especially import-competing lobbies/industries in an economic structure. Different 
lobbying models have tried to explain this element in policy making. In recent literature Grossman 
& Helpman have made tremendous efforts in explaining how trade policies are affected by 
different actors in a society and disclosed this reality that how the decision taken for efficient 
redistributive policy intensify the process of lobby making by special interest groups for getting 
maximum benefit from such policies which ultimately leads to considerable waste of resources. 
But still being distributive in nature, trade policies in different regimes have been related to welfare 
of the society. Sometimes this welfare is measured through increase in trade shares and elasticity 
estimates with respect to trade costs of various firms or through the efforts of political actors by 
eliminating imbalances from the economy. Recently again after Lucas,21 the first approach has 
been criticized over the issue that to assume constant elasticity for all firms is not logical. The 
reason is that in reality all firms participating in trade are not homogenous in nature. And in this 
                                                          
21 An idea presented in his research work ‘Policy Invariance in unrestricted econometric models’ that parameters under 
unrestricted model specification are not invariant when policy regimes switches with time to time. According to this 
view any policy shift will cause change in the behavior of endogenous and predetermined parameters. And trade shares 
and trade elasticities both are endogenous in their nature so that’s why these estimates can mislead on the behalf of 
welfare estimates to governments after assuming constant elasticity for all firms.  
13 
 
way actual welfare estimates can deviate from estimated.22 Thus from here it can be seen that up 
till now a series of effort is continued to evaluate how much trade policy choices made by 
governments are welfare enhancing in their nature. This study is actually focusing on the second 
approach for measuring welfare gains from trade policies. It has been observed that if social and 
economic outcomes are the result of fair political processes then such outcomes can bring equity 
and efficiency in the society. There is no clear evidence that politics directly affects growth rather 
only a connection has been observed between these two variables via ‘policies’ offered by 
politicians in various regimes. Therefore this public regardedness in policy making by 
governments is essential for social welfare planners because it promotes ‘welfarism’ in society 
overall. ‘Welfarism’ here is related to how much governments prioritize the welfare of masses 
through economic policy choices made by the governments of nations. This term was initially 
introduced by Jhon Hicks in 1981, but in contemporary times Amratya Sen (2009) made the use 
of this term in the theory of ‘social justice’. Here in this study a government will be more welfarist 
in its decision making if it puts high weight on the welfare of consumers not the politicians. Earlier 
authors have used the concept of welfare mindedness in decision making regarding trade policy 
which is the rate at which the governments tradeoff between welfare of masses and different 
pressure groups for making choice between trade policies. Actually this welfare mindedness of 
leaders and policymakers helps in determining the extent of ‘welfarism’ in societies and reduces 
the activities of rent seeking from policy making. Rent seeking23 promotes lobby formation and 
such lobbies tie themselves with the governments for diverting the resource allocation towards 
inefficient use.24 North (1990) as an economic historian has related the weak institutional 
frameworks of nations i.e. absence of rule of law, lack of enforcement of property rights, and poor 
checks and balance on the activities of public officials, with such rent seeking activities. All this 
leads to the development of such a system where powers are enjoyed by few number of hands and 
interests of masses are completely ignored. Many authors have tried to relate rent seeking activities 
with degree of democratization even in recent times. Like Calderon and Chong (2006, 2007) 
proved that the age of democracy matters for deciding whether a nation will be involved much in 
                                                          
22 Melitz & Redding (2014) have introduced a new concept of firm’s heterogeneity and proved in theoretical model 
that the inclusion of this factor in trade models can also matter in estimating welfare. 
23 According to Tullock (1967), rent seeking is that amount of income which is earned without any addition to 
productivity in an economy.  This leads to inefficient use of resources and increase the transaction costs like bribery 
in a society.  
24 Mitra (2005), “The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Theory and Applications to Latin America”. 
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rent seeking practices or not and old democracies were found less rent seekers. Similarly Iqbal & 
Daly (2014) using a dataset of developing nations proved that weak political institutions in 
democracies are positively related to rent seeking activities. Because in such political setups, 
agents possessing the powers of rent seeking activities act as a monopolist and divert the resource 
mobilization towards the fulfillment of their own private interests. In this way, higher social costs 
of any economic policy have to be borne by the whole system. Many authors have stressed on the 
roles of such interest groups as an important political factor even in the development of 
democracies (Calvert & Calvert, 2007).  
As the proposition of free trade has been one of the most important tenets of economists for the 
past two centuries therefore it has been asserted strongly now that this policy choice will benefit 
nations in most of the cases. But “new trade theory” 25 and “infant industry argument” does not 
support this principle of trade. Consequently now economists are trying to seek out not only 
economic rather political determinants of protection in nations. Factors like level of employment 
in the industry, import penetration rates, concentration of industries (Rodrik 1993) have been used 
by many authors to know the determinants regarding imposition of tariff in reality but no clear 
results have been found.26 Moreover few economists suggest that political economic models 
related to trade policy should focus on these important elements like; structure of levels of 
protection, instruments of protection, changes in the structure of levels of protection overtime and 
changes in the overall level of protection overtime (Krueger 1994). Recently more emphasis by 
political economists has been given upon the first element regarding the protection policy (Hillman 
1989, Rodrik 1993).  But important is why few nations choose one policy instrument for protecting 
their own industry while it demands other nation not to use the same one just to get more benefits 
by using its influence.27 Not much work has been done in this regard but still Hillman (1990) and 
Feenstra and Lewis (1991) can be viewed as preliminary works. Many a times it has been assumed 
that the structure of level of protection is time invariant. But in reality it is being observed that if 
an industry gets successful in achieving a level of protection then it can easily increase it overtime 
and then it becomes all political matter. Finally regarding the determinants of level of protection, 
                                                          
25 New Trade Theory proposed that intervention in trade like import duties, export taxes, import subsidy and export 
subsidy, can be used to enhance the economic welfare of the nations on the basis of scales of production. And new 
entrants in industries can have more economic profits or rents as compared to the late comers. 
26 Krueger (1997) worked for the failure of the US protection structure with any of the political economic model. 
27 For example in past we have seen US negotiating voluntary export restraints with Japan on many products rather 
than itself imposing import quotas which creates a price difference between two nations. 
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many research works have been conducted on the basis of many propositions but still gaps are here 
which are needed to be filled. 
2.2. Brief Summary of Politico-Economic Approaches For Evaluating Trade Policy 
This section explains different approaches used in past for knowing how politics and interest 
groups play their role in making trade policies. 
1. Tariff Formation Approach 
2. Political Support Function Approach: An extension of former approach  
3. The Median Voter Approach  
4. The Campaign Contribution Approach: An extension of H-O model 
5. The Political Contribution Approach  
Tariff Formation Approach: Findlay and Wellsiz (1982): This approach helps to determine 
tariff endogenously using general equilibrium model. It sheds light on how interest groups effect 
in tariff determination process. This model assumes political institutions as given. Despite all such 
there is something important was missing that is it failed to explain the policy maker’s objective 
function explicitly.  
Political Support Function Approach: Rodrik (1995): This approach is basically an extension 
of the former one. In this model a policy maker explicitly maximizes his welfare function. And he 
incorporates in his function the gains from protection and losses to the population. This model 
recommends that positive tariff rate is an optimal policy. Another advantage of this model is this 
that it can easily be applied in an open economy. This theory rejects that interests groups can have 
any role in policy making.  
The Median Voter Approach: Mayer (1984): This model incorporates the political and 
economic forces into the determination of protection policy. This model accepts the influence of 
interest groups in trade policy making decisions through majority voting. According to Mayer, 
every political decision is the result of the interaction of few players in an economy; self-interest 
voters, lobbying groups, politicians, and preferences of policy makers related to trade. The model 
also proposes that optimal tariff rate is associated with the factor endowment level with an 
individual. Moreover this approach decides that in the situation of diversification in the economic 
interests of voters for endowments of factor (labor and capital), tariff policy will be decided 
through majority voting system. And equilibrium tariff rate will be that one which will remain 
unchanged with any pressure from majority of voters. And this model concludes that optimal tariff 
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rate depends upon the relationship between individual’s capital-labor and society’ endowment. No 
doubt this is advancement in the theories of political economy models of trade policy 
determination but still critics28 have raised objections behind its rationale. They have regarded this 
theory as a theory of majoritarian politics not of interest groups politics.  
The Campaign Contribution Approach: Magee, Brock and Young (1989): This is an extension 
of H-O model by including two lobbies and two political parties along with two factors, and two 
goods in the determination process of trade policy. And this model explicitly explains the role 
political parties in decision making process. Magee et al. (1989) and Grossman & Helpman have 
contributed in this regard. The difference between these two approaches is quite obvious. In first 
approach lobbies through political campaign influence the chances of election of a particular party 
while in the second approach lobbies through political campaign of a certain candidate tries to 
influence the trade policy of ruling party in government. Moreover all players (lobbies, political 
parties and voters) maximize their welfare. One political party is assumed to be pro-protection and 
the other pro-trade. Moreover it is also being assumed by authors that capital-intensive sector is 
pro-trade and demands for export subsidies because this will increase the return to capital as 
proposed by Stopler-Sameulson Theorem while labor-intensive sector lobbies for import tariffs 
and is said to be pro-protection.  
The Political Contribution Approach: Grossman & Helpman (1994): This model considers a 
small open economy and does not allow for competition among political parties. It assumes only 
the role of a single political party which is in rule and faces many lobbies’ interests. Each lobby 
represents a single industry’s interest. The main purpose of government is to maximize weighted 
sum of aggregate social welfare and contributions made by lobbies for their particular interests. 
Now after reviewing past approaches which have used in reaching the right choice of trade policy, 
this study tries to develop its own framework.   
2.3: Theoretical Foundations 
In principle, there must be four elements in the political economy model of trade policy which are 
as follow:29 
                                                          
28 Reizman & Wilson (1995). 
29 Rodrick, “Political Economy of Trade Policy”. 
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Fig. 1: Diagram showing four elements in Decision Making Process 
So from this framework it is cleared that an economic outcome is the result of consensus between 
lobbies which are also known as special interest groups and political institutions working in an 
economy. In other words it can be interpreted as follows:30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly whenever the formulation of trade policy is analyzed, there comes mainly three actors 
who play their role in modifying policies according to their interests i.e. Interest groups, Political 
parties and Bureaucrats (policy makers). The system works in this way: interest groups provide 
electoral support to political parties and these parties provide political support to bureaucracy. Here 
bureaucracy refers to specialized organization composed of highly trained professionals.31 After 
this political parties extract benefits from these bureaucrats in the form of low regulations and 
special favors for domestic lobbies which help these parties to get reelected. Hence in this way 
special interests are protected by making legislation and institutions for personal motives not 
taking into account the common majority interests. Polk (2002) summarized different approaches 
                                                          
30 Acemoglu et al.  (2001, 2002). 
31 Jhonson. M. P, “A Glossary of Political Economy Terms”. 
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used to incorporate the effects of interest groups and concluded that politicians can deviate from 
the objective of maximization of social welfare due to the role of such lobbies. Because politicians 
use campaign contributions as a payment for buying policies while the other interest groups take 
politicians self-interested. But sometimes effect of lobbying has been observed positive in a way 
that politicians have asymmetric information but lobbyists being fully informed about the 
preferences of individuals help these politicians to make right policy decisions. Consequently 
lobbying can be regarded as welfare-enhancing here but welfare-reducing in the former case where 
contributions are used to deviate politicians from the right decision making. Van Winden (2002) 
also analyzed the role of interest groups and their influence on politicians and their policy 
outcomes. Author proved that interest groups affect policies in two ways i.e. directly and 
indirectly. In a direct way, these influence the behavior of policymakers and indirectly through 
affecting voters. And also shed light on several channels of this influence. For example, they may 
approach to bureaucrats,32 legislators33 and political candidates.34 Some authors35 consider that the 
interest groups make it their “targets” to influence the interaction between state and local 
governments.  
Merlo and Felli (2000) found that lobbying always matter which means that lobbying always 
affects the decision making process in democracies and concluded that policy outcome is robust 
even to the changes in the electoral rule. Similarly Reuben (2002) and Davies (2004) also discussed 
the importance of such interest groups and ended up with this decision that interest groups are now 
an important characteristic of any political system because such groups make payments to 
policymakers for shaping policies in their interests. 
Recently Calvert and Clavert (2007) also emphasized upon the role of interest groups in the success 
of any political governments mainly in case of liberal democracies36 because their role is distinct 
from the role of political parties. Interests groups are involved in the articulation of demands from 
masses while on the other side political parties work for the fulfillment of these demands through 
aggregation. Authors preferred the word ‘interest groups’ over ‘pressure groups’ because it is 
                                                          
32 Spiller (1990), Laffont & Tirole (1991), and Banks & Weingast (1992). 
33 Austen-Smith (1993), Dharmapala (1999a, 1999b). 
34 Hillman & Ursprung (1988), Hillman (1989). 
35 Hoyt & Toma (1989). 
36These are the democracies usually known as ‘federal’ governments where division of powers is being made between 
the central government and member states. United States is the most efficient example of liberal democracy. Moreover 
the powers of executive are being limitized by the constitution.  
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believed that such groups mostly cover all the aspect in political arena not specifically of few 
individuals. Moreover authors supported the view of Almond and Coleman (1960) that the reason 
for the failure of the political systems in developing countries is their nature of interests groups 
which are most of the time non-associational groups not associational ones.37 
The above discussion reveals the importance of interest groups in making any economic policy 
and how these interest groups form lobbies to pressurize the policy decision made by policy makers 
and politicians. Keeping in view this whole mechanism of policy making, this study also aims to 
analyze that how politicians and interest groups interact with each other to affect the objective of 
social welfare maximization of Governments. This analysis is being made specifically for 
developing nations by taking into consideration their various characteristics like nature of their 
political regimes, constitutional setups, and their income levels. Its basic purpose is to examine 
that how trade policy decisions are formulated in these countries i.e. whether small but strong 
domestic lobbies or majority of voters forces the politicians to take decisions. And how decisions 
taken in both ways i.e. either by giving high weights to choice by majority or by assigning more 
value to lobby’s influence, affect the government objective of maximizing social welfare with the 
help of policy choice. All this discussion shows that policy making is the result of many exogenous 
parameters as well which have stronger impact sometimes on policy decisions.  
2.4. Literature Review 
This section covers the review of past literature how individual trade policy preferences are made 
in an economy. Some are of the view that factor specificity actually determines the individual 
policy preference while some are relating it directly to the institution building. Different economic 
models incorporate different factors either factor endowment or product characteristics for trade 
policy preferences. Traditionally it is believed that whenever policymakers make efforts to take 
any decision about trade policy they keep in mind the distributional aspects in terms of incomes 
from certain decisions. But here lies the main difference between past studies and this one that it 
incorporates not only welfare aspect of trade policy formulation but also takes into account the 
institutional features of economies in taking such decisions. Below is given a brief review of those 
studies which were being made in this regards.   
                                                          
37 Non-associational groups are the groups like region, ethnic, and caste based in which these people are born by 
default and associational groups are those groups which people join on the basis of different interest articulated by 
them. Like a group pursuing protectionist policies or liberal policies.  
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Bhagwati and Feenstra (1982) explored that that how Government can minimize the role of 
lobbies in decision making process regarding trade by introducing the idea of Efficient Tariff. This 
is such a percentage of tax which the Government should have to impose for providing protection 
to labor in import-competing industries. The other way to satisfy laborers is to provide them 
subsidies or to bribe them but due to budget constraints it becomes difficult for governments to 
adopt this way. So the compensation through the generation of revenues from protection becomes 
more feasible. This study analyzed policy making through political economy aspects but still 
seems remained unsuccessful in reporting which protection level will be efficient in all nations 
having different natural endowments and institutional environments.  
Helpman (1995) for the first time related international and domestic politics in the formation of 
trade policies and tried to find the effect formation of free trade areas in trade policy on the overall 
welfare of an economy. Author showed his concern about this new dimension of making free trade 
areas due to the reason that trade policy in one nation is affected by the political environment of 
the other. International political arena play a vital role with the help of diplomacy to effect tariff 
rates and restrict the entry of many other nations to enter into their markets and emphasized that 
such a framework is needed that incorporates role of institutions in the formation process of trade 
matters.  
Golberg and Maggi (1999) employed G-H (1994) model for testing empirically the decision 
making process of trade policy. The results of study showed that the weight age was 50-70% higher 
for social welfare maximization as compared to the political contributions of worth $1 spending 
by the Government in US. Therefore on the basis of results this conclusion was being drawn that 
Governments are mostly interested to put high weights on social welfare of the society than to the 
campaign contributions while setting the trade policies. This study contributed impressively in the 
literature related to the formation of trade policy but for other nations to verify these results was 
not possible due to non-availability of data regarding campaign contributions in elections. And to 
overcome this problem of data, nations used different proxied variables to capture the effect of this 
variable which can make results biased towards the selection of proxy.  
Mitra (1999) also added his contribution in the literature of lobby formation within the framework 
of political economy of trade policy using the same G-H model. Author proved that more unequal 
distribution of assets leads to large numbers of lobbies in an economy. In this study author tried to 
distinguish between natures of industry whether organized or not by looking at its capital stock 
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and elasticity of demand for its product. Industries that are having high capital stock and inelastic 
demand are said to be organized otherwise unorganized. As this is one of the requirements of the 
model to make differentiation between these types  
Bandyopadhyay (2000) using the data for non-tariff barriers for US in G-H model proved that 
Governments puts thousand times high weights for the maximization of social welfare as compared 
to campaign contributions.  
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) analyzed that low skilled labor demands more protection than 
highly skilled labor in case of United States and but people engaged in those industries which are 
related to trade sector, are not showing strong  support for  trade barriers. Moreover the author also 
found that factor incomes and asset ownership also help to shape the policy preferences. But the 
main result of their findings showed that individual preferences are more related to the factor type 
endowment rather than the industry of their employment. 
Eicher and Osang (2002) using a dataset of 106 industries of US tried to make the comparison of 
two endogenous models of trade policy determination. One was political support function model 
and the other was influence driven function (G-H model). The dataset confirmed strongly and 
significantly the predictions of influence driven approach given by Grossman & Helpman and 
proved that import penetration has a strong positive effect on the tariff barriers and negative effect 
on non-tariff barriers for organized industries. Here threshold approach was being used for 
regarding an industry to be considered as an organized one. Overall their findings confirmed the 
superiority of influence driven models on political support models in explaining the trade policy 
choices and confirmed the earlier findings that Government always tries to be welfare maximizing 
in policy making. 
Kaempfer et al. (2002) applying non-technical approach and reviewing some theoretical and past 
empirical analysis concluded in that protectionism is the outcome of self-serving special interests 
in the society. It can be regarded as a costly product of a negative sum political game rather than 
the product of the Government which aims at the maximizing welfare of the society by bringing 
into focus on the tradeoff between equity and efficiency.  
Dutt and Mitra (2005) related political ideology of the Government in power with trade policy 
decision. Authors used Heckscher-Ohlin framework for measuring this relationship and observed 
that left wing party support more protectionist policies in capital nations and suggest more pro 
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trade policy in labor abundant nations and concluded that such behavior is strongly being observed 
in case of democracies than in dictatorships. 
Milner and Kabuta (2005) aimed to relate the nature of political system to the choice of trade 
policy i.e. either more free trade or protected one. Using five different proxies for trade policies as 
dependent variable, an econometric analysis for large number of developing nations had been 
applied. The study found that more democratic nations tend to have less trade barriers and 
concluded that in labor abundant nations, political leaders demand low trade barriers as the degree 
of democracy increases.  
Frey and Mansfield (2003) examined the institutional variations on trade policy with special 
reference to the post-communist world. Authors showed that democracies are having more 
inclination towards liberal trade policies while on the other hand non-democratic nation favor 
protectionism and found that in both types of regimes when power is being dispersed from 
protectionist elites, it creates a political space for interest groups in making such economic policy 
making process and who give much favor to liberal trade policy. Supporting the findings of other 
studies for different regions, this study concluded that domestic political actors and institutions 
play an important role in opening up trade policies. But if political fragmentation was being 
observed in communist nations, then such dispersion of power leads to more open commercial 
policies which were not based on the vested interests of few elites as it was before. 
Cadot et al. (2004) also making the use of G-H model showed that how tariff patterns are 
determined in rich and poor countries. Authors found a very important phenomenon that 
equilibrium level of protection is not just affected by the lobbies which are benefitted by this rate 
of protection but also from the counter lobbies’ effect which are negatively affected by this rate of 
protection. And results showed that the rate of protection is high in poor countries for revenue 
constraints and poor countries protect more to the agriculture sector while the rich do opposite. 
Overall this study concluded that a good policy may not be the result of politicians objective 
functions rather may be due to the removal of conflicts in different interest groups in a society.  
Afontsev (2004) using G-H model found that in Russia, citizens’ welfare was given higher weight 
in government priority than contributions of lobbies. It means that in formulating trade policy the 
lobbies do not have leading role in Russia. The author also made the use of extended G-H model 
to find the effects of a trade policy on different actors in the economy: exporters and importers. 
23 
 
For identifying between organized and unorganized industries, threshold criterion was used .i.e. 
number of firms in industry does not exceed a certain level.   
Belfrage (2004) tested extended G-H model used by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for a number of 
OECD countries and regions and concluded that special interests in the context of trade policy 
decisions vary positively with the change in protection rates of the industries. Their findings were 
in line with the predictions of the model.  
McCalman (2004) employing the G-H model for Australian economy tried to find the structural 
parameters causing trade liberalization in that nation. This study found that along with the weights 
assigned by Government to different welfare aspects, size of the voting lobbies also matters for 
such transitional change in trade policies which means that the protection of any industry is related 
to its voting strength. Overall the study concluded that about 40 times weights are higher for social 
welfare than on political contributions.  
Mobarak and Purbasari (2005) worked on Indonesian economy and experienced that personal 
relations with politicians can be helpful in influencing the policy outcomes from governments, 
which means that if lobbies and pressure groups are connected with some political parties then 
their chances to win policy are brighter as compared to other sectors in the economy. The study 
concluded using the data for 20,000 manufacturing firms that politicians are more willing to use 
import licenses to facilitate than other trade measures and try to focus on individual level protection 
not on the whole industry wise.  
Michalek and Hagemejer (2006) used G-H model for analyzing the role of lobbies in designing 
trade policy of Poland and they found that such lobbies try to affect the decision making ability of 
Polish government through the provision of contributions in political process. The results 
confirmed the predictions of this model and concluded that organized sectors have the advantage 
of influencing the decisions of governments in their favors.  
Blonigen (2008) made the addition of a new variable ‘access to information’ in the trade policy 
formation analysis and concluded that if the society is uninformed then it will be difficult for 
citizens to support the right choice of trade policy because high cost of acquiring information. 
Author asserted that life cycle change affects the policy decisions. For example after retirement 
people do not get much informed about the situations of present issues because information getting 
process becomes complex for them and therefore decisions will not be based on accurate estimates.  
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Tang (2009) examined the effect of political ideology of countries in determining their trade 
policies. The study included factor intensity variable along with ideology variable and observed 
that how left wing and right wing Governments effect the protection decisions in nations endowed 
with different natural resources. 
Gwande and Magee (2010) added the effect of free riding problem in G-H model and found some 
different results as compared to earlier studies. Using largest firm’s share of industry output for 
capturing the effect of this new variable and found that by introducing this variable, the weights 
on social welfare reduces and increases for campaign contributions. The authors concluded that 
this phenomenon cause the protection rates of developed nations very low despite the quite active 
role of their politicians. 
Soares and Moreira (2011) also made an attempt in relating various forms of import protection 
in a nation with welfare of the society. By developing a structural framework and employing two 
measure of trade policy i.e. legal import tariff and nominal tariff with special import regimes which 
allows exemptions to special interest groups, the authors found that whenever exemptions or 
exceptions exist in the trade policy regimes, rent-seeking gets started and it reduces the welfare of 
the society.  
Gawande et al. (2012) showed that various institutional factors help governments in taking 
decision making for the welfare maximization of people. Authors concluded that if political 
institutions are having more check and balances in the economy then governments will be welfare 
minded. Similarly if voters in an economy are more informed then governments put more weights 
for social welfare. But if voters are showing their concerns towards a specific ideology of a 
political party and media is also influencing their opinions then the objective of social welfare 
maximization will not achieved and the governments will not be proved welfare minded. The study 
made the conclusion that the major cause behind trade liberalization should be this 
welfaremindedness. Present study also aims to analyze this proposition given by Gawande et al. 
(2012) but by focusing completely on the developing nations’ position. The reason to make the 
choice of this specific region only is this that at present times all World organizations are forcing 
such nations to open up their financial and trade regimes. Now this analysis plans to examine how 
much the governments of developing nations are concerned about the welfare of their society while 
taking trade policy decisions. 
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Hicks et al. (2014) analyzed the role of political parties and their special interests in shaping up 
of the trade policies in a developing nation Costa Rica for observing their behavior towards an 
international trade agreement CAFTA and suggested that in trade policy theories, a special focus 
should be made on top-down political factors which include political elites in the society along 
with many other economic variables. Bottom-up political factors which are related to redistributive 
effects of trade policies seem to have very little importance.  
From all these studies, it can be seen that mostly the analysis are being made by taking only a 
single nation and that nation is also developed nation in many cases. If some studies used panel 
data then again large number of developed nations has been included in that panel. But developing 
nations own large part of this world and presently policy experts are much focused towards 
improving their economic position. Therefore keeping in view all the past literature and their 
conclusions, now this study describes its main objectives which have never been given importance 
earlier. 
2.5: Sub-Objectives  
 To see whether governments of developing nations are welfare oriented in their trade policy 
decisions or not. 
 To examine the extent of welfarism in trade policy without rent seeking activity (withot 
lobbying).  
 To analyze the impact of rent seeking activity (lobby formation) on the level of welfarism 
in the decision making of governments. 
2.6: Sub-Hypotheses 
 H1.1: Developing nations are welfare maximizing. α0 ≠ 0  
 H1.2: Democratic developing nations are concerned more to the welfare of society in 
making trade policy decision than autocratic developing nations.  
 H1.3: Lobby formation effects negatively to the aggregate welfare of the society. β0 ˂ 0  
2.7. Model 
In this section, theory has been developed that how governments show their welfare concerns for 
their citizens relative to private benefits. For this purpose G-H (1994) model has been used. This 
model provides strong theoretical basis for understanding the behavior of governments in 
assigning weights to either welfare of the societies or to the political contributions of special 
interest groups. This is basically political economy model which helps in knowing how decision 
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making process of governments is affected by political actors and economic players in an 
economy. These political actors are political parties and interest groups and economic players are 
policy makers who make the policies supported by organized lobbies in the society. For example 
an organized lobby will always demand high rate of protection and will try to get political support. 
So that such lobbies may convince policy makers through bureaucracy for making policies in their 
favor. First empirical test of this model was made by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for US economy. 
The data verified all the assumptions of the model because US is the only nation in which the data 
related to expenses on political contributions is easily available which helps the authors in knowing 
which sector is organized and non-organized. Organized sectors are actually those which get the 
more protection from government.  The model is as follows: 
Consider a small open economy. There is n+ 1 tradable sector. Identical preferences are being 
assumed for all individuals. Their preferences are represented by this utility function: 
𝑈 =  𝑧0 +  ∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
(𝑧𝑖) 
In the above equation, z0 is a numeraire good and has been produced using labor alone and under 
constant returns to scale.  Wage rate is being assumed w=1 under perfect competition. Moreover 
price of this good has been normalized to one. And zi is non-numeraire good. i= 1….n, whose 
production function is given by: 
𝑥𝑖 =  𝑓𝑖 (𝐾𝑖, 𝐿𝑖) 
Here Ki is sector specific input used in the production of this good, Li shows units of labor 
employed in the production of this non-numeraire good. And again production process is assumed 
to be constant returns to scale subject to diminishing returns against each factor of production.  
Consumer surplus is given by: 
𝑆(𝑝𝑖) = 𝑢(𝑑 (𝑝𝑖)) −  𝑝𝑖 𝑑 (𝑝𝑖) 
And aggregate form is  
                                                                  𝑆(𝑝) =  ∑(𝑢𝑑 (𝑝𝑖) −  𝑝𝑖 𝑑(𝑝𝑖)) 
Here d(pi) is the demand function for good i.  
The indirect utility function for individual k will be as follows: 
𝑣𝑘 =  𝑦𝑘 +  ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑘
𝑛
𝑖=1
(𝑝𝑖) 
Here yk is the income of the individual.  
27 
 
Moreover numeraire good has been assumed to be produced under constant returns to scale and 
with labor factor of production. Wages are fixed at one. The remaining n goods are produced using 
labour and sector specific inputs under constant returns to scale of technology. The supply of sector 
specific input is limited and that’s why rents are earned for these. Returns of each specific factor i 
are determined by the prices of good i and denoted by ψ(pi).  
Supply function for good i will be written as follows:  
𝑌𝑖  (𝑝𝑖) =  𝜓
′ (𝑝𝑖) 
So from above discussion it can be observed that the owner of specific factor input has chances to 
increase its rents through the price of the good in which that input have been used. Therefore it 
can be concluded that such owners of specific inputs may try to influence government policy 
decisions in a way to raise the prices of goods in which these are being used. For this purpose, 
governments make the use of different qualitative and quantitative measures of protection which 
help the domestic producers or producers of import competing industries to save them from foreign 
competition through increasing their domestic prices. Tariff is one of those measures and an 
important tool of trade policy. The world price of each good is assumed to be given. Therefore the 
domestic price after providing protection to domestic is given as: pi= p0+ 𝑡𝑖
𝑠 where p0 is world 
price and 𝑡𝑖
𝑠 is specific import tariff by the government creates a gap between the two prices i.e. 
world price and domestic price. It is also being assumed that the revenue generated through tariff 
will be distributed equally in society.  
Earlier the indirect utility function of a single individual k has been stated. If we sum up indirect 
utility functions of all individuals then we arrive at aggregate welfare of the society. So it means 
it can be generalized that aggregate welfare is the function of domestic prices. Similarly returns to 
labor, specific input factors and tariff revenue give the aggregate income.  Keeping in view all this 
information, now we can calculate aggregate welfare denoted by W as follows: 
𝑊 = 𝐿 +  ∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑛
𝑖−1
(𝑝𝑖) +  ∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑠
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑀𝑖(𝑝𝑖)  +  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖−1
(𝑝𝑖) 
Import function can be written as: 
𝑀𝑖 =  𝑑𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 
Now the next important question arises about the role of lobbies which can influence in 
determination of tariff. It is being assumed in the model that large proportion of the population of 
country is represented by organized lobbies. In G-H (1999) model, important motive of lobbies is 
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to maximize their rents from specific factor input. Formally the objective function can be stated 
as: 
𝑊𝑖 =  𝜓𝑖  (𝑝𝑖) 
Basically this objective function of G-H model is the summation of two factors. Either to maximize 
social welfare or political contributions of special interest groups which are also called lobbies. 
These lobbyists use political contributions for their different self-motivated interests i.e. to finance 
re-election campaigns and make such expenditures which can be helpful in purchasing government 
favors for their personal interests. Thus the complete government objective function can be written 
as: 
𝐺 = 𝑎𝑊 + 𝐶 
= 𝑎𝑊 +  ∑ 𝐶𝑖
𝑖 𝜖 𝐿
 
 “a” is the weight assigned by governments to the welfare of its citizen. Lobbies political 
contributions to government are represented by Ci. And these lobbies try to maximize this objective 
function: 
𝑊𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 
G-H (1994) model determines the equilibrium tariff through “menu auction” model but here in 
this study equilibrium tariffs are set fixed through Nash bargaining game. This also maximizes the 
government objective function i.e. joint surplus of political contributions by lobbies and welfare 
function of the governments. Joint surplus can be written as:  
𝜙 = 𝑎 𝑊 +  ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑖
 
Now this equation is showing that all sectors are politically organized which is frequently observed 
in industrial/advanced/developed countries in case of manufacturing sector. As in case of political 
action committees (US) and industry associations (Europe), special interest groups lobby their 
governments through reporting their expenditures to above mentioned bodies. But in other 
countries of the world, as it has been observed so far that no such records of political contributions 
exists and that’s why difficult to decide about organized and non-organized sectors. So the 
assumption that all sectors are organized even in developing nation can also be considered valid 
because that this analysis has been made at the aggregation level of 20 ISIC 2-digit industries. And 
this classification includes those industries which are organized in US and almost anywhere in 
29 
 
across the world. Therefore on the basis of these two assumptions i.e. Nash equilibrium game and 
politically organized sectors, now joint surplus function will be written as: 
Φ = 𝐿 + ∑(𝑎 + 1)
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝜓𝑖 +  ∑ 𝑎(𝑡𝑖
𝑠 𝑀𝑖 +  𝑠𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Differentiating above equation with respect to  𝑡𝑖
𝑠 which shows tariff on good i is equivalent to 
differentiating the same equation with respect to price of good i (pi) in which that specific input 
factor has been used. The derivative of profit function is as follows:  
𝜓′ (𝑝𝑖) =  𝑋𝑖 
𝑋𝑖 = (output of good i) 
And derivative of consumer surplus is: 
𝑠𝑖′  (𝑝𝑖) =  𝑑𝑖 
            𝑑𝑖 = (demand for good i) 
So by putting these values in the first order condition of joint surplus function is: 
 
(𝑎 + 1)𝑋𝑖 +  𝑎 ( −𝑑𝑖 +  𝑡𝑖
𝑠 𝑀𝑖′  (𝑝𝑖) +  𝑀𝑖 = 0 
Where i = 1…….n 
Solving this equation for t, we get equilibrium tariff that maximizes welfare and political 
contributions by lobbies.  
   
𝑡𝑖
1 + 𝑡𝑖
⁄ =  1 𝑎⁄  (
𝑋𝑖
𝑀𝑖
⁄
𝑒𝑖
)     (A) 
Where i= 1……..n 
Here  
𝑡𝑖 = (pi – pi
0)/ pi
0 is advalorem tariff for good i. 
𝑝𝑖 = Domestic price of good i and  
pi
0= World price of product.  
𝑋𝑖
𝑀𝑖
⁄  = Inverse import penetration ratio.  
𝑒𝑖 = Absolute import demand elasticity.  
Xi which shows industry output tell us about rents occurred from protection. And Mi (imports) 
captures the welfare losses due to protection. In G-H model, major determinants of trade policy 
are elasticity and import penetration ratio. If goods are having lower demand elasticity, higher will 
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be the tariff rate or level of protection. And higher tariff rate leads to smaller imports. In this way 
producers buy protection for their benefits.  
The above equation can be written as:  
   (
𝑡𝑖
1 + 𝑡𝑖
⁄  ) . 𝑒𝑖 . (
𝑀𝑖
𝑋𝑖
⁄ ) =  1 𝑎⁄      (B) 
Where i = 1…….n 
Stochastic version has been used in this study for estimating parameter “a”. So the econometric 
model used in the study is:  
                                     (
𝑡𝑖𝑡
1 + 𝑡𝑖𝑡 
⁄ ) . 𝑒𝑖 . (
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑖𝑡
⁄ ) =  𝛼0 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡     (C)  
Where i = 1………..n 
Equation C shows the determination of the degree of Welfarism in case where lobbies do not affect 
the government decision-making process. But in real world scenario, the role of lobbies cannot be 
ignored. It has been observed that many industries try to provide support to the governments or 
political party leaders just to protect their industries from foreign competition either demanding 
lower tariff rates on the use of inputs in their production process or raising duties on their final 
imported goods. As G-H (1994) model has been used to derive public regardedness in trade policy 
making, therefore lobbies are represented by various industries. And the lobby formation has been 
proxied by the use of intermediate inputs of one industry into their final output. In other words the 
extent of vertical integration among industries has been used as the source of decision whether 
industries are involved in rent seeking activities or not. If an industry is using more of its inputs 
from other industries then more chances will be there that such industries will demand lower tariff 
rates on such industries’ output to reduce their production cost. Vertical integration is an important 
topic focused within the framework of Transaction-cost Economics (TCE) and it is considered as 
a source of ‘monopoly rents’ in economics because the input users try to gain control of these input 
markets. Such monopoly rents reduce the efficiency in formulation and their implementation of 
policies and ultimately declines the welfare of the society.38 So following this aspect of transaction 
cost through the usage of intermediate inputs has been incorporated in the same G-H model and 
equation (C) gets changed into the following expression:39  
                                                          
38 Klien (2000). 
39 Full derivation is given in addendum-G. 
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(
𝑡𝑖𝑡
1 + 𝑡𝑖𝑡 
⁄ ) . 𝑒𝑖 . (
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑖𝑡− ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑗 𝑦𝑗 
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖
) =  𝛽0 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (D) 
Here 𝜑𝑖𝑗  𝑦𝑗  term has been extracted from Input-Output tables which show the part of intermediate 
input into final product. Error term has been assumed to be identically independent and normally 
distributed for all countries with homoskadastic variance σ2. In the original version of G-H model, 
there appears the problem of endogeneity to tariff related to imports, output and elasticity of 
demand but after assuming that all sectors are politically organized, this problem has been 
overcome by taking inverse import penetration ratio and elasticity to the left side of the equation. 
In the final equation, α0 shows welfare mindedness of governments in each nation. So we can write 
it as:  
𝜶𝟎 =  𝜷𝟎 =  
𝟏
𝒂⁄  
 
Now this stochastic version of model has been estimated for 56 developing nations. The reason of 
missing other developing nations is the unavailability of data for many variables especially output 
data. In previous studies authors have taken a mix of both developed and developing countries40 
for estimating this model in the context of political economy of trade policy. This is for the first 
time that a large and maximum number of developing countries have been used for estimation 
purpose. Further these developing nations have been divided into two sub categories i.e. politically 
free nations (Democratic nations) and politically not-free nations (Autocratic nations). More over 
welfarism regarding trade policy has also been analyzed through the political systems in these 
economies whether presidential or parliamentary system promotes welfare related to trade policy 
because such decisions vary according to the change in political regimes. 
2.8: Variables and Data Sources 
Variables used in this study are: 
1. Tariff 
2. Industry output 
3. Elasticity 
4. Input-Output data 
                                                          
40 Gawande et al (2008, 2012). 
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For each nation data has been collected across 20 industries and 2 digit classifications has been 
used. The reason of less number of industries is the non-availability of dataset either for industrial 
output or tariff. Time span used in this study is 1995-2013.  
 Tariff Data: Non-discriminatory tariff rates have been used for each nation. Data has been 
extracted from United nation’s database TRAINS.  
 Industry Output: Output data has been taken from the UNIDO’s INDSTAT using 2-digit 
classification and revision 3. International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) level 
of aggregation of output has been used. The purpose of using this classification is this; it is 
quite extensive in explaining the nature of association between industrial organizations and 
political setups in different industries and countries. Basically the record of political 
contributions in a nation tells about either industry is organized. Except U.S, no other 
nation has such records so to avoid this problem those industries have been chosen which 
are being run through government support. So in this case all such industries will be 
considered as politically organized because these are following government rules and 
regulations. 
 Elasticity: Import demand elasticities have been estimated for each nation at the six-digit 
HS level using a revenue function approach by Kee et al. (2008). Those nation for which 
sufficient data is not available for estimating elasticities, for such nations the industry 
averages of the elasticity estimates of all other nations have been used.41 
 Input-Output (I-O) data: GTAP 7 has been used in this empirical work. It is covering 57 
sectors and 113 regions overall. But the number of sectoral coverage is not same for all 
nations. Many nations have been included for this first time in this dataset. That is also one 
of the reasons that the numbers of sectors chosen in this study are confined to 20. Reference 
year of this database is 2004.   
2.9: Sample Development 
All developing countries according to the definition of World Bank have been selected. These 
were 133 total in number. But only those nations have been included into the analysis for which 
trade related data and political data was available. All these nations have been converted into two 
panels at initial stages.  
i) Free Nations. 
                                                          
41 Same practice has been done in recent study by Gawande et al (2012). 
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ii) Not-Free Nations. 
This division has been made on the basis of available source “The Freedom in the World Survey”. 
It is comprised of two important categories. a) Political Rights, b) Civil Liberties. Here Political 
right means how much people are free to join political parties, compete for public office, having 
the right to vote freely for potential candidates who have in real sense influential in making public 
policies. While on the other hand civil liberty means here freedom of expression, prevalence of 
rule of law, personal autonomy and economic freedom without any interference from state. The 
standards used by this survey are based on the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. This survey takes into account every aspect of an economy whether governmental or non-
governmental which can affect economic freedom. So it tries to measure freedom in its real sense 
through practices not only practiced by laws. Rating process of this survey includes both analytical 
reports and numerical ratings. The survey is containing 25 questions. 10 questions measuring 
political rights and 15 civil liberties. The topics of these questions include independence of media, 
religious freedom, corruption, the rights of the political parties to function, independence of the 
judicial system and women’s right. All countries are assigned numerical values from scale 1-7. ‘1’ 
shows highest level of freedom and ‘7’ shows the lowest level. Moreover both of these indicators 
of freedom are being averaged to see the status of a nation whether it is Free, Partially free, or Not-
Free. Countries rating between 1- 2.5 are Free, nations with rating 3-5 are partially free and those 
having scores between 5.5 - 7 are not-Free. But in this study the category of Partially Free nation 
has been merged in Free and Not-Free nations in such a way that scores of both freedoms have 
been averaged and a nation having score less than equal to 7 will come under Free nation heading 
and the nations having score greater than 7 are being ranked as Not- Free. More over this status 
has been observed individually in each year since 1995. And a country which has been mostly in 
both of these categories since 1995-2013 that nation will be the status of nation. Notation wise, the 
following rule is being followed in this study to convert World developing nations into two broad 
categories:  
Ʃ (PR+CL)/2 ≤ 3.5  Democratic Nation 
Ʃ (PR+CL)/2 > 3.5  Autocratic Nation 
Hence in this way category of partially free nations has been merged in two broad categories i.e. 
Free or Not free nations. Moreover Free nations have been considered as democratic nations in 
this study where everyone has maximum political and civil liberty and vice versa.  
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Similarly the distinction among nations on the basis of their institutions whether parliamentary or 
presidential has been made using the Database of Political Institutions 2013 (DPI). As the time 
span of the study is from 1995-2013, thus this time limit has been used as a threshold for deciding 
whether a nation has been parliamentary or presidential. Maximum number of years a nation has 
been in any category, it will decide its status. For example, if for maximum number of years a 
nation has been having a parliamentary system during a specified time limit, then it will be 
considered as a nation having parliamentary system and vice versa.  
Moreover the status of being poor and rich nation has also been decided taking into consideration 
World Bank data source. GNI per capita income has been used to decide this status. But the nations 
with high income and upper middle income have been awarded the status of rich and nations with 
low income and lower middle income has been considered as poor nations.  
2.10: Methodology 
Empirical results given above are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equations 
(C) and (D). The data has been pooled for each nation across industries and over time period. 
Following Gawande et al. (2012), data has been stacked across 56 developing nations and 
parameter a has been determined as a co-efficient on the dummies42 for nations used in study. This 
equation gives directly country-specific parameter a, which measures the welfare mindedness of 
nations’ government in the sample. These estimates of parameter a can also be obtained as the 
simple averages of the expression on left hand side. The estimation of both equations gives very 
reliable and unbiased results w. r. t. endogeneity as compared to earlier existing literature because 
in this equation on the right hand side, only constant term is there. Problem of endogeneity occurs 
when 
𝑋𝑖
𝑀𝑖
⁄  ratio remains on the right hand side because to some extent tariff rates or trade policies 
are endogenous to imports and output. Moreover G-H (1994) model has assumed that parameter a 
is constant across industries but not across countries. Due to this reason, industry or time fixed 
effects is not in line with already built theory. This in turn try to highlight this fact that in applying 
panel models, within and between (it implies taking the average of each industry across time) 
estimates should give the same magnitudes of point estimates as derived from pooled OLS 
estimation in balanced panel. Moreover the panel fixed effect model actually measures the overall 
averages of industry effects across time which corresponds to the left hand side calculation of 
                                                          
42 It has been explained in a paper “Interpreting the Intercept in the Fixed Effects Model” published by Stata Journal. 
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equation (C) and (D). As the panel used in this study is unbalanced that’s why a little discrepancy 
remains between these two point estimates obtained either fixed effect model or pooled OLS. Table 
given below gives the results of OLS and then the resulting estimates of the degree of welfarism 
in a state. 
2.11: Results 
 
Table 2.1 shows the results for overall panel without discriminating between democratic and 
autocratic developing nations. According to model, if the estimate of final parameter is greater 
than 0 than it means the governments are welfare concerned in their trade policy making. Higher 
the parameter, higher will be the extent of welfarism. But from this Table it can be seen value of 
parameter is not very high though it is significant. This shows that the governments are welfare 
oriented in developing nations but the degree of welfarism is quite small. Basing upon the results, 
the first null hypothesis is being rejected and the drawn conclusion is this that such nations’ 
governments are welfare concerned in their trade policy choices. 
 
Table 2.1: Overall Panel Results 
Overall panels Constant Welfarism 
Whole developing nations 
panel 
3.6758 
[2.3833] 
0.2724 
(significant) 
Democratic developing 
nations 
2.4836 
(2.1109) 
0.4032 
(significant) 
Autocratic developing 
nations 
2.4248^ 
(1.3900) 
0.4124 
(insignificant) 
                      [ ] shows t-statistics and ‘^’ shows insignificant value. 
 
Now in the same Table 2.1 the last two rows are showing segregated results on the basis of political 
regimes. And the results are supporting the theories that the governments in democracies are more 
concerned to the welfare of society in their trade policymaking. The results for both of these 
categories also help to reject the null hypothesis of second sub hypothesis (i.e. Democratic 
developing nations are less welfare oriented than autocratic developing nations) of this study and 
to make conclusion that the governments of democratic developing nations are welfarist in their 
trade policy choices as compared to autocratic nations. For the third sub hypothesis (Lobby 
formation effects negatively to the aggregate welfare of the society), the estimates have been 
reported in the Addendum in Tables A9, and A10. Table A9 gives the estimates of welfarism for 
democratic developing nations incorporating the effect of both rent seeking and without rent 
seeking on the decision taken by their governments.  According to the model, if estimate of 
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parameter is less than 0 then it means governments are not concerned to the welfare of society in 
their policy choice. The estimated results show that as the model incorporates the role of lobbies 
(downstream users) for observing the effect of rent seeking in the original G-H (1994) model, the 
welfare estimates turn to be negative proving that lobbies reduce the welfare of the society by 
pressurizing the governments for their special favors. 
Now the welfare estimates of government objective function after incorporating the effect of lobby 
formation has been reported in Table A10 in Addendum. And interesting thing which can be noted 
from this Table for most of the nations is that the magnitude of the estimates has reduced drastically 
for autocratic nations. It means the governments in such nations become particularist and protect 
their own interests ignoring the welfare concerns of masses in policy decisions. Effect of lobby 
formation is negative for these nations as well.  
2.12: Discussion 
The Tables 2.1, A9 and A10 show the extent how much developing nations are welfare concerned 
in case of trade policy formation. This is for the first time that such a broad analysis covering 
maximum number of developing nations has been conducted.43 Baseline Model being used in this 
study has also been extended for observing the lobbying effect through considering the use of one 
sector’s output by producers as an intermediate input in their final product. This also results in 
vertical integration. This variable i.e. one sector’s output as an intermediate input, has been used 
as proxy for rent seeing because it is assumed that due to this reason producers involve themselves 
in pressurizing the government to reduce protection rates for those intermediate products which 
are used by them for their final production. This ultimately forces those producers to form a lobby 
for influencing the policy decision of the government. Hence such lobby formation may benefit 
small segment of society by increasing/decreasing tariff rates for some specific sectors at the cost 
of ignoring welfare of masses.  
All the nations included in the panel have been divided into two categories based on regime 
differences i.e. democratic and autocratic nations. This is an important point to be focused here as 
this study intends to explore specifically whether political regimes matter for a government in it 
welfare concerns for masses/ in decision making process or not. Moreover, division of nations has 
also been made on the basis of different constitutional set ups44 like either nations having 
                                                          
43 Only those nations have been dropped for which data was not sufficiently available.  
44 Alt et al. (1996) found that domestic institutions also matters while deciding about trade policy and trade   coalitions.  
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parliamentary system are more welfare oriented or nations with presidential system are more 
involved in the policy formation which is concerned with betterment of masses. Furthermore, for 
estimating the extent of welfarism in the policies of governments, their income levels have also 
been taken into consideration under two broad categories of regimes i.e. either rich 
democracy/autocracy or poor democracy/autocracy. According to World Bank (2013) definition, 
all lower and middle income nations are considered developing nations. The same definition has 
been used in this study. But for rich and poor developing nations, the discrimination has been made 
on the basis of threshold provided by World Bank (2013), that nations having GNI per capita 
income higher than US$ 4,063 are being considered rich nations while nations with less than US$ 
4,063 GNI per capita income are taken as poor developing nations.  Estimation has been done both 
individual country wise and broad category wise as well.  As the null hypothesis states that nations 
are welfare oriented if parameter value is not equal to and greater than zero and values larger in 
magnitude shows more welfare mindedness of governments and vice versa. From the results it can 
be seen that for overall panel of developing countries this value of parameter is not very large 
showing that the trade policies of the governments of developing nations are less welfare oriented 
or welfare of society has not been weighted much in designing their trade policies. Following G-
H (1994) theoretical structure, it can be concluded that these governments are giving more weights 
to the special interests of political parties which try to have political contributions from different 
lobbies (industries) in the economy through pursuing their policy choices.  
2.12.1: Qualitative Analysis 
The results of study are supportive to the real world scenario both qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively. Qualitatively in a sense that for democratic nations, values of the parameter “a” are 
larger and significant both country wise and panel wise. While for autocratic nations these values 
are small in magnitude and mostly insignificant for many Middle East developing nations because 
there prevails monarchic autocratic rule in which powers are concentrated in few hands and these 
few try to promote their own special interests. Similarly political systems in different regimes are 
showing the same trends which the theories predicted actually. In many developing countries, 
parliamentary democracies seem to be more welfare oriented than presidential democracies.45 
Moreover this value gets even higher for rich democracies (Argentina, Malaysia and Thailand). It 
                                                          
 
45 Linz (1990). 
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means income level of a nation also matters a lot in taking steps by governments regarding some 
policy decision. It also shows that if nations have better living standards then there are chances 
that governments will try to opt that policy choice which at least maintain the welfare of their 
society. While the trend for both constitutional types of autocracy i.e. presidential and 
parliamentary are mix but mostly showing no effective contribution in raising welfare of the 
society. Overall for most autocratic nations, either the estimates are insignificant or very small. 
Only for rich autocratic nations the value of parameter shows upward trend. So in this way it can 
be concluded that more rich nations are more welfare minded than poor ones in their policy 
decisions. It also means that all these factors are complementary for each other in decision making 
and promoting welfarism in these governments. And for a nation to be democratic or autocratic is 
not only important rather the systems through which these regimes are being controlled like their 
constitutional setups are of more importance because these help in deciding the powers of leaders 
running the governments.  
2.12.2: Quantitative Analysis 
On the other hand, results are also in line with the present trends of openness or protection policies 
of nations. For example, nations having high tariff rates have lower extent of welfarism in their 
policies towards masses. Example of such nations are Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Ethiopia, 
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia while more open countries or countries with lower tariff 
rates like Singapore, Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine46 
are having high values of this parameter which means that if nations are moving towards free trade 
policies then it means these governments are becoming more welfare concerned. Moreover again 
an attempt has been made to observe the effect of lobby formation in an economy. This is being 
done through taking into consideration the role of vertical linkages by downstream producers in 
trade. Such vertical linkages actually help in intra firm trade and promote vertical integration. 
Theories of lobby formation (rent seeking) describes that in building such linkages sometimes 
governments are pressurized by few industries for getting protected from domestic competition 
and offer those policies which manipulate the interests of majority. It can be seen from the results 
that welfare estimates are showing mostly negative values when the role of downstream producers 
has been added into model. Resulting estimates show that such lobby formation affects badly the 
                                                          
46To gain more knowledge in terms of quantitative policy effects (Tariff policy), Trade Policy Reviews issued by 
WTO has been used.  
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designing process of policies. Moreover the effect of lobby formation is same in any case either 
democracy or autocracy, rich or poor and presidential or parliamentary system. Results are 
supporting the findings observed in a recent study for most of the nations.47 Not much examples 
by various authors are present in literature for this type of analysis therefore this study has tried to 
use this G-H (1994) model for purely developing nations and keeping in view many characteristics 
of this region for knowing whether these governments give more weights to aggregate welfare of 
the society or patronize the welfare or special interests of politicians. But story does not end here. 
This part is actually linked with the next section because in the next section further efforts have 
been made to observe empirically the role of various institutional parameters on this state of 
welfarism48 found here.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
47 Gawande et al. (2012). 
48 Estimates of Welfarism have been found both in case of rent seeking activities (lobbying) and without rent seeking 
activities (without lobbying) but in next section, the objective is purely related to the welfare concerns of these 
governments of developing nations i.e. how much these governments are welfare oriented in their policy decisions, 
therefore simply the estimates without lobby effect have been used in the next section for further estimation.  
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CHAPTER: THREE 
 
TRAJECTORY OF WELFARISM: 
POLTICAL INSTITUTIONS, GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
“The best policy in the world will never fly unless it has its poetry, and the poetry is 
created in the expression of the minister. And you feel poetic about the policies that 
really matter.” 
 
                                                                     (Hallsworth, Parker and Rutter, 2011, p. 85) 
 
This part of the research deals with the role of domestic institutional framework in policy making 
process of developing countries. Public policy making has been always a topic of interest for both 
economists and political scientists. Many attempts have been made in past to see how leaders reach 
up to a certain policy decision. Traditionally, it has always been considered that public policy 
making is a related to government only or a benevolent social planner.49 But it is not so rather it is 
explanandum through the interaction of different participants like voters, technocrats and lobbies 
in any political landscape. Moreover with the passage of time, it is being observed and emphasized 
that policy decisions contain inter temporal element i.e. these are not the result of overnight 
interaction among the political actors and these have their influence beyond the time these are 
concluded. Therefore policy scientists claim that public policy is the outcome of political 
influences and better is to describe public policy as a ‘process’ (Jenkins: 1978, Rose: 1976, 
Anderson: 1978, Hill: 1993). Recently Anderson (2014) has described this policy making process 
as a ‘policy cycle’ and has claimed that it is fully ‘political’ and involves ‘politics’. Because it is 
based on negotiation, bargaining, compromising among various interest groups, and exercising 
political powers by leaders.50 Author has penned down the characteristics of public policy and 
explained that it can be positive or negative. But taking its positive side, public policy is based on 
law and it should be authoritative51 in its nature. And political leaders and policy makers 
                                                          
49 Ardanaz et al. (2012). 
50 Osman (2002) also incorporated the similar idea in his study by including an extra role of state i.e. bringing 
adjustments in vested interests of various lobbies.  
51 He has considered authoritativeness as a necessary condition for policy making by governments but this particular 
characteristic is not the sufficient condition for effectiveness of public policy.  
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(bureaucrats) have the right to use coercion52 in legitimate way. However Anderson (2014) has 
provided a new direction to the policymakers in their decision making process by differentiating 
between two concepts i.e.  ‘Policy output’ from ‘policy outcome’ and proposed that if policy output 
is in accordance to the planning by government but it does not mean that policy outcome will also 
be in line with policy output. For example in case of trade, if policy is to reduce restrictiveness on 
trade through bringing down the tariff and non-tariff barriers, and if the government after a 
specified time achieve the desired rate then it is called ‘policy output’. But now the question 
appears what societal consequences this policy has been. If reducing trade taxes or opening up of 
trade has increased volume of trade leading to increase employment opportunities for citizens and 
enhancement of the welfare of society then it is called ‘policy outcome’. The present study is also 
an attempt to analyze those factors which actually affects the public regardedness53 in policy 
making.  Earlier it was believed that citizens can only approach politicians through two way; 
elections and lobbying.54 But with the passage of time it has been observed that in developing 
countries, policymaking is not only the interplay between political parties and interest groups 
rather ‘alternative political technologies’55 in the form of strikes, wars, turmoil, and protest 
activities on road are also part of these societies. And only week political institutions are held 
responsible for such disruptions in an economic system. Hence it can be said that in developing 
countries, policy outcomes are not only the result of de jure institutions rather it is the interaction 
of de facto institutions56 in the form of ‘alternative political technologies’. And this shows that so 
far the policy making is not institutionalized in these nations (Scartascini and Tommasi; 2012). 
Scartascini and Tommasi (2012) also proved that policy content is not anymore the guarantee for 
its better results rather it is quality of policies which depends on each polity’s institutional 
capabilities57; bureaucratic machinery; party structure; and judiciary which makes it possible for 
                                                          
52 Barro (1973) also made an attempt to incorporate the role of politicians in public choice model and proved that 
many times politicians make use of their powers beyond the capacity of constitutions.  
53 For more details on policy regardedness, Scartascini et al. (2008, 2009) and Ardanaz et al. (2010) is very helpful. 
54 Persson & Tabellini (2000). 
55 Scartascini et al. (2009) explained these alternative technologies in this way specifically; ‘bribes by the rich’ and 
‘protests by the poor’. For the first time he modeled this factor in political equilibrium analysis and found that these 
technologies have deeper impact on institutional capacities and policy outcomes of developing countries.  
56 The idea initially resented by Acemoglu &Robinson (2006).  
57Weaver & Rockman (1993) proposed that Institutional capabilities and credibility ensures consistency of policies in 
terms of similar results in the same policy area for all regions across the time. Such capabilities include prioritizing, 
targeting of resources, ensuring better implementation and stability of the system where the policy is going to be 
applied.  
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public policies to have more welfare element in them. For incorporating the roles of all these 
factors, many approaches have been used in past for policymaking like rational model (Simon, 
1955), incremental theory (Lindblom, 1959), elite model (Mills, 1999) etc. But presently 
economists and political scientists are relying on political systems approach (Easton, 1957) which 
is based on the view that policies are actually influenced by the nature of different polities. And 
these polities are composed of various institutions. These institutions shape up an environment for 
decision making and this environment ultimately helps in knowing the demands from ‘inputs’ like 
pressure groups to generate ‘outputs’ in the form of policies.58 It means institutions help nations 
in designing policies by bringing all players of a political system together.59 The present analysis 
is also an attempt in this regard that how policy decisions are affected in different polities i.e. 
democracy and autocracy. 
3.2: View of Institutionalism: From Past to Present 
A lot of literature exists on the interaction between institutions and economic activity. But still 
ambiguities remained there either on the issues regarding the right selection of the proxies for 
institutions or the mechanism how these institutions are working. Many authors have proposed the 
idea that institutions does not have direct impact on the performance of nations rather there are 
various other factors which act as intermediating sources for evaluating the true impact of on 
economic performance. Basically the roots of institutional economics goes back to Ronald Coase 
contribution in literature through these two books “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) and “The 
Problem of Social Costs” (Coase, 1960), then North for his collaborative works on “Institutional 
Change and American Economic Growth (1970)” and The Rise of the Western World (1973), and 
Williamson (1975) for his remarkable work on Markets and Hierarchies. Coase (1937) discussed 
the role of institutions in the perspective of transaction costs, North in the form of property rights 
while Williamson (1975) focused on the governance aspect of institutions in contract enforcement. 
                                                          
58 For more details Easton’s (1965) ‘political system model’ can be seen. He proposed this model for developing 
countries for policy making process. Recently Persson & Tebellini (2003) and Rodrik et al (2004) also showed that 
these are the political institutions which provide the basis for economic policy and economic development.  
59 But many authors have contradiction about the role of polities in policy making in present world. They believe that 
constitutional politics is not enough to provide the solution to new pressing problems of the world. Hajer (2003) 
explained this gap between existing and required political space in policymaking with the help of ‘institutional void’. 
This concept actually explains that no clear rules are available for in the established institutions for making new 
policies with changing situations of the world. Hajer has provided a way to come out of this institutional void with the 
help of classical-modernist political institutions and introducing new political spaces in set rules of political games. 
This institutional void helps the political actors to introduce deliberatively new rules of game in the established systems 
for handling arising issues.   
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Ménard and Shirley (2012) recently used a term “Golden Triangle” for these three dimensions and 
regarded them as the basis of NIE maintaining the centrality of Coase idea which was actually a 
departure from neo-classicals who believed that decisions and choices regarding the firms and 
markets are determined taking into account the technological aspect of production and not by 
transaction costs. But North (1970) actually developed the theory of institutions by focusing on 
American and European nations through institutional point of view and tried to find out the answer 
of this question that why some countries are rich and others are poor and regarded ‘institutional 
change’ as one of the main reason for all this. But still indecisiveness prevails about the reasons 
which compel nations to adopt specific institutions in specific time. Keeping in view such 
ambiguities North (1990) developed a new path of thinking discarding the neo-classical concept 
of rationality and diverting all attention towards roles of ideas and ideologies in the performance 
of an economy. Author claimed that change in institution occurs only through either political 
entrepreneurs or economic entrepreneurs which one will be having strong bargaining power to 
bring change in existing institutions of the society at margin. North (1990) used the word 
entrepreneur for political actors which shows the importance of political ideologies60 in an 
economic system and also found that nation’s poor or good performance is path dependent to 
‘institutions’ and ‘institutional reforms’. Recently new concept of ‘limited and open access 
orders61 has been introduced in the discipline of new political economy and new institutional 
economy which again focuses on the interaction between institutions and their long term effect on 
the growth of economies. According to this approach, modern and civilized European and 
American states are being considered as ‘open access order’ and treated as exceptions in the world 
while all other parts of the world is taken as ‘limited access order’ which is thought as a ‘natural 
state’. This approach also emphasized the role of legislative, executive, rules designed by 
constitutions and political parties are the main factors which influence actually the policy making 
in any nation. So it can be seen that in general North used the cognitive approach to discuss the 
income and performance differential among nations of the world. North (1990) defined 
‘institutions’ as the rules of the game which helps in designing organizations. And these 
organizations act as players in the society for the implementation of such rules. Organizations 
                                                          
60 Weiss (1977) also emphasized upon the role of ideologies and institutions in categorizing the factors which affect 
policy making process.  
61 North (2007). 
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include political parties, any regulatory agency on political grounds, firms and trade unions 
economic point of view, churches covering the social activities of people in a nation and schools, 
colleges and vocational training centers in case of educational institutions. Moreover institutions 
taking into account the economic theory constraints provide opportunities and organizations take 
steps to make the best use of these opportunities. By introducing an attractive and quite realistic 
concept of ‘institutional matrix’ which is composed of three main elements i.e. externalities, 
complementarities and economies of scope, North (1990) highlighted that performance of 
institutions is path dependent62 actually. Moreover learning process of entrepreneur has also been 
considered an important source of progress in an economy. Because new gained knowledge helps 
in modifying the mental models of actors of the society and then such entrepreneurs acting as 
interests groups assure to bring change in the institutional framework of an economy. North (1990) 
in his theory of institutions tried to realize World that sustainable economic development can be 
achieved if nations believe in adaptive efficiency instead of allocative efficiency.63 Like North, 
two more insitutionalists, Greif (1992) and Ostrom (1995) also emphasized on the role of informal 
institutions of the society based on its social norms and beliefs in making formal rules for the better 
economic performance of the nations.  
Rodrik, again one of the renowned institutional economists, has also tried to analyze the 
institutional supremacy in growth analysis and introduced the difference between two concepts: 
stimulating growth and sustaining growth. Rodrik (2003) considered institutions more important 
for the latter one than the former and concluded that growth together with ‘institutional 
transformation’ can be helpful in maintaining virtuous circle in an economy because these both 
factors feed on each other. And sustained economic convergence is not possible without the 
improvement in the quality of institutions. But recently Rodrik (2014) has emphasized more the 
role of ‘ideas’ of political leaders or ‘policy innovation’ in the political economy of decision 
                                                          
62 In explaining the performance of institutions, the concept of path dependency was being used by him due to the 
reason that history matters in institution building. David (1994) also used the term ‘carriers of history’ for institutions.  
63 North (1996) has related here adaptive efficiency with the willingness to get more knowledge and information.  
According to North, (1990), institutions provide incentives to both the political and economic actors. And using the 
institutional rules, the firms, trade unions, political parties, and regulatory authorities can attain adaptive efficiency 
even in the realm of positive transaction costs. He has used a specific terminology of political and economic 
entrepreneur for agents of institutional change and economies have been assumed as markets. Moreover the 
institutional change occurs as a results of  ‘lock in’, (a term introduced by Arther in case of decision making  process 
due to the path dependency view, and sometimes the societies choose sub-optimal policy instead many other better 
opportunities exists) and ‘feedback’ by human beings . On the basis of these two key factors the path of institutional 
change can be predicted. 
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making and explained the role of politics with the help of political ‘transformation curve’ and 
‘economic policy frontier’. This helped in knowing that how the political leader make choice of 
economic policy inside the political transformation curve by choosing ‘Pareto inefficient point’ 
(status quo point) on economic policy choice frontier. The politicians make this choice with the 
fear of losing political power and rents they enjoy from vested interests groups for making policies 
in their favor. Rodrik (2014) suggested a solution for the removal of this inefficiency with the idea 
of ‘compensation’ to the elites/political leaders in return of policy reforms. For example, opening 
up trade sector or reducing import duties is not a ‘Pareto-optimal’ policy choice for the political 
elites unless they are not compensated for this reduction of rents into their incomes. China’s dual 
track policy reforms are the clear cut example of such ‘idea-based approach’ of economic decision 
makers which means that a high pace of development is the result of a ‘policy mix idea’ of its 
leaders and policy makers. Thus if some policy reform like, imposition of tax, is going to harm the 
interest of some specific and influential interest group of the society, then relief can be provided 
to the same group as compensation on some other side.  But again this approach based on ‘ideology 
of political leader’ varies from society to society due to differences in cultures, social norms and 
values. All these characteristics are being given the name of ‘slow-moving institution’ by Ronald 
(2004) who made responsible these particularities for the gradual, continuous and above all 
evolutionary change in the system while the same strand of view has been expressed by Easterly 
(2008) but in a different manner introducing the two extremes of views which cause actually the 
institutional change. Presenting an agenda for the reforms to be followed by LDCs, Easterly (2008) 
suggested that institutional change should follow bottom-up strategy not top-down.64 Bottom-up 
approach actually leads to gradualism and is based on experimentation while top-down strategy is 
revolutionary in its nature which can have sometimes negative effects on societies due to abrupt 
change in the working of already existing institutions. Present world has experienced the result of 
both of these type of institutional changes in the form of transition from communism to capitalism 
for Russia and China. Reforms collapsed in the former nation due to top-down strategy (shock 
therapy) and remained successful for later due to bottom-up strategy (being gradualists). Moreover 
                                                          
64 Bottom-up institutions are considered to be spontaneous in nature as a result of norms, culture and values of nation 
and top-down strategy are instantaneous in nature by the orders of political leaders. So this change can be brought 
overnight as in case of fast-moving institutions but the institutional change through bottom-up strategy is time taking 
but the repeated experiments help the experts to reach to the best solutions. These both strategies are very informative 
for economists in devising right policy prescription.  
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in the former case, institutional setup had been monopolized system (also known as U-form) in 
which rules are designed by top managers and are based on incomplete information. While in the 
later case, the organizational setup is like competitive in nature (M-form) which is a moderate mix 
of centralized and decentralized system and relies on experimentation mostly. It is more flexible 
system of building organizations and helps in innovations without disrupting the working of whole 
system. Qian et al. (2000) highlighted the importance of such organizations for economies in 
transition and  related these U-form organizations as unitary governments (like Japan, Russia) and 
M-form organizations with Federal states (like US, having the status of ‘Laboratory of states’ in 
which all state are involved in experimentation according to its geographical attributes and found 
the better policy outcome).  Keeping in view the importance of all these aspects, this study has 
tried to make an empirical link of all these institutional parameters with the government objective 
of welfare maximization of society through trade policy especially for developing countries. 
3.3: Theoretical Framework 
From the past literature the importance of institutions and role of political environment on growth 
of the economies has been observed very clearly in above section. Large number of research work 
has been conducted by taking different forms of institutions (formal, informal, legal, economic 
and social) and political dimensions (whether autocratic or democratic in its system) of the states. 
Now a days, economies are not focusing on pure economic variables for the increase in their 
performance rather much attention has been diverted towards the governance related issues for the 
success of any policy designed for the welfare of the society. For example if rule of law is not 
prevalent in society, if courts are not impartial, if elites and politicians or up highs are not 
accountable for their deeds then the situation of any society will be more worse than a nation facing 
economic issues like poverty, income inequality, unemployment, inflation etc. The reason for 
being worst due to absence of proper institutional framework is that polities are run by formal rules 
and institutions and according to Williamson (1998) formal institutions are actually the outcome 
of informal rules of any society because these informal rules are the reflection of mindsets of the 
citizens.65 Or in other words it can be said that formal rules depend upon the mental models of the 
common individuals in any society.66 And formal institutions can perform well and can be helpful 
                                                          
65 Recently Davis & Trebilcock (2008) have put emphasis on the interaction of these two types of institutions 
simultaneously without making any distinction between them.  
66 North (1990). 
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if those informal rules are creating a sense of responsibility in the citizens of the society. That’s 
why Williamson presented a four stage model incorporating the role of governance and showing 
how institutions develop and how institutional change can be brought in any society and set 
foundation of new institutional economics. According to this view, change in formal institutions 
can be brought within a time span of ten to hundred years but it takes hundred and even more than 
hundred years to bring the change in informal institutions, norms, culture and traditions. Therefore 
it can be said that social behaviors actually help in developing institutions. Williamson (1998) 
economized the whole institutional setup into four stages given as below. 
Informal Institutions                Formal institutional  Development of  
 (embededdness)                     environment   Governance structures  
Continuous  
                        marginal change67 
If formal institutions are designed in such a way that these are in contradiction with informal rules 
of the society then there will be persistent political instability in the economy. Monocropping of 
institutions from other societies to get the high rate of economic performance is not the right 
solution for solving the issues in any society or economy. In public choice models, state has been 
assigned a leviathan68 role which is quite redistributive in its nature. But in reality state has to act 
as a manager of many other affairs to bring the prosperity for its citizens. Krueger (1974) has 
emphasized upon those types of institutions which limitize the role of state providing this reason 
that in such a way unproductive expenses by political actors can be avoided to influence the 
political equilibrium. Baumol (1990) supported this view by describing those institutions more 
efficient for a state which provide more incentives to its entrepreneur for productive activities than 
unproductive. Rodrik (2000) has also pointed out that those institutions which help in mitigating 
conflicts, assuring social cohesion and stability of the system because these are actually the sources 
of successful working of market economy. Such institutions play the role of ‘participatory 
politics’69 in political economy context of policies. According to this view such ‘participatory 
democracies’ also given the name ‘meta-institution’ are really helpful in tailoring the formal 
                                                          
67 Williamson (2000). 
68 North (1990). 
69 Davis (2009). 
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institutions according to the local environment.70 Hence all this discussion shows the importance 
of political institutions in designing the better environment for economic activities.  This study has 
tried to incorporate the role of all these institutional factors in the decision making process of 
governments. Here decision making is regarding trade policy of a nation. Much work can be seen 
either on the role of trade policy and economic performance or role of institutions on economic 
outcomes.71 Few scholars72 have incorporated different policies into pure public choice models for 
evaluating the electoral process and politicians preferences. But this study attempts to make a new 
blend of all these views presented in theories of institutionalism to analyze the effect of various de 
facto and de jure institutional factors on the decision making process of the governments in 
developing nations. G-H (1994) model of ‘protection for sale’ has been used to observe how much 
government puts weight on the welfare of the society when designing a trade policy. The question 
arises ‘Why Trade policy?’. The idea was actually based on the view given by an institutionalist 
North (1990), who proposed that only those nations will converge towards equilibrium in future 
which will engage in trade. Hence divergence among nations performance would gradually 
converge due to their involvement in trade in goods and services.   
Following North’s (1990) view of the role of polities in economic policy making, Williamson’s 
(1985) view of Governance and Rodrik’s (2000) idea about institutional supremacy in long run 
growth of the economy, the theoretical framework has been designed for this study. Here the 
institutional matrix takes the shape of these three factors: Governance, political system73, and 
constitutional distribution of powers showing political party orientation. The complementarities of 
these three factors actually affect the policy outcomes of politicians. The Schematic diagram of 
the theoretical framework is given as below: 
                                                          
70 Rodrik believes in ‘adaptability’ aspect for institutional change and development. Moreover he is of the opinion 
that if some institution is not performing its role for fulfilling any economic objective even then these are not wasteful 
and these must serve as a complementary institution to other institutions for achieving their goals. For example, 
insurance system due to its impact on social coherence may not be well efficient but it can be complement to those 
institutions in a society which provide the assurance of protection of property rights.  
71 Mamoon and Murshed (2006), Yanikkaya (2002), Tang (2012), Dollar & kraay (2002), Wacziarg & Welch (2008), 
Spanu (2003), Winters (2004), Chen & Gupta (2006).  
72 Hicks and Swank (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
73 Political system not only includes the democracy or non-democracy, rather it includes characteristics of executive, 
bureaucracy, repression of state, legitimacy and efficiency of political system.  
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Fig. 2: Trajectory of Welfarism  
Author’s own compiled view 
3.4: Theoretical Links of Various Aspects of Institutionalism in Policy Making 
After reviewing the theoretical foundation of this analysis, now this section attempts to relate 
different aspects of an institutional framework one by one with decision making process especially 
with reference to trade policy.  
 Governance and Welfarism 
 Bureaucracy and Welfarism 
 Political Regimes and Welfarism 
 Political Competitiveness and Welfarism 
 Political Constraints and Welfarism 
 Checks & Stability and Welfarism 
 State Fragility and Welfarism 
 Political Party’s Orientation and Welfarism 
 Parliamentary and Presidential system and Welfarism 
3.4.1: Governance and Welfarism 
Governance is one of the most important aspects related to public administration and analysis of 
public policy. It is also related to more political legitimacy and political autonomy of the leader in 
any political system. In short governance explains quality of the government. Sen (2009) presented 
theory of justice (capability approach towards the provision of basic resources to all citizens for 
ensuring economic development) in the context of ‘policy guidance’ and emphasized that political 
players should try to focus on inclusive institution building and try to abduct extractive institutions 
(Acemoglu et al., 2012) so that powers are distributed evenly in the society. Such institutions may 
help in policy innovations by providing an equal opportunity to all citizens through their 
welfarism in 
trade policy
Political 
institutions
Governance 
Costitutional 
powers (Party 
institutionalism)
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participation in decision making process using their skills and knowledge. This will lead to fully 
decentralized political system and information asymmetry will be reduced to large extent.74 
Recently Sen (2014) attempted to relate governance with economic development in broader 
context for Asian economies. Earlier economists have made efforts to see how much income levels 
are being affected by governance conditions in economies by taking into account various aspects 
of governance like administrative capacity, legal infrastructure and state accountability. The 
mechanism through which governance affects development has been defined in the light of 
efficient utilization of domestic resources which helps in attracting the investors to play their role 
in well governed nations. Moreover the author has conceptualized the relationship between these 
two concepts in a way that better governance improves incomes, tax revenues and social welfare 
spending which ultimately results in development. Kurtz and Shrank (2006), Batley et.al. (2012), 
Norris (2012) and Anheier et al. (2013) also related governance failure responsible for 
misallocation of resources and under-provision of public goods to the society. Different 
perceptions exist in defining governance like interactive governance, participatory governance and 
democratic governance but now recent view has been diverted governance towards impartiality75 
of civil servants in policy making. This means that if in any society, exercise of power is ‘just’ 
then governance level will be improved and exercise of power is related to de jure institutions. If 
these are well defined rules then chances of corruption can be minimized. Fukuyama (2013) also 
took the opportunity of conceptualizing governance with a new point of view that governance is 
all about the enforcement of laws and delivering of services ignoring the exogenous factors like 
whether a nation is democratic or autocratic. In other words governance is related to ‘execution’ 
in public administration not in politics which helps ‘agents’ in the fulfillment of the desires of 
‘principals’. According to this view governance is a part of any nation’s bureaucracy i.e. capacity 
                                                          
74 The idea of K-form (Knowledge form) organizations is parallel to inclusive institutions. In organizational theory, 
various forms of organizations exist in making decisions regarding production and distribution. All have their own 
principles for decision making e.g. In past Unitary form (U-form) and Multidivisional form (M-form) organizations 
in past have been of very much importance not only in case of an organization but for an economy too. But with the 
passage of time, theorists focused on knowledge based organizations and proved theoretically that such organizations 
are having more adaptability and effectiveness in their decisions because of the reason that these use the available 
information in market for creating more knowledge (ideas) and then converting that knowledge in to innovations (new 
policy choices). Therefore it can be said that these organizations are almost leaderless which means no strict 
centralized rule and authority is being divided among all specialized units.  Such organizations may help in bringing 
bottom-up reforms in societies. But the more important point to be focused here is to keep balance among three 
building blocks of any system i.e. to balance control, co-operation and autonomy among the participants of such type 
of organizations.  
75 Rothstein (2011). 
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and autonomy (opposite of subordination) of its bureaucratic sphere. And both are complementary 
to each other in deciding the quality of the government because it is believed that more autonomous 
a bureaucracy is, better the quality of government would be. And if the capacity of nation is lower 
than autonomy of bureaucracy is below the optimal level and it leads to poor governance structure. 
Kaufman (2005) also highlighted the importance of governance by concluding that governance is 
not the consequence of growth rather it is more a cause for growth which means that efficient 
administrative system is more conducive to the development of nations. Therefore keeping this 
view, this study has also tried to relate the effect of this important factor on trade policy making. 
Because trade policy is such an instrument in the hands of policymakers through which 
manipulation of the common people can be done so easily. But if proper governance will be there 
in system then it can be avoided.  
3.4.2: Bureaucracy and Welfarism 
Bureaucracy is considered as one of the most important pillars of any political system for the better 
economic performance. It is basically related to civil administration of the political system and 
influenced by political actors, legal system of governments and above all by interest groups.76 
Weber’s contribution in this regard is appreciable as he made first theoretical link between 
performance of economies and better bureaucratic infrastructure.77 Political scientists believe that 
viable policies are actually the outcome of better relationship between political leaders and 
bureaucracy because of the reason that bureaucratic actors usually work for those objectives which 
translate the ideology of politicians.78 Week and unorganized bureaucracies in nations are usually 
involved in ‘rent seeking’ to fulfill the goals of political leaders through making unofficial 
payments. It has been observed that many times bureaucracies are a part of predation or patronage. 
Partisan appointments79 are one of the tools by politicians in office to avoid bureaucratic rent-
seeking activities to harm their governments. And in such a way sometimes this bureaucratic class 
makes corruption with political leaders to get collective benefits in a political system by acting as 
                                                          
76 Goodin (2011).  
77 Keefer & Knack (1995) and Rauch and Evans (1999). 
78 McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast (1987, 1989). But sometimes it has also been observed that delegation of more 
powers to bureaucrats create discrepancy between the goals of politicians and bureaucracies. A bureaucrat becomes 
more discretionary in his decisions and can use his expertise against politicians for the fulfillment of their own special 
interests leading to those policy choices which will not be in line with politician’s agenda. This will be the point of 
conflict and will result in policy uncertainty.  
79 Williams et al.  (2009).  
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agents of political leaders (principals). Then these officers try to use their discretionary powers to 
extract rents.  This process can be explained with the help of iron triangle, a concept presented by 
political scientists. It describes the mutual relationship among these three pillars of any political 
system. This triangle is considered to be very strong in case of collective action problems because 
each of its sides supports the other one in such a way that outsiders (new entrants in political arena) 
cannot harm their interests. Bureaucrats are provided patronage in the form of high salaried 
positions by political leaders to get their support for their narrow self-interests against general 
interest of the whole society. And lobbies provide information and campaign contributions to the 
politicians for shaping policies according to their interests. Thus in this way it becomes difficult 
to break this vicious cycle of political patronage. In developing countries the interconnection of 
these three forces sometimes acts as ‘binding constraints’ in their growth process. 
The noxious impact of these interests’ group activities can be seen from the figure given below.  
                                                        
                                              Electoral support Political supports 
 
 
                                                    
        Special favors 
                                                     Fig.3:  Iron Triangle 
This figure helps in understanding how policy outcomes are obtained with the help of these three 
important pillars. In past, it has been observed that in US, the policies were designed by these three 
sections of the system.80 But according to regulatory models by Chicago School of thoughts81 and 
rent seeking model of Public choice, lobbyists’ activities in this triangle overshadow the role of 
legislature in making policies and try to extract benefits from such policy offers which strengthen 
their position in the policy arena.82 However this cycle can be regarded as virtuous depending upon 
the nature of bureaucracy. If meritocracy has been given appropriate weight in the selection of 
these civil servants then they can divert the attention of political servants towards the general 
                                                          
80 Freeman (1955), Bauer et al. (1963), Ripley & Franklin (1976). 
81 The contributions of these authors can be seen in this regard; Stigler (1971), Posner (1975), Peltzman (1976) & 
Becker (1985). 
82 Cox & McCubbins (1997). 
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interests of public and can keep them refrained from ill practices via policymaking. So it means 
that if a bureaucratic structure is independent from political influence then better will be policy 
design and outcome. In other words broader interests instead of narrower will be catered by such 
policy outcomes. The same vision has been penned down by Edigheji (2007) and Fukuyama (2013) 
where they related the better governance with ‘bureaucratic autonomy’. Incorporating the idea 
given by Evans (1995) in ‘embedded autonomy’, Fukuyama (2013) also showed that there exists 
an inverted U-type relationship between autonomy of bureaucracy and better quality of 
government. It means both extremes of bureaucracy (one is fully rule-bound i.e. subordination, 
and has no discretionary powers and the other extreme is related to full discretion of power and 
autonomy) are bad for better administration of a political system. As this study is based on the 
sample of developing nations and such nations actually lacks meritocracy in its bureaucratic 
structure, therefore it has been tried to analyze the role of this factor in influencing the government 
policy regardedness in case of trade sector.  
3.4.3: Political Regimes and Welfarism:                          
Role of political regimes in economic growth has always a topic of quite interest for researchers 
since last two decades. These are actually the political systems which shape up the institutional 
frameworks in nations and then these institutions help or retard economic progress. Some 
economists have this view that democracy as being institutionally more ‘thick system’ leads to 
more economic development while on the other side dictatorship being institutionally ‘thin system’ 
retards the economic progress. But reality differs from theories and can be witnessed in case of 
East Asian Miracle in which almost all nations were centrally controlled. Similarly in present times 
again China is one of the most important example that is having communist political system, the 
pace of economic progress is so fast that many democratic nations are lagging behind.83 One of 
the reasons of these rapid growth nations is this that in authoritarian regimes exchange rate is kept 
undervalued by leaders. And this policy of exchange rate helps to increase exports and high income 
                                                          
83 On the basis of this drastic progress of China, Halper (2010) suggested that there can be a possibility that World has 
to face a paradigm shift from ‘Washington Consensus’ towards ‘Beijing Consensus’ which promotes interventionists 
view rather than lassiez faire or openness.  McKinnon (2010) also presented his idea that China is providing ‘aid’ to 
developing countries through providing trade opportunities to them in large manufacturing sectors specially railways. 
China has involved many African nations with herself in trade and is becoming an agent of freer trade in modern 
world through obtaining MES (market economy status) from nations at the expense of aid- investment in developing 
nation’s primary product sector. 
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growth84 (Steinberg & Malhotra, 2014). Similarly Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Chile’s 
authoritarian governments have also shown radical upward shifts in their economic growths. All 
these success stories diverted the attention of world organizations to relate high growth rates not 
with autocracy rather with ‘Benevolent autocrat’85 (Easterly, 2011). Olson (1993) related the 
success of a dictator to the degree of certainty of its rule but concluded that such governments are 
less welfare oriented in their policies. For example if an autocratic leader is ‘stationary bandit’ and 
is sure about his long tenure for leadership then his performance will outweigh the performance of 
a democratic leader but if he is ‘a roving bandit’ which means uncertainty exists in changing the 
leadership then autocracy will have negative impact on growth (Olson, 2000). Batley et al. (2012) 
also developed a link between prosperity of nations and trade because specialization and trade are 
actually taken as incentives provided to the political elites of both systems that help them to provide 
public services to the citizens of their nations. Moreover it has been observed in theoretical and 
empirical models that autocracies do not provide the opportunity to solve their collective action 
problems with the help of political competition and electoral participation but democracies provide 
such an opportunity to cater the interests of their poor majority class. Recently Sylwester and 
Assiotis (2014) found that democracies have shown increased growth rates in Sub-Saharan Africa 
both in short run and long run but not in Europe and concluded that democracy can be a tool of 
success for lower income nations but not for rich nations. Masaki and van de Walle (2014) also 
proved ‘democratic advantage hypothesis’ for those Sub Saharan African nations in which 
democracies had been observed since long time or in other words more mature and old 
democracies result more economic growth but these authors also found that regime effect is related 
to time factor. Cox & McCubbins (1997) proved that democracies can only provide public 
regarding policies only if these are more decisive and responsive to the general interests of people. 
                                                          
84 Steinberg & Malhotra (2014) found that both civilian and military autocrats keep their exchange rates undervalued 
but a democratic leader maintains overvalued exchange rates. Moreover they also observed that monarchic (like 
Middle East nations) and civilian autocrat pursue more undervalued exchange rate than military and democratic regime 
hence proved the hypothesis that the degree of undervaluation depends on the security of tenure. And it has been found 
that civilian dictator (single-party regimes, like China) is having more secure tenure as compared to military dictator.  
85Singapore can be seen as an example of such a benevolent and visionary leader. But another point of view is also 
here which talks about ‘malevolent autocrat’. This perspective is from the side of political economy aid. It has been 
observed that mostly aid receiving nations are autocratic. If an autocrat is really ‘benevolent’ these aid agencies don’t 
consider system approach in the distribution of aid towards autocracy. Supporters of aid think that such leaders are 
more caring for their needy people and therefore can administer such aid flows in appropriate way. While the critics 
of aid take the role of autocrats as ‘malevolent’ and hold these leaders responsible for the poverty of their citizens. So 
in this way it can be concluded that still indecisiveness among political scientists and economists prevails over whether 
autocracy is good or democracy.  
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Lack of these two characteristics leads to inefficient policy outcomes. On the other hand 
authoritarian regimes are considered to have positive effect on growth rates because of the 
persistent nature of the policies and extraction of rents from citizens in the form of taxes helps 
those autocrats to provide basic public services.86 Further it has been observed that all rich nations 
are democratic but all these nations have their historical background that was authoritarian natured 
in past. Gerring et al. (2005) also proved that democracy can be enjoyed only by rich nations 
regarding democracy as a ‘luxury’.87 Poor nations cannot reap its benefits. And this is the reason 
mostly poor nations in the world are autocratic in nature not democratic.  Moreover Calderón and 
Chong (2006) related rent seeking with nature of political regimes and found that rent seeking is 
less in democratic nations as compared to non-democratic ones. Rodrik (2000) called autocracy a 
‘risky gamble’ in case of economic growth if it is related to autocratic leader‘s personality quality 
and proved that variance within growth rates under autocracy is more than a democracy. And this 
variation is related to the difference in the personal inclinations (leadership effect) of autocratic 
leaders. World Bank (2012) has also made an effort to relate ‘growth miracles’ of 30 developing 
nations to ‘leadership accounting’ in present times for achieving continuous growth rate of 6 
percent per annum. But recently it has been found that government bureaucracy and many other 
power centres can even affect the decision autonomy of an autocrat through veto those verdicts of 
leaders which are not favouring their interests (Easterly & Pennings, 2014). Contrary to this Freund 
and Jaud (2013) gave another perspective by highlighting the propensity of change in political 
regimes also matters in decisive policymaking and it’s not the democracy which affects income 
levels rather it’s the transitional period of change towards democracy which brings change in 
economic growth of nations. Moreover the gradual change in regimes affects negatively but 
insignificantly the pace of economic development because investors need stable environment for 
making investment. As almost all developing nations have been in transition period of democracy. 
Some faced failures of these transitions and some observed successful relative to democracy. 
Overall their study proved that transition brings positive change but if this is either fully successful 
or fully failure. Temporary or gradual brings negative effect due to their adverse impact on policy 
making. As developing countries face such regime shifts very frequently and mostly have 
                                                          
86 Chong & Zanforlin (2004).  
87 Heid et.at. (2012) also found the results using dataset of 150 nations having higher incomes have more chances to 
be more democratic. 
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autocratic ruling system, therefore the effect of these variables have been tried to see in policy 
making and welfare concerns of these  government. 
3.4.4: Political Competitiveness and Welfarism 
Beginning with Downs (1957) then Becker (1958) and now recently Olson (2000) being the public 
choice theorists have emphasized the role of political competition in the formation of governments 
and their policy making process. This is now well recognized fact that in economics, competition 
in market structure helps consumers in maximizing their welfare and monopoly moves around the 
phenomenon of ‘access of power’ and inefficient ‘exercise of power’ by controlling prices. 
Therefore it is assumed monopoly creates opportunities for rents in a society which leads to 
underutilization of resources or welfare deterioration. Similar concept of competition prevails in 
political arena as well i.e. whether political actors trying to maximize the interests of voters or 
interests of special interests groups for re-election. Political competitiveness means the extent to 
which a political dome of a country has the ability to absorb different alternative choices for policy 
formation and leadership roles. It is believed that political competition helps in minimizing 
political rents, designing more policy options for voters, providing better solution for collective 
action problems and leading towards more accountability of system. Moreover such competition 
diverts the attention of political leaders towards those policies which takes into account overall 
public interest not personal motive and in this way political competition proves to be a welfare 
enhancing tool of political setup.88  
Now the question arises about the mechanism how this political competitiveness affects the ability 
of governments in policy making. It is believed that if in a polity, the leader has to face more 
political competition then he will not be able to cater the interest of narrow group for its stay in 
system and this competition will keep him away from the extraction of rents for self-interest and 
devised agenda in the form of policy will be more towards the social welfare. While in the opposite 
case or in a non-competitive system, more rents will be diverted towards special interest groups 
which will help those leaders in their re-election. In such case policies will be serving the interests 
of those privileged groups and ruler will try to maximize her own rents. Extent of political 
competition provides players in an economy the chances to be involved in productive or non-
productive activities. Non-productive activities in political economy context are mostly related to 
rent-seeking activities i.e. protection demanded by home producer through tariffs, controls on 
                                                          
88 Stigler (1972), Barro (1973), Becker (1983), Wittman (1995) and Persson et al. (1997). 
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capital mobility, and many other types of unproductive activities of the government for securing 
personal interests. Following the classical approach of Median Voter presented by Black (1948), 
if a ruler is working in more competitive environment then ‘pivotal citizens’89 will be given more 
consideration in the designing of governmental policies and benefits will be directed towards their 
welfare and less spending of money by rulers on preferential groups during decision making 
process. In this way such favored groups will be having lesser opportunities to form lobbies for 
getting more favors from governments and will try to involve in those activities which will be 
productive for society. Practical example of political competition is mostly electoral participation 
of different political parties for the competition to win support of citizens through elections.90 
Elections actually help in lowering the barriers to entry for potential candidates in political process 
and also allow citizens to show their mandate for those leaders who promote their welfare and 
sometimes appear as a candidate by themselves if they feel that elected candidates are not doing 
satisfactory level job for the betterment of citizens. In this way, it can be said that the franchise 
size in a democracy or the size of administrative body which helps in choosing leader in non-
democracy are the most vital elements in any political system because these help in knowing who 
is the representative citizen/median voter. 
Pinto and Timmons (2003) found that more competitive regimes are more efficient in resource 
allocation explained through various theoretical reasons. Moreover political cycles which are the 
main property of democracies are actually the result of political competition in any polity. It has 
been observed that in more competitive environment, productivity of output increases through the 
introduction of new ideas in the market by the politicians in the form of policies. Hence it can be 
concluded that political competition promotes innovation in economic market.91 Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) have related to economic backwardness in the political perspectives and talked 
about ‘political replacement effect’ as one of the major hindrances in bringing effective economic 
and institutional change. Because political elites believe that innovations and technological uplift 
of nations can increase the likelihood that they will lose their political powers. All this helped in 
concluding that it is only the political competition which can stop this step of blocking the 
                                                          
89 In Median voter theory (MVT) of public choice model, pivotal voter or citizen is the representative of the society 
and the policy makers have to offer such policies to the ruler which fulfills their interests.  
90 Schumpeter (1941) also asserted that the competitive elections actually help to designate the power of decision 
making to those individuals which have been chosen by the voters. So Schumpeter related democracy as the outcome 
of political competition arising in the form of free and fair elections.  
91 Wittman (1989) also supported this idea.  
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development process by political actors. Damania and Yalcin (2008) have recently found the 
consequences of the absence of political competition in the society in the form of rent seeking 
opportunities and inefficient use of public resources. Besley et al. (2010) and Ghosh (2010) also 
proved that political competition forces politicians to offer growth-enhancing strategies for 
development instead of vested interest policies because if political competition prevails in society 
then chances for an inappropriate political player to get re-elected reduce92 paving way for the 
welfare society. Similarly Dash and Mukherjee (2013) related political competition and human 
development in Indian states and concluded that the high rate of political participation is associated 
with improvement in HDI score. However there exists another stream of thoughts which believes 
that role of political competition is not advantageous in promoting welfare of the majority by 
politicians93 because sometimes ‘intensity of political competition’ has been seen as a source of 
inefficiency of leaders to provide better policies for citizens. This may lead politicians towards 
pork-barrel policies94 which means they involve themselves in satisfying the interests of minority 
at the expense of majority.95 From all this discussion it can be summarized that political 
competition actually helps the rulers to be involved in more productive natured intervention like 
consumer protection in the market as compared to non-productive intervention such as rent seeking 
in the form of tariff protection. Moreover it is only the political competition which can provide 
incentives to the politicians for the solution of their collective action problems.  
3.4.5: Political Constraints and Welfarism 
Political constraint means here how much a political leader is having discretionary power in 
introducing new or switching over to old policies? Or in other words it is related to feasibility of 
policy change by the ruler of a nation. This dimension of political structure actually helps in 
knowing the credibility of any political system. If a political leader has more discretion or less 
constrained then theory suggests that investors will be having more uncertainty in their minds and 
they will hesitate to invest in such nations.96 Dornbusch (1991), Murphy et al (1991) and Rodrik 
                                                          
92 Bardhan & Yang (2004). 
93 Pinto &Timmons (2005), Cleary (2007), and Moreno-Jaimes (2007). 
94 It is a term usually used in politics for making expenditure with the intention to benefit various constituents of a 
political party for their political support, either through political  campaign contributions or votes. 
95 Acemoglu et al. (2005), and Lizzeri & Persico (2005). 
96 North (1990), Weingast (1993), Borner.et.al. (1995), Olson(1993) and Henisz (2000) for analyzed the role of socio-
economic factors not only in the historical perspective in nation building but also from the point of view of economic 
development. All of them proved a sound relationship between long term growth in an economy and the government’s 
ability to commit for some policy and not to interfere in rules regarding property rights. 
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(1993) focused in their research works on the issue of this creditability of reforms in an economy 
and found that non-credibility of any policy retards stabilization programs, hits saving and 
investment structure in an economy, deregulate the process of trade reforms, promote black 
economy and capital outflow. Moreover it is believed that if a ruler is having more discretion in 
policy making then such policies will be more particularistic in nature. National interest will not 
be given more importance in such circumstances. In practice, democratic leaders have observed 
more constrained (less discretionary power to resolve some policy) as compared to a dictator. 
Recently Hensiz (2000) has contributed into the literature of role of political institutions on 
economic growth by developing a more objective measure of political constraint after taking into 
consideration the structural differences of all polities into consideration, like executive, lower 
legislature, upper legislature, sub-federal system, and judiciary set up. More importantly this 
measure is based on de facto veto power of political actors. More veto powers in a political setup, 
more constrained a ruler will be. Furthermore it is based on the assumption that complete 
information about the executive’s preferences is available and all these preferences are evenly 
distributed. When the ruler will be having complete political discretion in policy switching then it 
will be a clear sign of polarization in political system. And in opposite case when the leader is 
maximum politically constrained then political environment will be more stable. The descriptive 
data analysis of this variable shows that the variable has its values are less than but closer to 1 for 
developing countries. This is due to the present wave of democracy which is forcing developing 
nations to turn their political systems into democratic ones which are more constrained in nature 
as compared to autocratic systems.    
3.4.6: Checks & Stability and Welfarism 
Keefer and Knack (2007) related the role of political check and balance for the credibility of 
government policies. It has been observed in past research that policy failures can be due to either 
collective action problem like overgrazing, or under providing, weak institutions or political 
market imperfections. And all these characteristics can be easily found in case of developing 
countries. It is believed that if there is check and balance on the leaders then policy failures can be 
avoided up to a certain extent. As this study is relating decision making process with different 
political systems and their constitutional set ups, whether parliamentary system is more conducive 
for economic development or presidential, autocratic leader is more accountable than a democratic 
one, answers of all these questions is going to decide the validity of the planned policy. It has been 
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observed that parliamentary type of government are more stable because it has lesser number of 
veto players so distortion in decision making process is less as compared to presidential system 
where powers are divided among various political actors and this can affect the solidarity of the 
executive of the nation. 
3.4.7: State Fragility and Welfarism  
State fragility is related to the weak potential of the a nation in policy making, managing state 
conflicts, extent of resilient power of political system, providing better quality of life, ability to 
handle crises and maintain the development rate in the society. This is also one of the most 
important measures in institutional analysis and is actually an outcome based measure. Fragility 
actually helps in deciding about whether the political processes and institutions of economies able 
enough to be accorded as sovereign state. It is perceived that each nation is to some extent fragile. 
Fragility can be the result of poverty, political conflicts, political unrest and lack of governance 
and all this leads to underdevelopment of the society. It has been observed recently that a surprising 
change has occurred in world i.e. a decade ago almost all fragile states were low income nations 
but now the new picture is quite different. Almost half of the fragile nations belong to middle 
income status.97 Factionalism and polarization are two important characteristics of fragile states. 
Kaplan (2008, 2012) has done impressive work in this regard and concluded that fragility is a 
phenomenon mostly observed in the societies which are fragmented i.e. a society with gaps 
between different segments of society horizontally and between the state vertically. Similarly, 
Carment et al. (2009) described the state fragility as a phenomenon which shows the difference 
between the actual practices and potentials of the nations from a desired image. This term is used 
to observe the degree not the kind of all these failures in nations. Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012) 
proved that role of institutions is very important in deciding about the fragility of the state of Sub 
Saharan African nations and explored that the nations facing lower levels of civil liberty index and 
more numbers of revolution are considered to be more fragile. According to the recent report by 
OECD nations, there are eight important factors which affect the fragility level in a state. 
International barriers to exports are also one of those factors.98 To remove the fragility from a state, 
                                                          
97 World Bank-African Development Bank-Asian Development Bank harmonized list of fragile and post-conflict 
countries for the year 2012. 
98 OECD (2012b), Think Global, Act Local: Confronting Global Factors that Influence Conflict and Fragility. 
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such states have to develop such an institutional frame work which promotes political competition 
because this will ensure accountability in the system for the ruling class which serves such nations.  
So far different authors have tried to analyze the determinants of fragility in various nations. As 
the state fragility has been used in different contexts in different studies, some have used in the 
sense of ‘under governed’ society while others used this measure to show the level of 
‘underdevelopment of societal systems’. It means high value of fragility index shows lower level 
of resilience of state. The measure used in this study for measuring fragility of the state includes 
four dimension i.e. Economic, Political, Security and social well-being using the matrix of two 
kinds: 1) efficiency 2) legitimacy. This has been developed by Marshall and Cole and ranges from 
0 (no fragility) to 25 (high Fragility).99 Efficiency scores shows improvement in all spheres but 
more improvement is in political efficiency which is related to democratization process in these 
nations. While legitimacy scores in these nations are showing a mix trend. Legitimacy means the 
extent to which the political governments are loyal to their governing regime in case of legislation 
and policymaking. Here again scores are showing dramatic improvement in case of political 
legitimacy but scores for economic legitimacy are in deteriorating position which means that such 
nations are unable to convert their investments from primary level production towards 
manufacturing sector. Social legitimacy for all nations is also improving and this has been 
calculated through improvement in human development index. Whereas security legitimacy 
measured through state repression, is showing modest improvement. It means violation of human 
rights is still a part of these developing nations.  
3.4.8: Political Party’s Orientation and Welfarism 
Party institutionalization is an important for political leaders to initiate policy reforms. Political 
parties are considered as a conduit between government and its citizens and have their origin from 
past four decades. These are considered as ‘principal campaign organizations’100 in the formation 
of a sound political system. In Downs theory of democracy (1957), for the first time the role of the 
parties, candidates and voters was highlighted. The theory defined the political parties as the team 
of politicians where politicians make efforts to win office and political parties aim at achieving the 
control of the government. Their role is not limited to be a part of electoral process for the quest 
of government office, rather these are supposed to channelize demand from voters, represent the 
                                                          
99 Detailed description of the variable is given in appendix.  
100 Goldman (n.d). 
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preferences of citizens, collect opinion of commons/majority on several political issues. Ware 
(1996) has made an attempt to relate theoretically the role of this political institution in public 
policy making and concluded that interests and policies of a political party may differ depending 
upon its association with other social organizations in a country. Therefore political parties provide 
a ‘voter - policy’ output link to the ruling governments. And if the proposed policy is representing 
the median voter’s choice then such political parties help in enhancing the ‘credibility’ of their 
political office and ‘legitimacy’ of the political decisions of their leaders. Different authors have 
defined ‘institutionalization’ in different ways. Huntington (1968) defined it as a process by 
organizations which bring value and stability in their working environment. Jones (2005) also 
attempted to relate this institutionalization101 of political parties with policy orientation in any 
society by postulating that if a society has more and more well-connected party system then it 
means competition among them will be based on policy stances. Hence all this shows that that 
how strongly these parties exert influence over the decision of politicians. Contributions made by 
Mainwaring (1990) and Sartori (2005)102 regarding institutionalization of party system works as a 
cornerstone for researchers in realizing the importance of this pillar in any political arena. Sartori 
(2005) stressed upon the ideological differences in a nations political parties which help the leaders 
to move towards policy making. Scartascini, et al. (2013) also found a linear relationship between 
party institutionalization with public regardedness of policies in general. In past literature, role of 
partisanship has been linked with the development of democracies. Two party system or multi-
party system approaches have been used for this purpose. The role of these parties has also been 
given considered imperative in the process of democratization in twentieth century in which 
democracy has entered into its third wave of reform.103 Similarly in case of authoritarian regimes, 
pro-reform political parties are offered in political opposition. Political parties work in any society 
according to their agendas. Ideological differences help each party to have its own interests and 
work for those motives. But these days it has been observed that personalities and media role is 
                                                          
101 He introduced a specific term for such institutionalized system i.e. programmatic party system which is in favor of 
a political setup for making efficient policy decisions against clienteism in which political parties are less 
institutionalized and less coherent. All this leads to high rates of corruption in clientelist societies. And mostly 
developing countries are characterized with this type of political setups. And to some extent such political landscape 
are responsible of poor institutional capacities of these nations.  
102 Their much work is based on the economies of African and Latin American political party systems. These political 
parties are considered as a main reason of a stability and fluidity of any political system.  
103  Lindberg (2007), Huntington (1991). First, Second & third wave of democratization are respectively as follows; 
1828–1926, 1943–1962, 1974–continued.  
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going to have more effect than party organization in a political system which is not healthy sign 
for transparent working of governments.104 Burnell (2004) discussed the role of these parties 
through institutional approach and highlighted the electoral and regulatory system as one of the 
most important factors in setting the rules for political parties Many have blamed the weak 
parliament for the weak party system in a political setup. And weak parliament is the result of 
constitutional powers designated to the executives of nations. Like under presidential system of 
democracy, the degree of accountability of executive increases and this affects the party working 
and refrain it from manipulative activities. For the success of partisan ship, it is necessary that 
parties should follow bottom-up strategy so that there must not remain a gulf between governments 
and citizens. Such political parties if results from the roots of the society then only these can be 
the true representative of the society. These parties are assumed to serve as ‘agents’ of the acting 
rulers ‘principals’. And if a society has institutionalized party system then more chances are here 
that public interests will be given priority over private interests of rulers and this degree of 
institutionalization actually helps in solving the collective action problems efficiently.105 Easterly 
and Levein (1997) have been successful in relating the growth tragedy of Africa with the political 
systems of these nations. Autocracy and single party system have been the key factor in this regard 
and now world has diverted its attention towards the institutional improvement of such nations 
first before the designing of better economic policies. It has been observed that political 
endowments of nations predispose them in making selection of optimal policies.106 Coppedge 
(2001) has also related the quality of democracy and governance with party system in Latin 
America. Rius and van de Walle (2003) presented a framework relating political party system to 
the ‘willingness of leader’ for policy reform in an economy while electoral rules provide the 
leaders the ‘power to reform’. Sten et al. (2008) stressed upon this factor of lower level of 
institutionalization to the lesser development of Latin America. Lee (2012) found that structure of 
trade tariffs is not affected by sectoral personal preferences rather these are the results of political 
orientation of these industries towards elected constituencies. Recently Yardımcı-Geyikçi (2013) 
and Andrews and Bairett Jr. (2014) proved that less coherent relationship between interest groups, 
electorate rules and civil society after regime settlement factor as one of the main reasons of lower 
                                                          
104 Burnell (2004). 
105 Scartascini & Tommasi (2009) has also emphasized upon the same factor very important in policy making.  
106 Humphreys & Bates (2005), Political Institutions and Economic Policies: Lessons from Africa. 
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degree of institutionalization of political parties in a political arena and highlighted the role of 
party stabilization in the success of new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. From all these 
studies this conclusion can be drawn that it is the degree of uncertainty107 and volatility of any 
political party system which decides the fortune of nations.  
Unfortunately all developing countries are facing these problems due to which policy outcomes 
do not cater properly the interests of majority class of the society and that’s why now it is being 
suggested that reforms should be from internal side not from external forces by changing the 
mindsets of people.  
 “The single most important determinant of variations in macroeconomic performance 
from one industrialized democracy to another is the location on the left-right spectrum of 
the governing party...the governing political party is very much responsible for major 
macroeconomic outcomes. . .” 
          (Tufte, 1978, 104)  
Following the same idea this study has tried to analyze the role of parties in this way whether the 
head of the state is from the right wing or the left wing. Both wings have different ideologies in 
the context of policy making. And mainly this differentiation helps in knowing the role of state 
actor in managing the demand structures arising from voters. Wren (2008) has named this role of 
state actor as his “instrumental capacity” to get engaged in decision making process.  
3.4.9: Parliamentary and Presidential system and Welfarism 
Earlier it was believed that only institutions matter. And institutions and social interests are 
interrelated. But with the passage of time and with invent of “new institutionalism,” it has been 
recognized that institutions are actually the outcome of constitutions i.e. presidential and 
parliamentary structures. And this line of distinction is getting popularity after the failure of 
presidential system in Latin America and recently in Socialists nations and advantages of 
parliamentary system in India and Singapore. But still a gap remains in these two categories for 
making a right or accurate analysis and this is the change in the nature of presidential system in 
                                                          
107 Lupu & Riedl (2013) have identified the role of these ‘uncertainties’ in political party system and their effects in 
policy decision making. They defined this uncertainty in three dimensions; political uncertainty, economic uncertainty 
and institutional uncertainty. And mostly developing countries are facing political uncertainty so much in their 
economies. These uncertainties are about the lack of power of political leaders to take decisions at right time or to 
predict the future policy direction.  Because these are the result of incomplete information and this leads to less 
competitiveness in political system. All this sometimes result in pessimism and biased decisions. Moreover Brader et 
al. (2013) also emphasized on the existence of uncertainty even in a system where overall system is having lesser 
uncertainty like developed nation’s democracies. But these authors claimed that party has more chances to attract 
more and more voters to its policy choices if that party has long age and more coherence in terms of ideology. 
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different nations. Each policy outcome is the result of two important factors either through veto 
power or separation of powers and separation of purposes in each political system and finally these 
two factors shape up the right policy choices. Effective number of veto players helps in making 
decisiveness-resoluteness trade off which means either to introduce a policy change or sustain the 
already existing one. In case of more veto players (presidential system), decisions are difficult to 
make, so usually policies resolute. Moreover one of the reasons of this resoluteness is the “divided 
nature of the governments” in presidential systems. Lifont & Tirole (1989) also highlighted the 
importance of constitutions in institution building. Now the question arises which constitutional 
structure whether parliamentary or presidential, promotes economic efficiency and good 
governance in an economic system. Both systems have their weaknesses and strengths in various 
stages of policies making.108 It has been observed that performance of executive in these two 
systems vary due to difference in cultural, socio economic and temporal factors which vary time 
to time and nation to nation. Therefore it can be said that presidential system can be better in some 
aspects while parliamentary in some other context. It means indecisiveness of political scientists 
exists here as well in differentiating between these two constitutional forms. But still this confusion 
can be solved by taking into consideration this question which system is promoting more the 
welfare of society. Apparently this question sheds light on the normative aspect of any discipline 
but this really can help in reaching some conclusion that whether parliamentary or presidential 
leaders are more conscious about the well-being of society. Earlier focus has been remained 
towards analyzing the effects of these two systems in case of bureaucracy, electoral process, 
legislative decision, interest group formation, policy making, and governance. Yet so far no single 
attempt has been observed in past literature in which these two systems particularly are related to 
the policy effectiveness and welfare mindedness of their executives in case of trade policy making. 
But in this study endeavor is made whether executives are more concerned towards welfare of 
people in parliamentary systems or presidential system. Moreover whether presidential 
democracies are doing better or parliamentary democracies?  
Before this analysis starts there must be a clear cut line between these two systems in terms of 
definition. About parliamentary system it is being observed that this is more centralized system. 
Here executive or Prime Minister is elected by legislature and s/he is responsible to maintain the 
sovereignty of the state as a single locus point. Such system has strong political party structure and 
                                                          
108 Weaver & Rockman (1993). 
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decision making process is quite transparent due to veto power enjoyed by every policy agent 
(interest group/political party). Parliamentary systems are considered more decisive which means 
that these are having more capacity to solve state problems related to policy. This system is 
considered more flexible because tenure of Prime Minister can be foreshortened at any time by 
parliament. Moreover policy making is highly institutionalized and centralized in parliamentary 
systems because it is the result of various political parties’ vision. And all players in political 
environment are supposed to be a part of establishment.  It is strongly based on administrative 
hierarchy.  
Presidential systems on the other hand are more personalized and power structure is centered on a 
particular individual. Here power structure is different from parliamentary system in a way that 
powers are divided into two separate bodies, legislature and president but this system is more rigid. 
No one can replace president before the end of his/her tenure period. Thus it can be said that 
political stability is a virtue of presidential system but on the other hand it has been observed that 
in this way presidents lose their credibility and legitimacy and may get involved in corrupt 
activities through the pursuance of wrong policies in his own favor. President act as a policy 
entrepreneur and involves himself in making public policy. No hierarchical structure is present in 
such governments. Political scientists have this opinion about presidential systems that these are 
not decisive rather are resolutory in nature109 which means president’s power in implementing 
already established policy decisions. In other words it can be said that it’s a choice between 
decisiveness (new policy making) and resoluteness110 and this choice is the outcome of the 
numbers of veto players in both political systems. Moreover conflict is a common characteristic 
of presidential system because each separate unit gives its own opinion regarding the prevailing 
situation. For this reason consensus building through a proper mechanism is an essential ingredient 
of its policy making.  
Both systems have their own constituencies and that’s why their institutions vary to each other. It 
is believed by political scientists that in those governments where institutions are being separated 
on the basis of constitutions are more decisive about policy commitments.111 Thus it means 
constitutional structures come first then institutional frameworks are built. Overall no doubt 
                                                          
109 Cox & McCubbins (2001). 
110 Ibid. 
111 Henisz (2000), Keefer & Stasavage (2003). 
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institutions matter but constitutional structures matters more than institutions. Proximate effects of 
both systems are known to every political player in a system but yet no consensus has been 
developed over this question which is promoting state legitimacy and efficiency. Different authors 
like Gerring, et al. (2009) have tried to analyze the role of these two systems in three dimensions 
of policy making and proved that parliamentary structure of governments are positively associated 
with these three types of developments i.e. political development, economic development and 
human development. Moreover the results showed that parliamentary system is related with lower 
import duties and more openness to trade. But the gap left in these analysis is this that endogeneity 
of trade policy has not given importance. This study is covering in detail all the institutional aspects 
in designing trade policies.  
3.5: Research Design 
As this research is based on three main hypotheses extracted from theoretical framework. For 
detailed analysis, each main hypothesis has been divided into further more sub hypotheses. Such 
break down helps in knowing the role of each ingredient of political system in policy making 
process of government.  
Hypothesis 2.1 (H1): Better institutional governance helps politicians to make such policies 
which increase the welfare of society. 
Hypothesis 2.1.1 (H2.1.1): More (less) political stability promotes more (less) efficient policies. 
Hypothesis 2.1.2(H2.1.2): More (less) government effectiveness enhances welfarism in policy  
                                       decisions. 
Hypothesis 2.1.3(H2.1.3): More(less) regulations in political process results in more (less)  
                                        welfarism in governments decisions about trade policies.  
Hypothesis 2.1.4 (H2.1.4): More (less) rule of law in a state, more (less) better policies avoiding  
                                         the  exploitation of citizens due to the fear of accountability. 
Hypothesis 2.1.5 (H2.1.5): More (less) Media Freedom in a state, more (less) welfare  
                                          contained policies.  
Hypothesis 2.1.6 (H2.1.6): Better (Worse) governance in a nation, more (less) the policy welfare  
                                         mindedness. 
Hypothesis 2.2 (H2.2): Political environment affects degree of welfare in policymaking.   
Hypothesis 2.2.1 (H2.2.1): More (less) democratic environment, more (less) a government will be    
                                         welfarist in policy making. 
Hypothesis 2.2.2 (H2.2.2): More (less) autocratic rule in a state, less (more) welfarism in a society. 
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Hypothesis 2.2.3 (H2.2.3): More (less) a state is fragile, less (more) a government will be welfarist  
                                          in its policy decision. 
Hypothesis 2.2.4 (H2.2.4): More (less) politically constrained a leader in policy switching, more          
                                        (less)  will be welfarism in policy decisions.  
Hypothesis 2.2.5 (H2.2.5): Higher (lower) level of bureaucracy, lower (higher) welfare orientation  
                                         in policy making. 
Hypothesis 2.2.6 (H2.2.6): More (less) competitiveness in political participation rate, more (less)  
                                        welfarist a government will be policy making. 
Hypothesis 2.2.7 (H2.2.7): More (less) political legitimacy in a state leads to less (more)  
                                         welfarism in policymaking. 
Hypothesis 2.2.8 (H2.2.8): More (less) a political system is efficient; more (less) will be welfare  
                                         orientation in policy making. 
Hypothesis 2.2.9 (H2.2.9): More (less) a state is in repression, more (less) their leaders will be  
                                         having welfare concerns in policy making for their citizens. 
Hypothesis 2.2.10 (H2.2.10): More (less) frequent a state switches its regime, less (more)  
                                             Leader will be welfare concerned in policy making for their  
                                             citizens. 
Hypothesis 2.3 (H2.3): Political party’s orientation affects the welfare orientation of 
policymaking. 
Hypothesis2. 3.1 (H2.3.1): Parliamentary polities are more welfare concerned in policy making  
                                        than presidential ones. 
Hypothesis 2.3.2 (H2.3.2): More (less) a political party ruling the state is of socialist view, less  
                                        (more) Welfarist a government will be in its policy making. 
Hypothesis2.3.3 (H2.3.3): More (less) a party liberal in its views, more (less) will be  
                                         welfarism in societies. 
Hypothesis 2.3.4 (H2.3.4): More (less) a party is involved in promoting private enterprise, more   
                                         (less) Welfarist a government will be its policy designing. 
Hypothesis 2.3.5 (H2.3.5):Military executive will make choice for more welfarist  policies.   
Hypothesis 2.3.6 (H2.3.6): More(less) stable is a state is, more (less) welfare-enhancing policy  
                                         choices will be made governments.  
 
  
69 
 
3.6: Methodology 
Basing on the theoretical framework, multi-model approach has been used for analyzing the role 
of various institutional factors in determining the welfarism in trade policies for developing 
nations. Overall four models have been designed but the fourth one is again spitted into two sub 
models i.e. one for democracy and the other for autocracy. Moreover each model is having three 
equations and in all cases, first one is simply the OLS equation and second and third equations are 
fixed and random models respectively between which the selection will be made after applying 
diagnostic tests. Estimation has been aimed to start by applying Pooled OLS technique. As the 
analysis is based on cross sectional and time series data therefore there are more chances of the 
violation of the assumption of classical ordinary least square (OLS), independent and identically 
distributed errors (i.i.d) if simply pooled OLS is being applied. The estimated coefficients also 
become biased in this case due to the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in a 
regression model. Literature suggests various choices of models for dealing with such problems. 
After observing the nature of disturbances in model through diagnostic tests, further selection of 
such models can be made in this regard. β, α, ν, and γ are the parameters to be estimated and ε, ξ, 
φ are the error terms in all models. The subscripts i and t refers to numbers of countries and years 
respectively in each specification.  
Model: 1 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (1.1) 
 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜑,𝑖𝑡     (1.2) 
Where  𝛼𝑖  =   𝛼 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝜈𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜉𝑖,𝑡     (1.3) 
And vi is vector of individual effects 
 
Model: 2 
    
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (2.1) 
 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑡    (2.2) 
Where  𝛼𝑖  =   𝛼 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝜈𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖,𝑡    (2.3) 
And vi is vector of individual effects 
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Model: 3 
   
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (3.1) 
 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜑𝑖,𝑡    (3.2) 
Where 𝛼𝑖  =   𝛼 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝜈𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖,𝑡    (3.3) 
And vi is vector of individual effects 
 
Model: 4  
  
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (4.1) 
 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜑𝑖,𝑡  (4.2) 
Where  𝛼𝑖  =   𝛼 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡  =  𝜈𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜉𝑖,𝑡    ( 4.3) 
And vi is vector of individual effects 
 
Furthermore to see whether the applied model is best fit and free from econometric disease like 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels or not, various 
diagnostic tests have been proposed in literature. For example Wooldridge (2012) test for 
identifying autocorrelation of first order in panel with the null hypothesis that there is no 
autocorrelation in variables used in model. Similarly for group wise heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals, Modified Wald Test is being suggested 112 stating the null hypothesis that all the 
variances are equal for each panel unit. For finding the cross sectional dependence (CD), again 
variety of tests are available i.e. Langrange Multiplier test (LM), Pesaran, Friedman’s and Free’s 
CD test. But according to De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006), if model is static in nature and N is large 
relative to T in the analysis (as in the case of this study), then any of these tests can be used for 
checking cross sectional dependence without any strict restriction. Hence all these diagnostic 
measures will be used to decide the goodness of model in the end.  
3.7: Results 
After discussing methodology in detail, now the next step is to estimate the models for proposed 
hypotheses. This part of the study is aimed at finding the role of the institutional environment of 
developing countries in determining the welfare concerns of their governments regarding trade 
                                                          
112 Greene (2012). 
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policy i.e. how their domestic political institutional factors are affecting the welfarism in trade 
policy decision because policy making is the result of political process actually therefore for this 
purpose institutional framework has been split into three various dimensions which can affect the 
leader’s decision regarding the maximization of social welfare in their economic policymaking. 
Using the structural approach of G-H (1994) model, estimates of government objective function 
which is the ‘welfare of the society’ have been derived and only those estimates which are without 
lobby formation effect, have been treated as dependent variable for analyzing the impact of 
governance, political structures, and party orientation on the government choice of trade policy. 
Firstly Pooled OLS was being applied but diagnostics113 showed the violations of the assumptions 
of Ordinary Least Square Method (OLS) and therefore the movement towards more refined 
econometric techniques was made i.e. Random Effects and Fixed Effects models by keeping in 
view the heterogeneity problem of the data using second and third equation of each basic model. 
For finding the validity of each of these models again, different tests have been applied. For 
example Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test showed that random effects model is more 
preferred as compared to simple OLS technique in the case of all specifications. Similarly the F-
test after fixed effect model indicates the rejection of null hypothesis that there are no country 
fixed effects in the model specification which was a clear sign for not making choice of OLS 
technique in the estimation procedure. After observing the random and fixed effects in the model, 
now the question comes which is to be selected in between these two? For this purpose Hausman 
test has been applied and it showed the rejection of its null hypothesis which claims that random 
effect model is more efficient than fixed effect model. Hence finally fixed effect model has been 
used for estimation purpose.  
Diagnostic tests of this model confirmed the presence of these three problems autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation (HAPC) in the estimation process. 
Hypotheses of Wooldridge test and Modified Wald Test have been rejected at 1% level of 
significance concluding that presence of autocorrelation and GroupWise hetreoskadasticity in 
model. For Cross sectional independence in residuals, this study has applied Pesaran and 
Friedman’s tests along with Langrange Multiplier test presented by Breusch-Pagan.114 All tests 
showed the indication of the problem of contemporaneous correlation by rejecting the null 
                                                          
113 Given in the end of each Table. 
114 Wooldridge (2010) and Drukker (2003). 
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hypothesis at 1% level of significance in each case. This led to move towards new techniques 
which could handle these three problems HAPC simultaneously i.e. Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) and Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). Both of these models have been 
suggested by experts as a remedial measure and the choice will be made in favor of that model 
which reports accurate standard errors for the coefficients. FGLS, presented by Parks (1967) is 
basically used when errors show the problem of HAPC in TSCS panels. However Beck and Katz 
(1995) who introduced PCSE model have observed that estimates of FGLS appear to be more 
optimistic when used for the social science data set. Because the estimates of standard error 50%-
100% for FGLS model become lower than the OLS model using PCSE. Moreover both models 
have their specific characteristics i.e. PCSE model has been suggested as more appropriate one in 
case of hypothesis testing and FGLS model is being considered more suitable when to get accurate 
coefficient estimates is the main objective.115 
FGLS and PCSE models have also been actually used as alternative to each other. Estimates of 
both models are conditional on any estimated autocorrelation parameter and error covariance 
matrix116 and are considered to be consistent and efficient until the conditional mean is reported 
corrected. In case of PCSE, coefficients can be computed either through OLS or Pair-Winston 
(PW) technique (where no autocorrelation is mentioned in the model). In the estimation procedure 
of standard errors and variance-co variances, this model assumes, by default, that errors are 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. These error components are also 
be assumed to be having autocorrelation of first order within the panel but are assumed constant 
either across the panels or varying in nature for each cross section.  
There is much debate on which estimator is best among these two. Because it is being observed 
that FGLS and PCSE produces almost same coefficients with the exception of more corrected 
standard errors. Now question comes about the underestimation or overestimation of standard 
errors by these methods. As Beck and Katz (1995) are of the opinion that FGLS underestimate the 
standard errors or in simple words the estimates through this method contain overconfidence 
therefore due to this reasoning these authors recommended the use of PCSE model in case a panel 
suffering from HAPC disease. But the debate doesn’t end here. Recently Robert Reed and Webb 
(2010) has tried to prove by replicating experiments done by Beck and Katz(1995) that PCSE are 
                                                          
115 Robert Reed & Ye (2011) 
116Kmenta (1997), Greene (2012), Davidson & MacKinnon (1993),  and Judge et al. (1985) 
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not more efficient estimators as compared to FGLS. Efficiency depends on fulfillment of certain 
structural conditions. Robert Reed and Webb (2010) also observed that PCSE estimator losses its 
efficiency when T becomes large. And FGLS gives more reliable results when T is twice large as 
compared to N. However this is not the only criteria upon which decision can be taken for the 
choice between these two methodologies. These authors have talked a little bit more about the 
selection criteria and this is related to the ‘average of the absolute value of the cross-sectional 
correlations’. According to their findings, if this estimate is between 0-0.25 then PCSE estimates 
will be more efficient and average efficiency of PCSE estimator will be 97% higher relative to 
Parks method of FGLS. And if this average value lies between 0.25-0.50 then estimates are 40% 
less efficient than FGLS method. And FGLS becomes slightly more efficient than PCSE. In short 
Beck and Katz (1995) has considered the PCSE more efficient than FGLS except for the only one 
case where the average contemporaneous correlation becomes equal or more than 50% (0.50) and 
with larger T. However in contrast Chen et al. (2009) viewed PCSE model less efficient than FGLS 
except when T approaches to N. But again Robert Reed and Webb (2010) have contradiction over 
here on the issue of larger T for the efficiency of PCSE and the debate is still indecisive. In many 
research works authors have used both of these methods side by side though both have different 
prerequisites for modeling.117 After discussing in detail different perspectives of experts regarding 
these two remedial measures, this study has also incorporated both of these models simultaneously 
after the detection of the HAPC problem in fixed effect model. And ‘average component of 
contemporaneous correlation in panel’ has been used as the decision criteria for estimating 
efficiency of parameters. Almost in all models, this average has been between 0.25 and 0.50. Since 
there is no end on the econometric debate and this study is concerned in achieving both aims, that’s 
why results of both models have been presented for reaching at some conclusion.  
Now moving towards estimation, Table 3.1 exhibits the results for various factors showing the 
effect of role of governance in government decision making about trade policies of the sampled 
developing countries. Governance has been evaluated by the level of political stability, 
effectiveness of the government in an economy, government regulation,118 rule of law and role of 
media activities in developing countries. From the same Table it can also be seen that all these 
                                                          
117 Baccaro (2005), Aristovnik (2013), Dash & Mukherjee (2013), Llera & Valinas (2013). 
118 Mĳiyawa (n.d) also found the positive role of government regulations as one of the important key factors of 
sustainable economic growth.  
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indicators are affecting positively but the role of media and rule of law is minor. It shows that these 
nations are lacking these two characteristics. Media is an indicator which helps in reducing 
information asymmetry in any system. Therefore its sign confirms that this variable positively 
contribute in the government objective which is to improve welfare of the society by making right 
choice about trade policy but lower magnitude is due to the reason that such nations lack this 
freedom of information access in their society. Direct relationship between all these variables 
prove that if these factors are in better position, then governments will be in a better position to 
take such policy decisions which are welfare oriented. But here these signs mean that political 
system of developing nations lack these characteristics therefore less welfarism in government 
decisions. However the situation is improving with the current wave of democracy all over the 
world. But the surprising fact from this dimension of institutional environment is this that the 
impact of overall governance factors is showing strong positive and highly significant impact on 
welfarism through policy choices of the government which shows that in nations with poor 
governance, governments will be less concerned to improve social welfare because of the 
involvement of malpractices in decision making process. This is quite evident from the present 
condition of these developing nations which are suffering from poor governance therefore it can 
be observed that their policies are less fruitful as compared to developed nations even having the 
same policy contents like policy of trade liberalization is practiced all over the world due to its 
positive impact on economic growth  after the rules designed by WTO but developing nations 
could not reap that much benefits from this as the developed nation could do. Estimates of model 
FGLS are considered finally for evaluating the impact of various independent variables on 
dependent variable in all models. Each variable is significant at 1%. All diagnostics are also 
showing that model is correct in its specification. R-square is showing the overall impact of these 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable which is 33%.  
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Table: 3.1: Estimation of Model 1: Governance and Welfarism 
Variables OLS FE 
Prais-Winston 
Regression(PCSEs) 
FGLS 
Political Stability 
.9720 
(.1500,0.000) 
.0040 
(.0112, 0.722) 
.0916 
(.0298, 0.000) 
.0829*** 
(.0116, 0.000) 
Govt. Effectiveness 
2.375 
(.2412,0.000) 
.0096 
(.0177, 0.587) 
.1569 
(.0466, 0.001) 
.1497*** 
(.0171 0.000) 
Regulatory Quality 
.5091 
(.1695,0.003) 
-.0057 
(.0120, 0.635) 
.0784 
(.0342, 0.022) 
.0774*** 
(.0133, 0.000) 
Rule of Law 
.8841 
(.2212,0.000) 
.0034 
(.0169, 0.839) 
.0014 
(.0449, 0.974) 
.0301*** 
(.0125, 0.016) 
Media 
.0077 
(.0022,0.001) 
.0001 
(.0002, 0.440) 
.0054 
(.0007, 0.000) 
.0050*** 
(.0002, 0.000) 
Overall Governance 
4.7781 
(.6762,0.000) 
.0081 
(.0475, 0.863) 
.6014 
(.1152, 0.000) 
.5749*** 
(.0465, 0.000) 
Constant 
-.4919 
(.1147,0.000) 
.0283 
(.0125, 0.025) 
-.4532 
(.0405, 0.000) 
-.4678*** 
(.0127, 0.000) 
R-squqred 0.18  0.33  
F-Statistics/Wald 
(prob.) 
28.63 (0.000) 8769.42 
(0.000) 
204.88 
(0.000) 
1938.75 
(0.000) 
Observations 880 880 880 880 
No. of groups 55^ 55 55 55 
Diagnostics 
Wooldridge test 
(Autocorrelation Test) 
7.400e+07 
(0.000) 
 
No autocorrelation 
No 
autocorrelation 
White Test 
(Heteroscadicity Test) 
213.42 
(0.000) 
Modified 
Wald Test 
6.1e+08 
(0.000) 
No heteroscadicity 
No 
heteroscadicity 
Cross sectional 
correlation (Pesaran) 
2.140 
(0.0324) 
0.412 
    
Breusch-Pagan LM 
5177.35       
(0.000) 
Hausman Test 
(13.66, 0.033) 
  
Panel specific AR (1) standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors (se) and p-values are presented 
below their corresponding coefficient (se; p). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.  ‘^’ shows that Singapore has been omitted from the analysis due to infinity value of the dependent 
variable.  
 
Now the impact of political environment in developing nations on their governments’ objective of 
welfarism through trade policy making has been evaluated in the Table 3.2 given below using 
Model 2. Different features of political system specifically of developing nations are included in 
this model. The results are showing that democracy is affecting positively to the state of welfarism 
in policy decision supporting the view of Milner and Kubota (2005) that in democracies political 
leaders choose that trade policy which promotes the welfare of voters or society overall and 
democracy favors to liberalize trade. On the other side, autocracy is negatively impacting 
welfarism in decision making of the government regarding their trade policy. Regime change 
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which also shows political instability is affecting negatively in this regard again confirming Milner 
and Kubota (2005), but they related this regime variable directly with tariff rates. And it can be 
observed from facts that autocracy and switching of powers are the main features of political set 
ups of developing countries. Proxy used for analyzing the role of bureaucracy in this regard is also 
showing negative sign with respect to public regardedness (welfare concerns of society) in the 
trade policies of developing nations. Political competitiveness which lacks in developing nations 
and another indicator of the transparency in the political process is also showing positive and direct 
impact on the government objective in developing nations but the small magnitude of the co-
efficient shows that lack of competition in political system is resulting the governments of such 
nations less welfarist in their policy choices. Political legitimacy is very important for any political 
system to be sustained. It’s related to the acceptance of the governments’ authority and their 
agendas for the citizens of a nation. Unfortunately in low and middle income nations, leaders lack 
this recognizability and the people lose their confidence on their leaders which lead to uncertainty 
in the political environment.  According to Calvert & Calvert (2007), military interventions, more 
clientelism and corruption are the main reasons for reducing legitimacy of these governments in 
developing nations. This variable is showing negative impact in this regard showing that if the 
nations’ leader lacks recognition then they try to be more welfarist in their decisions regarding 
policies to get recognition in masses for next elections. State fragility shows how much a state is 
fragile in its political and economic institutional capacity. Theoretical perspective is this; if a state 
is more fragile then there will be more underdevelopment in the society and less well-being of the 
citizens.119 But here this fragility of the state is being captured not for growth or development 
purpose rather for the government concerns related to the social welfare through policy choice and 
the results are showing negative impact of this variable on the government objective of 
maximization of welfare through their policy choice. This shows that weak potentials of any 
political system becomes hurdle in becoming governments more welfarist and this is the reason 
that such nations remain underdeveloped. Another important variable State repression is actually 
an indicator showing the extent of human rights violation in any nation. This variable is also 
showing a positive and significant sign which means that more a state is repressed, more a 
government will be welfare concerned in its trade policymaking. Similar has been observed in case 
of the developing nations. Last but not the least the effect of political constraints has also been 
                                                          
119  Marshall & Cole (2011). 
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observed positive on welfarism in trade policy making. This variable actually tells about the extent 
to which a government has discretion or constraints for bringing change in policy if preferences of 
a political actor changes. It is being observed that political constraints are positively related to 
economic performance of nations.120 Same kind of relationship has been tested in this analysis too 
with the only difference that here nexus has been developed between political constraint and 
welfarism in government decision making. Results are supporting both Hensiz (2000) and Gaviria 
et al. (2000). Gaviria et al. (2000) linked political constraints and political particularism121 with 
recovery from shock in an economy and found a positive relationship among these variables. In 
short it can be concluded from the results of  this analysis that more political constraints (less 
political discretion/more stable political environment) improves the welfare concerns of 
governments in decision making. Overall these political variables are affecting more than 50% the 
government decision making power.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
120 Hensiz (2000). 
121 Carey and Shugart (1995) define Political particularism as the political process catering the narrow interests instead 
of national broader interests by politicians to establish their career. Particularism can be of two types. And both are 
extreme in their nature. One is party centeredness particularism and other is candidate centeredness. But Gaviria et al. 
(2000) used the middle vales of this scale and index to measure the particularism and proved that middle range of this 
index is well efficient for policymaking. Moreover political particularism plays more of its role in democracy as 
compared to dictatorship and has a strong quadratic nature of relationship with change in growth.  
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Table: 3.2: Estimation of Model 2: Political Environment and Welfarism  
Variables OLS FE Prais-Winston 
Regression(PCSEs) 
FGLS 
Democracy 
.3790 
(.1828,0.038) 
-.0125 
(.0086, 0.146) 
.2204 
(.0556, 0.000) 
0.1310*** 
(.0198, 0.000) 
Autocracy 
-.4505 
(.1892,0.017) 
.0081 
(.0096, 0.399) 
-.2232 
(.0634, 0.000) 
-0.0541* 
(.0290, 0.062) 
Regime change 
-.4123 
(.1814,0.023) 
.0088 
(.0085, 0.300) 
-.1856 
(.0575, 0.001) 
-0.0787*** 
(.0193, 0.000) 
Political constraint 
1.1131 
(.1578,0.000) 
.0004 
(.0096, 0.961) 
 
.3078 
(.0682, 0.000) 
0.2217*** 
(.0404, 0.000) 
Bureaucracy  
-.0947 
(.0667,0.156) 
.0253 
(.0054, 0.000) 
-.1517 
(.0332, 0.000) 
-0.1052*** 
(.0156, 0.000) 
Political 
competitiveness 
 .0773 
(.0268,0.004) 
.0001 
(.0021, 0.927) 
 .0782 
(.0123, 0.000) 
  0.0500*** 
(.0088, 0.000) 
Political legitimacy 
.1870 
(.0453,0.000) 
.0027 
(.0030, 0.365) 
 
-.0897 
(.0174, 0.000) 
-0.0696*** 
(.0123, 0.000) 
Political efficiency 
.1644 
(.0376,0.000) 
.0010 
(.0037, 0.779) 
.1220 
(.0229, 0.000) 
0.0960*** 
(.0136, 0.000) 
State repression 
.5627 
(.0410,0.000) 
.0017 
(.0029, 0.549) 
.1188 
(.0193, 0.000) 
0.0831*** 
(.0114, 0.000) 
State fragility 
-.1020 
(.0108,0.000) 
-.0013 
(.0012, 0.283) 
-.0165 
(.0054, 0.002) 
-0.0199*** 
(.0045, 0.000) 
Constant 
-.3805 
(.3183,0.232) 
-.0724 
(.0278, 0.010) 
.6162 
(.1533, 0.000) 
0.2357*** 
(.0920, 0.010) 
R-squqred 0.27  0.54  
F-Statistics/Wald 
(prob.) 
29.78 
(0.000) 
9224.92 
(0.000) 
603.14 
(0.000) 
440.56 
(0.000) 
Observations 880 880 880 880 
No. of groups 55^ 55 55 55 
Diagnostics 
Wooldridge test 
(Autocorrelation Test) 
214533.953 
(0.000) 
 No autocorrelation No autocorrelation 
White Test 
(Hetroscadasticity 
Test) 
397.15 
(0.000) 
Modified 
Wald Test 
3.4e+08 
(0.000) 
No heteroscadicity No heteroscadicity 
Cross sectional 
correlation (pesaran) 
4.552 
(0.000), 0.37 
 
Breusch-Pagan LM 
 
4973.59 
(0.000) 
Hausman Test 
(31.98, 0.0008) 
  
Panel specific AR (1) standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors (se) and p-values are presented 
below their corresponding coefficient (se; p). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. ^  shows that Singapore has been omitted from the analysis due to infinity value of the dependent 
variable.  
Now Table 3.3 shows the results for hypothesis that welfarism in trade policy making is related to 
political party orientation in a political structure. For this purpose various constitutional variables 
related to any political systems have been included in the model i.e. parliamentary/presidential 
powers of political leaders, party ideology with respect to economic policy and role of the 
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executive if he has been a military officer or not. Party structure has been divided into three 
categories i.e. whether executive in power belongs to liberal, communist or social-liberal (they 
believe in the policy of privatization) political party because each political party has its own agenda 
and it has huge impact on the government objective extracted from policy making. Results in Table 
3.3 show that parliamentary system, governments are more concerned to the social welfare in their 
policy decisions as compared to presidential natured governments. This can be seen from the 
estimates of FGLS model in Table 3.3. As this is a dummy variable so the constant term is showing 
the effect of presidential governments which is negative122 in nature but when the parameter of 
parliamentary variable has been derived after adding up this constant in dummy variable parameter 
then it gives positive123 value showing direct relationship between the governments’ aim of welfare 
maximization and parliamentary nature political system. Moreover, another attempt has been made 
that which type of political parties are giving welfare oriented policies in developing countries. 
Three categories have been included: if socialists make a large party share in the government, or 
liberals, or mix of both calling as socio-liberal party which promotes the privatization activity in 
the economies. From the results, it can be viewed that the nations in which main government 
structure is controlled by socialist leaders then in such nations, governments are maximizing more 
welfare of the society in their trade policy choices. In real world situation, this can be observed in 
the case of Pakistan first and then fast growing economies like China, India, Argentina and Srilank 
a. Centrists’ governments like Bolivia, Brazil, Russia, and Philippines are next to the socialist 
governments in maximizing the welfare of societies through policymaking. Economies where 
liberals (right wings) form the large part of the governments like Bulgaria, Turkey, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Ukraine, Uruguay and Thailand, their governments are less efficient in maximizing the 
welfare of societies. Role of military leader is being observed negative in enhancing the welfarism 
in society in case of developing countries supporting the findings of Bowman (2002) who also 
found negation relationship among militarization, growth and equity in an economy. Recently 
Khan (2012) proved from his analysis for Pakistan’s economy that military government has been 
inefficient for sustainable economic growth because in such regimes investment starts crowding 
out and such leaders are less concerned for making investment in social and physical development 
plans for society. Moreover exports showed decline in the tenure of military leaders. This finding 
                                                          
122 As in case of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Uruguay, Srilanka, Senegal and Russia. 
123 Examples are India, Thailand, Turkey, Latvia, Nepal and Bulgaria. 
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is opposed to the view of Huntington (1968) and Jhonson (1964) who considered military as a 
modernizer agent for bringing an incremental change in developing nations using the concept of 
modernization revisionism124 for the role of military.  This can be observed in case of few nations 
like Pakistan, Venezuela and but overall this factor is affecting negatively to policy decision taken 
by government.  Stability means how much the stability in the governments is affecting the element 
of welfarism in policy making of developing nations. And due to lack of proper governance this 
variable is showing negative impact in this context. All variables are showing expected signs and 
are highly significant at 1%.  
Table: 3.3: Estimation of Model 3: Party Orientation and Welfarism 
Variables OLS FE Prais-Winston 
Regression (PCSE) 
FGLS 
Parliamentary 
.3174 
(.0799,0.000) 
.5098 
(.0133, 0.000) 
.3699 
(.0136, 0.000) 
.3669*** 
(.0033, 0.000) 
Socialists(left) 
.3917 
(.0860,0.000) 
.6381 
(.0189, 0.000) 
.6527 
(.0230, 0.000) 
.6489*** 
(.0042, 0.000) 
Liberals(right) 
.5092 
(.0873,0.000) 
-.6752 
(.0133, 0.000) 
.5583 
(.0151, 0.000) 
.5546*** 
(.0042, 0.000) 
Centerists 
.6994 
(.0993,0.000) 
-1.2734 
(.0189, 0.000) 
.6095 
(.0831, 0.000) 
.6073*** 
(.0032, 0.000) 
Military 
.9943 
(.1246,0.000) 
-.0009 
(.0097, 0.924) 
.0851 
(.0499, 0.088) 
.0794*** 
(.0017, 0.000) 
Stability 
-.0186 
(.1257,0.882) 
-.0055 
(.0053, 0.301) 
-.0045 
(.0086, 0.596) 
-.0042*** 
(.00009, 0.000) 
Constant 
-.4935 
(.0586,0.000) 
.9263 
(.0163, 0.000) 
-.3436 
(.0163, 0.000) 
-.3399*** 
(.0038, 0.000) 
R-squared 0.12  0.17  
F-Statistics/Wald 
(prob.) 
20.76 
(0.000) 
9137.10 
(0.000) 
65558.91 
(0.000) 
51115.94 
(0.000) 
Observations 832 832 832 832 
No. of groups 52 52 52 52 
Diagnostics 
Wooldridge test 
(Autocorrelation 
Test) 
994112.327 
(0.000) 
 No Autocorrelation No Autocorrelation 
White Test 
(Hetreoskadasticity 
Test) 
47.50 
(0.0000) 
Modified 
Wald 
Test 
4.4e+08 
(0.000) 
No Hetroscadasticity No Hetroscadasticity 
Cross sectional 
correlation (Pesaran) 
3.142 
(0.000), 0.35 
 
Breusch-Pagan LM 5941.94 
(0.0000) 
Hausman Test 
(5.09, 0.07) 
 
Panel specific AR (1) standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors (se) and p-values are presented below 
their corresponding coefficient (se; p). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
                                                          
124 It stresses the role of strong government and indigenous social structure for increasing the pace of development 
and regarded these factors as a source of paretorianism.  
81 
 
Now another model has been formed which is capturing the effect of democratic 
parliamentary/presidential system and autocratic parliamentary/presidential systems in developing 
nations. Because many authors believe that that no doubt institutions positively affect the economic 
development and to say that democracy always directly related to growth is not correct perception.125 
Moreover few institutionalists like Persson et al. (1997, 2000) and Persson (2002, 2005) proved that 
it is the nature of democracy which decides the path of development and found that presidential 
democracies are involved lesser in making social welfare spending as compared to parliamentary 
democracies. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 are showing the results of the model incorporating these two 
additional variables for democracy and autocracy respectively. As these two models have been made 
as an extension of model 3.3 therefore all other variables have been included in the same way with 
little addition of two new variables. These are related to concentration of power either with 
opposition or ruling government political party. Results are given below.    
According to Persson (2005), for nations to be democratic or autocratic is not going to help actually 
in growth-enhancing structural policy making. This is actually the nature of democracy like 
presidential, parliamentary, permanent natured or temporary. Similar view has been applied here 
to see the role of different political leaders under various forms of democracies to evaluate whether 
parliamentary governments are more offering more welfare-promoting policies or presidential 
ones. From the results of the Table 3.4 it can be seen that democracies are more welfare promoting 
in their trade policy decisions if these are parliamentary in nature while democracies having 
presidential nature of political systems are affecting negatively the government’s ability in 
enhancing the social welfare in the society. The results are in line with findings given by Persson 
(2005). Beck et al. (2000) also found the same notion in their research about discovering new tools 
for political database that democracies usually survive more under parliamentary systems. The 
only difference is that our results confirm these findings in the context of welfarism in government 
policymaking regarding trade. Positive sign of liberal democracy is proving the idea of Fukuyama 
(1992) sustainable development attached with liberal democracies considering these as ‘human 
social organizations’. Because in such democracies powers are limited by constitution and legal 
system operates very effectively.  
From the same Table, it can also be seen that now centrists are playing more positive role in 
decision-making as compared to other two types of political parties which means that in this type 
                                                          
125 Barro (1996) and De Haan & Siermann (1996).  
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of democracies, governments try to be welfarist by covering both the aspects of policies i.e. 
socialist and liberal to maximize the well-being of their societies.  
Moreover the concentration of power in both cases i.e. opposition or government is affecting 
negatively the decision making process of governments but more adverse in case of opposition. 
So this shows the importance of consensus building among both pillars of a political system in 
policymaking. The value of R-square is quite high in this model justifying the importance of nature 
of any political system actually. Again all results are highly significance at 1 %. 
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Table: 3.4: Estimation of Model 4a: Constitutional powers of Political Regime (Democracy) 
and Welfarism 
Variables OLS FE Prais-Winston 
Regression (PCSE) 
FGLS 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
.5745 
(.0844,0.000) 
1.2646 
(.0187, 0.000) 
.7639 
(.0138, 0.000) 
.7744*** 
(.0054,0.000) 
Socialists 
.0559 
(.1060,0.598) 
-.4456 
(.0204, 0.000) 
.2708 
(.0131, 0.000) 
.5054*** 
(.0133,0.000) 
Liberals 
.3713 
(.1012,0.000) 
-2.2432 
(.0296, 0.000) 
.7286 
(.0150, 0.000) 
.9098*** 
(.0148, 0.000) 
Centerists 
.2360 
(.1200,0.050) 
-1.1216 
(.0206, 0.000) 
.8351 
(.2515, 0.001) 
1.7158*** 
(.0349, 0.000) 
Milltary 
.2032 
(.1686,0.229) 
-.0013 
(.0147, 0.927) 
.0706 
(.0460, 0.125) 
.0798*** 
(.0020, 0.000) 
Stability 
-.1358 
(.1380,0.326) 
-.0093 
(.0089, 0.298) 
-.0065 
(.0129, 0.615) 
-.0017*** 
(.0006, 0.007) 
Concentration of political power 
Opposition 
-.5668 
(.1527,0.000) 
.0048 
(.0135, 0.720) 
-.0452 
(.0328, 0.169) 
-.0618 
(.0021, 0.000) 
Government 
-1.2097 
(.1402, 0.000) 
-.0053 
(.0114, 0.644) 
-.0403 
(.0282, 0.153) 
-.0377 
(.0018, 0.000) 
Constant 
.6400 
(.1417,0.000) 
.1844 
(.0182, 0.000) 
-.7395 
(.0375, 0.0000) 
-.7554 
(.0113, 0.000) 
R-squared 0.30  0.74  
F-Statistics/Wald 
(prob.) 
26.31 
(0.000) 
3956.76 
(0.000) 
25932.68 
(0.000) 
1709769 
(0.000) 
Observations 480 480 480 480 
No. of groups 30 30 30 30 
Diagnostics 
Wooldridge test 
(Autocorrelation 
Test) 
351707.431 
(0.000) 
 No autocorrelation No autocorrelation 
White Test 
(Hetroscadasticity 
Test) 
86.49 
(0.0000) 
Modified 
Wald Test 
(groupwise) 
1.6e+0
8 
(0.000) 
No hetroscadasticity No hetroscadasticity 
Cross sectional 
correlation 
(Pesaran) 
(2.454, 0.014), 
0.367 
 
Breusch-Pagan LM 2537.69 
(0.0000) 
Hausman Test 
(37.83, 0.0000) 
 
Panel specific AR (1) standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors (se) and p-values are presented below 
their corresponding coefficient (se; p). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Now the same process has been done for observing the role of autocracy under different 
constitutional setups. The Table 3.5 shows the results showing the results that whether in 
parliamentary natured autocracies governments are concerned to the maximization of social 
welfare via trade policy or in presidential type of autocracies.  
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Table: 3.5: Estimation of Model 4b: Constitutional powers of Political Regime (Autocracy) and 
Welfarism 
Variables OLS FE Prais-Winston 
Regression (PCSE) 
FGLS 
 Parliamentary 
Autocracy 
-1.0341 
(.1640, 0.000) 
-1.0547 
(.8083, 0.213) 
-1.1773 
(.0345, 0.000) 
-1.2097*** 
(.0121,  0.000) 
Socialist 
.8470 
(.1148, 0.000) 
.6563 
(.5299, 0.236) 
1.0123 
(.0401, 0.000) 
 
            1.0094*** 
(.0116, 0.000) 
Liberals 
1.1940 
(.1552, 0.000) 
1.3289 
(.6864, 0.073) 
1.1961 
(.0411, 0.000) 
1.1624*** 
(.0110, 0.000) 
Centerist 
1.1199 
(.1379, 0.000) 
1.5466 
(.6551, 0.033) 
.7687 
(.0295, 0.000) 
.7239*** 
(.0152, 0.000) 
Military 
.9250 
(.1489, 0.000) 
1.0755 
(.7439, 0.170) 
.3158 
(.1350, 0.019) 
.2734*** 
(.0097, 0.000) 
Stability 
.2704 
(.1626. 0.097) 
3.2340 
(2.6136, 0.236) 
-.0025 
(.0206, 0.903) 
-.0027*** 
(.0005, 0.000) 
Concentration of political power 
Opposition 
.0498 
(.1258, 0.692) 
.0708 
(.8371, 0.934) 
-.0441 
(.0519, 0.395) 
-.0350*** 
(.0017, 0.000) 
Government 
.7324 
(.1374, 0.000) 
2.2172 
(1.0296, 0.049) 
.1127 
(.0463, 0.015) 
.0913*** 
(.0033, 0.000) 
Constant 
-.9375 
(.0625, 0.000) 
-2.4238 
(.9293, 0.021) 
-.3483 
(.0429, 0.000) 
-.3087*** 
(.0097, 0.000) 
R-squared 0.43  0.65  
F-Statistics/Wald 
(prob.) 
36.47  
(0.000) 
2.55  
(0.0598) 
13635.09 
 (0.000) 
2696436 
(0.00) 
Observations 368 368 368 368 
No. of groups 22 22 22 22 
Diagnostics 
Wooldridge test 
(Autocorrelation 
Test) 
70.74*** 
(0.000) 
No GroupWise 
Hetroscadasticity 
No autocorrelation No autocorrelation 
White Test 
(Hetreoskadasticit
y Test) 
133.54*** 
(0.000) 
No cross sectional 
correlation 
No Hetroscadasticity No Hetroscadasticity 
Breusch-Pagan 
LM 
2629.61 *** 
(0.0000) 
Hausman Test 
(43.52, 0.0000) 
  
Panel specific AR (1) standard errors are shown in parentheses. Standard errors (se) and p-values are presented below their 
corresponding coefficient (se; p). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
It has been observed that more centralized governments are involved more in rent seeking126 
activities. Such activities fill up the pockets of the leaders of such governments and the general 
welfare of public decreases due to corruption, nepotism etc. Moreover interesting results have been 
found that both types of autocracies are negatively related to the objective of welfarism in trade 
                                                          
126 Calvert & Calvert (2007). 
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policy. Again the same other variables have also been incorporated in the model 4b presented in 
Table 3.5 on the same lines and results are almost similar in its nature for all those variables as in 
case of model 4a presented in Table 3.4 but only with slight change in the intensity of their effect. 
Like in case of autocratic governments, role of military executive in welfare-enhancing trade 
policy is more as compared to democracy and similarly negative effect of stability of the 
government is more in case of autocracy against democracy because due to less number of veto 
players in such governments. This increases the credibility of the political leader and its system 
and in this way he will try to serve more to the interest of general public. Moreover in this model 
powers with governments are positively affecting welfare in trade policy decisions while powers 
exercised by opposition is influencing negatively to the governments’ decisions about 
policymaking. However R-square is very high as compared to other models showing the 
importance of the constitutional nature of any political system.  
3.8: Discussion 
This section has tried to analyze explicitly the effect of three broad categories of any nations 
political set up i.e. Governance, Political environment and division of constitutional powers in any 
political regime on the government objective related to the maximization of social welfare through 
trade policy choices. Political regime and constitutional powers actually informs about the 
institutional frame work of an economy and are often taken as ‘rules of game’ or in other words 
tells us how much politics is involved in decision making process while governance is about the 
‘play of game’ i.e. how those rules have been implemented successfully. Governance is always 
related to the institutional quality of any nation. At present, developing nations are facing these 
issues related to political environment and trying to find ways through the ‘second generation 
reforms’ for the solution of such problems. Interesting fact is this now these reforms are not related 
anymore to new growth strategies rather about the maintaining rule of law and security of property 
rights. Because it is believed that if environment is safe and controlled in these vulnerable states 
then more investors will be here for business activities and this will ultimately lead to more 
economic activity. Recently Acemoglu & Robinson (2013) have related economics with politics 
and gave a clear direction for policy reforms for nations in the context of political economy and 
concluded that ‘good economics is good politics’ which means that good economic policy choices 
can even remove the distortions in politics of a nation. Therefore in designing any economic policy, 
policy makers must not overlook its both political causes and consequences. For example if any 
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policy reform/innovation is aimed to eliminate economic rents of a weak group of the society then 
it can sometimes badly affect the political equilibrium and destroy the balance of power. Even 
knowing all these facts, unfortunately it has been observed that role of politics has been ignored in 
decision making process and only since 1980s economists have started taking it into focus.127 
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), one of the  reasons for not incorporating the role of 
politics explicitly in models that it is understood that politicians will choose only that policy which 
is maximizing the social welfare of the society because this step will provide them ‘a window of 
opportunity’ to get re-elected.   
Keeping in view these theoretical debates, this study has also made an attempt to observe the 
effects of all these factors explicitly on the welfare concerns of a government in trade policy 
making. Findings of the study report that it’s not about type of political regime actually rather this 
is the constitutional nature of these political regimes which matters in promoting welfarism in 
government policies i.e. if democracy is of parliamentary natured then its impact is positive on 
welfare estimates and for presidential type of democracy it turns into negative coefficient. All this 
helps in drawing this conclusion that developing nations should not only promote democracy in 
their political set up but should also try to focus that such democracies should be of parliamentary 
type and focus on the de jure (constitutional rules) institutions more in case of policy making by 
governments as compared to other institutional parameters. Because the result of study confirms 
that political party ideology in the different constitutional set ups of the governments are affecting 
the extent of welfarism more as compared to any other strand of institutional framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
127 Drazen (2000); Persson & Tabellini (2000); Acemoglu & Robinson (2006).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
IMPACT OF SYNERGIES BETWEEN POLICY RFORMS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
REFORMS ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF DEVELOPING NATIONS 
 
 
4.1: Introduction: 
After evaluating the ‘welfarism’ in government trade policy decision and the main factors affecting 
this paradigm in making economic policies, now this section is designed to relate the trade policy 
choices of developing nations with their economic performance after incorporating the role of 
various institutions.  
 
“Institutions may be seen as architecture and as rules that determine opportunities and 
incentives for behavior, inclusion and exclusion of potential players, and structuring the 
relative ease or difficulty of inducing change, and the mechanisms through which change 
may be facilitated or denied.”  
                                                                                        (Rhodes & Binder, 2006, p. xiii)  
 
Various authors have worked on defining institutions and their direct or indirect impact on 
economic performance of nations. Some authors emphasized on “institutions matters”128 while 
some found that “institutions do not matter”.129 Instead these are fixed factors like geographical 
conditions that have more effect on the growth acceleration process of economies than institutions. 
And according to these authors such geographical positions actually help in designing institutions.   
Earlier it was believed that only economic factors were responsible for the development of 
economies but with the passage of time this horizon got broader. The journey of these decades has 
been summarized in few lines. Like first decade of development studies embedding with Rostow 
stages (1956) and Kuznets (1973) view tried to show the world that the difference in the economic 
development of North and South was actually due to the cultural or civilization catch up between 
these two poles. In this way, civilization gaps (lags) led to economic gaps. All these approaches 
ignored the role of social and political factors in shaping the future of nations. But in 1960s a new 
shift in development paradigms was introduced with import substitution strategy by incorporating 
social and economic aspects of society as well in development literature. In 1970’s, development 
                                                          
128 North (1996), Rodrik (2002), Preziworski (2004), Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), Keefer and Knack (1995), La 
Porta et al. (1998), Kaufmann et al. (2000), Rodrik, et al. (2004). 
129 Sachs (2003), Haber et al. (n.d). 
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theorists diverted their focus on another important determinant of economic development which 
was the emphasis on ‘human rights’ for the removal of income inequality. 1980’s debt crises led 
to market liberalization strategy for development. In 1990’s, the view of development turned into 
‘human development’ by United Nation and East Asian Newly industrialized nations showed 
miracle of success following this paradigm shift not only through increased in growth rates but 
through culminating poverty and emphasizing more on education and skill attainment. This is a 
little tale covering various aspects of development side of economics where policies were being 
used as a tool for development. Many developing countries also tried to follow well designed 
policies used in the North region of the world. But the outcome in the form of real progress didn’t 
occur in the same line. That was the time when economists started thinking beyond this perception 
‘Getting prices right’ because in economics, if suggested policy choice goes wrong in showing its 
results than it means imperfections in the form of externalities or monopoly exists in the economy. 
And economists started taking into consideration the political landscape of nations into account 
for the implantation of policies in right way and then focus diverted towards ‘getting institutions 
right’.130 In 1990s, Williamson, an analyst of World Bank, gave an agenda of 10 points for the 
development of Latin American nations. This agenda motivated developing nations that if these 
really want to come out of their poverty traps then these should have to follow policies of 
liberalization, privatization and stabilization. Since then mostly all developing nations tried to 
follow these policies as prescription for development. But unfortunately again policy outcomes 
were not same for all nations and the passing time revealed that these mantras of reforms have 
been turned into ‘Washington Confusion’ (Rodrik, 2006). This again forced world thinkers and 
economists to provide guidance to developing countries in their policymaking and brought a 
revolutionary change in policy devising with a new approach ‘Getting the diagnosis right’.131 This 
idea was actually based on prioritizing among different ‘binding constraints’ in less developed 
nations through proper diagnosis of an economy and then giving a targeted prescription for the 
recovery of that specific disease of economy. One-size-fits-all policy cannot help in making all 
poor and developing nations’ condition better off equally. Because each nation has its different 
economic problem and if in designing policy that problem has not been addressed seriously and 
some other sector’s related reforms have been applied then off course results will not be positive. 
                                                          
130 Rodrik (2004). 
131 Hausmann et al. (2006). 
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Better is to start from that reform which has most direct effect on the population of such nations 
as compared to following spray gun approach with the hope that perhaps the reform will make 
change or effect remains neutral. The designers of this approach were of the view that it is more 
targeted approach and one can expect change in a specific time period in economies with much 
emphasis on bringing overall institutional and governance reforms overall which is not an easy 
task for developing countries. But Rodrik (2008) introduced the same approach using different 
context of ‘binding constraints’ and introduced the solution of the removal of such constraints with 
the help of ‘second best institutions,132 which actually works by keeping an eye on the changing 
nature of binding constraints. Rodrik also forwarded this idea that such binding constraints133 vary 
time to time so their solutions should also be based on the present situation and proposed that 
mostly such type of second best institutions can bring more swiftly tailwinds for developing 
countries as compared to formal orthodox institutions. Rejecting the approach of ‘best practices’ 
due to the reason that many a times the prescriptions which proved best in one circumstances may 
not helpful in other changed institutional framework and at other time, Rodrik (2008) suggested 
that developing countries should try to follow the ‘Growth Diagnostics’ approach before having 
some prescription and try to avoid following best practice approach. On the basis of this huge 
literature analysis of interplay between policies and growth of nations, theorists134 believe that as 
a last resort, stronger institutions are sine qua non for achieving self-sustaining growth objective 
pertaining to neoliberal view of development. This is the reason that now the emphasis on the 
                                                          
132 Such institutions are related heavily to the institutional and governance structures of nations. This idea was 
presented by Rodrik in the form of augmented Washington Consensus by adding ten points in the previous policy 
reforms of Washington Consensus. And in this context, secure property rights conditions have been regarded the most 
important source of the difference in the incomes of rich and poor nations. And all this led to ‘institutional 
fundamentalism’ and many research work lead towards this new approach. Easterly and Levine (2003) proved the 
supremacy of domestic institutions over policy reforms in growth empirics. All this provided a new road to success 
for developing countries. 
133 Rodrik has explained this difference of binding constraints for right policy prescriptions by providing the example 
of El Salvador and Brazil. Both nations have different binding constraints i.e. El Salvador has low rates of return of 
investment and Brazil despite of having high rates of returns on investment face lower levels of savings. Due to lower 
levels of investment in El Salvador, lack of ‘self-discovery’ or innovations has been taken as binding constraint for 
their low economic growth. On the other side, Brazilians due to more education has more innovative capacity in their 
nationals but paucity of proper channel through which domestic savings can be moved towards investment projects 
has proved binding constraint in that economy. So in this way a similar remedy for the uplift of both economies will 
not work. Growth diagnostic approach which is based on this binding constraint concept actually states that reform 
can only be there in economic system if ‘right policy prescription’ is referred on the basis of prevailing situation. 
Recently Grenada (2012) also proved that inefficient institutional environment for business class has been the most 
important binding constraint in case of Grenada for low economic performance.  
134 For details see Peet & Hartwick (1999). 
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institutional development for the progress of economies in the form of better policies135 as 
compared to complete dependency on economic indicators has increased much in last two decades. 
In an attempt to find the role of institutions, works of Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones 
(1999), Sen (1999), Rodrik (2000) are very influential. They explored various dimensions of 
institutions in this regard like bureaucracy, democracy, civil and political rights etc. Various terms 
like ‘social infrastructure’, ‘social constructions’, ‘rules of games’, ‘social constraints’, ‘black box’ 
have been used for defining these institutions. Earlier economists tried to follow the one-size-fits-
all recipe for removing the gap between Western and non-Western societies by transplanting the 
former’s institutions in toto in the latter’s societies but this experiment also failed and proved that 
natural endowments and informal setups of nations matter more for the evolvement of sufficient 
institutions. And only those formal institutions which are incorporating the informal aspects of the 
societies can be more conducive for the development. Moreover it was also observed that only 
those institutions can have ‘legitimacy’ which are embedded with the norms and culture of the 
society. Now economists talk about right institutional mix or institutional monocroping136 for 
better results. Recently Andrew (2013) and Krause (2013) supported the same idea of 
monocroping using a new term ‘isomorphic mimicry137’ for the institutional imitation by poor 
nations for their economic progress.138 On the other side economic geographers are also now more 
concerned about ‘institutional thickness’,139 ‘institutional space,140 and untraded 
interdependencies,141 for regional interconnectedness of nations. Both the authors have also 
                                                          
135 Few authors have made attempt to present an analytical framework of policymaking and policy implementation 
Moncrieffe and Luttrell (2005). 
136 Evan (2002), Mkandawire (2009). 
137 This term was actually coined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who tried to describe that how the imitation of 
successful organizations of developed countries by developing countries can attract the world towards their 
economies. They were of the view that in developing nations mostly newly designed institutions do not know how to 
perform well. So to copy from the other side of the world can increase the chances but not surely, of better economic 
performance through getting recognition in the world. They actually proved it with the help of Japanese economy 
which copied various systems from various part of the world like postal services of Britain, Police set up of France 
and army of Persia and it got success in copying the Persia. 
138 Krause (2013) for more details on isomorphism. Recently Powell and DiMaggio (2013) have again tried to relate 
new institutionalism with different strands arising in various fields of social sciences. They emphasized upon the social 
constructs in the development of contemporary institutions. This means that changing ideas, norms, beliefs and social 
behaviors result in more refined and practical institutions.  
139 Amin & Thrift (1995), related a new idea to the strong mutual relationship among various institutions of a particular 
region and lesser level of conflict. And this interconnectedness of regional institutions facilitates to make collective 
decision regarding projects among nations.  
140 An Idea developed by Martin (2000) 
141 A new Theoretical concept introduced by Stroper (1995). This is related to the co-operation between organizations 
and enterprises in specific areas in case of production. Here these interdependencies emerge in the form of values, 
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admitted the supremacy of institutions in regional policymaking after embeddedness of societies 
and their geographical proximity for enhancing level of cooperation, trust and exchange of 
knowledge among nations. Keeping in view all of the above discussion, this study attempts to 
relate not only trade policy to economic growth but also aims to incorporate the effects of all these 
institutional factors in trade policy making. Many authors in past (North; 1990, Olson; 1993, 
Dawson; 1998, Hall and Jones; 1999, Kaufmann and Kraay; 2002, Parente and Prescot; 1999) have 
concluded that institutions are actually liable for the differences in the economic gains among 
nations. But in their analysis, either a direct link between growth and institutions was being made 
by capturing the endogeneity of institutions (Acemoglu et al.; 2005) or the relation has been 
checked directly from policy towards growth without capturing the endogeneity of these policies. 
Earlier efforts have been made to capture the endogeneity of trade policy via geography and 
governance but ignoring other aspects of any political system involved in policy making. To fulfill 
this gap in literature, this study has tried to address the issue of endogeneity of trade policy not 
only through geography as has been the practice in past but also using different dimensions of a 
nation’s institutional framework which actually matter in this regard. These dimensions include 
political and economic institutions, governance and the extent of institutional integration/openness 
with the whole world. In short it discusses the Trade policy-Growth analysis from a ‘New Political 
Economy’ perspective by employing a new estimation technique and not relying on Gravity model 
for dealing with this endogeneity problem. 
4.2: Literature Review: 
Literature review has been split into two parts. First one is covering briefly the connection between 
institutions and economic growth and the second section is wrapping the empirical evidences 
showing the importance of institutions in designing trade policies. Basing upon these two strands, 
this study has tried to prove the trade policy–growth nexus by incorporating the role of various 
types of institutions in designing these policies.  
4.2.1: Institutions and economic growth 
There are two important approaches related to the definition of institutions. First was given by 
Williamson (1975, 1985) which was actually put forward by Coase (1937) who considers 
institutions as ‘Governing Structure’. It means that institutions are system of rules which help in 
                                                          
culture and norms which provide help to economic actors in the phase of uncertainty. This is an idea specifically 
related to region-specific institute building for the development of economies.  
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avoiding collective action problems. The main focus of such institutions is on the ownership 
structure, corporate culture and common agency problems. Second definition is given by North 
(1990) in which he defines institutions as a ‘Rules of Game’ or it can be said that according to this 
approach institutions provide ‘Incentive Structures’ for the economy and societies. In literature 
such types of institutions have positive impact on economic performance of the nations because of 
the predictability of parties’ action. The prominent difference between these two types of 
institutions is that the former is more helpful in handling societal and economic issues when the 
latter institutes become inefficient. Moreover institutions can also be divided by taking their effects 
on markets such as ‘market clearing’ and ‘market deepening’ effects. Institutions as rules of game 
have the effect of market clearing through the provision of incentives to economic players in 
market for contracting. While institutions as governing structure have market deepening effects by 
enabling economic players to obtain high returns over the economic transactions. According to 
Rodrik (2000), institutions governed by rules of game are institutions of property rights, and 
conflict resolution institutions. Rule of law, contract enforceability, power and accountability, 
judicial impartiality are the measures used to evaluate the quality of such type of institutions. On 
the other hand regulatory institutions and stabilization institutions come under the category of 
institutions as governing structures. Bureaucratic efficiency, transparency, policy predictability are 
the major factors through which the quality of this type of institutions can be measured. Rodrik 
now debates over the issue how to acquire better institutions after the acknowledgement that 
“institutions matter” and points out that market vigilance is an important factor for the better 
working of institutions and their outcome. Example of Asian Financial crisis can be seen in this 
regard in which Thailand and South Korea got into trouble not because of financial liberalization 
rather it was due to inadequate regulation on behalf of authorities. Therefore it is asserted now that 
many a times such type of interventions help nations to come out of low level of traps and get the 
maximum benefits out of their business decisions. Such controls from government show the 
importance of institutions in explaining growth quite clearly. Moreover Rodrik (2000) regarded 
democracy as a meta-institution in good institution building and acknowledged that democracies 
have much ability to absorb sudden shocks faced by the economies.  
Hall and Jones (1999) attempted to find the reasons of difference in output per worker. By 
employing various measures of formal and informal institutions, the results of the study showed 
93 
 
that it’s the change in institutions named as social infrastructure which helped in increasing 
productivity or economic performance of workers in different regions of the world. 
Hensiz (2000) aimed to develop a relation between role of political institutions and their impact 
on growth of economies. Author found this relation by developing an index of political constraints 
in a system and highlighted the role of political constraints in his study i.e. how much a policy has 
feasibility to change. Such constraints by political and institutional factor can affect the effort of 
government’s capacity to absorb shocks and give the quick policy change.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) examined the reasons of difference in incomes among rich and poor 
nations of the World and proved institutions as the first order determinant of economic 
performance as compared to geographical factors. Empirical results showed strongly negative 
relationship between institutional quality and mortality rates of settlers and proved the supremacy 
of long lasting institutes over other factors in raising GDP per capita of nations. 
Persson (2002) explored that whether political institutions interfere in shaping up economic 
policies or not and found the answer of this question in positive concluding that adjustments to 
many economic events comes only from institutions. Moreover the author found that in 
majoritarian type of government as compared to parliamentary type have less chances of 
corruption because of smaller size of government spending in such states on welfare programs and 
weaker proportion of social transfers through electoral cycle. This study differentiates from earlier 
ones because it made a deeper link of politico-economic issues. But the link was made direct not 
involving the policy difference of these two political systems which actually creates the web of 
evils in a society.   
Nkurunziza and Bates (2003) tried to relate political institutions with economic growth in African 
nations and proved that political regimes do not make any difference on attaining the level of 
political stability. Moreover a surprising finding was found that long tenure of a dictator appears 
to be better for growth than a democratic politician who tries to win governments again and again 
in electoral process through any means.142 
Rodrik (2004) aimed to find the reasons of sustained development in an economy. The results 
supported that better institutional transformation is one of the main ingredients in achieving the 
objective of sustainable economic growth. But this transformation needs not to be on large scale. 
Even minimal transformations are enough for development convergence towards economic 
                                                          
142 For details see De Mesquita et al. (2002). 
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prosperity and once the growth starts taking place then countries find it easy to maintain a virtuous 
cycle with growth and better institutional set up/arrangements feeding each other. 
Eicher and Leukert (2006) examined the effect of economic and political institutions on 
economic performance in both OECD and Non-OECD countries using Hall and Jones (1999) 
model specification and found the significant impact of economic institutions for those countries. 
Authors concluded that the impact of these institutions was two third smaller for OECD than Non-
OECD nations.   
Weymouth (2007) also made an attempt to relate political institutions with economic outcomes in 
an economy. Author admitted that good institutions matters for improved financial development 
and concluded that political checks and balances are more effective in enhancing the policy 
stability because of the monitoring on chief executive. The empirical findings of research showed 
that property right institutions have strong positive effect on the growth of economies.   
Manca (2009) also proved that it is basically the differences in institutional quality which is 
delaying the process of technology gap among countries. Using Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) 
empirical specification the author found a positive relation of increase in total factor productivity 
with institutional quality differences in nations  
Barseghyan and Dicecio (2010) observed the importance of institutions by relating their 
performance with the volatility of output growth per worker. Using two proxies of institutions i.e. 
Entry costs in business and property rights, authors found that one standard deviation increases in 
entry cost worsens the output growth by 60 percent and proved that barriers to entry in business 
have a strong fundamental effect on output growth. These findings supported the view that 
transaction costs (rent-seeking) hinder mainly the growth of any industry leading to downturn in 
output growth. 
Fata`s and Mihov (2011) evaluated the role of institutions on growth through formulation of 
macroeconomic policies. The results showed that one standard deviation increase in policy 
volatility reduces growth by 0.74% in panel regression and more than one percentage point in cross 
section analysis. Authors concluded that the political institutions which constrain the executive 
have strong effect on economic growth. This study was some improvement in past literature but 
with a flaw that authors used outcome based policies which are not directly policies themselves 
rather the results of actual policies.  
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Kourtellos et al. (2010) also tried to be a participant of the debate whether institutions rule over 
geography in explaining the long run economic performance or vice versa. Their study confirmed 
this fact that quality of institutions actually determines the role of both variables. Results showed 
that impact of improvement in quality of institutions on long run economic performance is 5.5 
times more for the nations lying under the lower limit of threshold of institutional quality index. 
Their results confirmed the primacy of institutions for nations with poor institutional setup. 
Estimates also showed that for low income nations, one standard deviation improvement in quality 
of institutions led to increase their long run economic performance by 3.3 standard deviations 
point. Again here link direct between institutions and development was being made in this study 
ignoring the indirect impact on policy making. 
Eris and Ulasan (2013) revisited the relationship between openness and long run economic 
growth in the neo classical growth model. Authors found an interesting result that the relationship 
between these two variables weakens when other variables such as institutions and their quality, 
geography and heterogeneity of the society is being incorporated in the baseline line model. This 
shows that openness cannot be growth enhancing until better institutions, lesser conflict and 
fragmentation of the society are the characteristics of a nation. Hence the study concluded that 
trade openness and growth nexus is sensitive to the inclusion of these variables.  
Flachaire et al. (2014) also analyzed the role of political and economic institutions in growth 
regimes and found that political institutions provide a stage to design economic institutions and 
implement economic policies using the dataset for both developing and developed countries. More 
important policy implication of their work was this if in week democracies, an autocratic 
government improves economic institutions then such economies have higher growth rates like 
East Asian nations.  
4.2.2: Institutions and Trade policy  
Trade has always been considered as engine to economic growth. Many renowned economists 
emphasized upon trade as an important ingredient for better economic performance.143 
 
 
‘the causes which determine the economic progress of nations belong to the study of 
international trade’ 
(Marshall, 1890, p. 16) 
                                                          
143 Krueger (1997). 
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‘the institutional setting in which trade policy operates is more important for economic 
performance than the levels at which specific trade barriers are set’. 
                     (Rodrik, 2002, p. 9) 
Effects of institutions on trade policy has so far been not given much importance by researchers 
and if some work has been done then only descriptively not empirically. Basically institutions help 
in providing strategic environment to policy makers and interest group for the formulation of 
policies in an economy. There are different types of institutions in an economy. These are political, 
economic, formal, informal, and legal institutions etc. All such institutions play their part in 
concluding economic outcome. In past literature only theory of endogenous tariff made a little 
effort to incorporate the role of political forces in the model. This theory proposed that policy 
makers (politicians) do not make trade policies taking into the consideration the benefits of 
common citizens rather they try to make that choice between protection and free trade whose lobby 
is strongest. And this will make more chances of their re-election in next tenure. Or in other words 
it can be said that this model incorporates the idea that protectionists have more chances of making 
strong lobbies as compared to advocates of free trade.144 
After these premier works about better institutional quality and economic development, now the 
time is to focus on several important features of institutions and their role in shaping the economic 
outcomes in nations. Tabellini (2005) highlighted the growth effects of different economic policies 
under various institutional setups and proposed that to explain growth variations due to change in 
economic policies is not easy task because economic policies are endogenous. According to this 
point of view, government incentives were assumed to be the major factor affecting policies 
endogenously as compared to new discoveries in the form of technology. Tabellini (2005) has 
admitted that this is the serious methodological problem researcher is facing in regressing these 
two variables i.e. growth and economic policy and tried to explain theoretically a new channel how 
macroeconomic policies affect economic performance in a nation through institutions. Or in other 
words institutions affects public policies and then these policies play their role in economic 
development. Here institutions can be political like democracies or autocracies, economic, formal 
or informal institutions. Trade volume and trade policy along with many other macroeconomic 
policies has been discussed in literature where policy has endogeneity problem in determining the 
growth effects of the economy. Literature shows a mix picture of the relationship between trade 
and growth. Lucas (1988) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) gave an idea that it can go either 
                                                          
144 For instance Mayer (1984), Magee, Brock, & Young (1989) and Grossman & Helpman (1994, 2001).   
97 
 
way. According to researchers, this discrepancy can be due to the methodological error in handling 
the endogeneity of policy past analysis. Frankel and Romer (1999) for the first time and then 
following him Alesina et al. (2003) tried to purpose a technique to solve this problem by using 
Gravity model. But in that model the endogeneity of trade policy was proposed to capture only 
through geographical measures like distance, landlockedness etc. Many other important factors 
have remained ignored for a long period of time. Here is a brief literature review showing the 
relationship among trade, institutions and economic performance.   
Milgrom and North (1990) diverted the attention of policy makers towards the role of institutions 
in the revival of trade. Authors based their view on the proposition that as trade activity expands 
among nations then it becomes difficult for ‘merchants’ to remain well informed about the 
behaviors of their partners. For this purpose, an essential need of designing institutions arises 
which can reduce the chances of cheating among traders and proposed an idea that if in a society 
law and order situations are controlled through better performance of elected judges then a wave 
of ‘trust’ will help traders to involve themselves bilaterally into trade agreement because of no fear 
of breaking promises and an effective reputation of system will help in enhancing trade relations. 
This law enforcement will promote contract enforcement and less chances of uncertainty (cheating 
in making bilateral exchanges) will be in economic environment. And traders will be well informed 
with the help of such institutions and transaction costs in knowing the past behavior and reputation 
of other trade partner will also come down due to impartial behavior of judges. 
Greif (1992) proved that trade is not only being determined by endowments, technology and 
preferences rather this is the outcome of many political and economic institutions and concluded 
that trade across borders depends on political and economic exchange relations among nations. 
And these exchange relations are governed by institutions. History has also shown that the 
relationship between institutions and trade in the form of commercial revolution during 11th-14th 
century. This gave rise to the reemergence of trade between Mediterranean and European 
nations.145 Historians are of the opinion that it was purely due to the change in institutional 
environment in these nations and these institutions are basically the outcome of political and social 
processes. Actors of these social and political processes help in transmitting information from one 
entity to another, in bringing different parties towards collective action and even use their coercive 
powers for implementing rules for achieving economic ends. Moreover author also found that 
                                                          
145 Lopaz (1976). 
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these institutions cannot be regarded as the second best which means that they help in maximizing 
trade instead these were self-enforcing systems only to facilitate trade among nations. And these 
help in regulating commodity futures market, diffusion of knowledge and relationships between 
foreign investors, overseas suppliers and distributors and governments. 
Przeworskai and Limongi (1993) aimed to observe the role of politics in policy making and 
proved that international institutions and governments are of the same opinion that policies matter 
for growth and each policy is the outcome of political process of governments. These authors 
concluded that ‘politics’ is a fundamental ingredient of policymaking in any nation According to 
their view, it’s the state autonomy which helps in making and execution of better policies i.e. 
democracy or autocracy doesn’t make any difference, it is basically the institutions that allow these 
states to do what these should and prevent them what these should not for the welfare of citizens.  
Ng and Yeats (1998) also related governance and trade policy to the economic performance of 
Sub Saharan African nations. Using various proxies for measuring economic performance of these 
nations via trade policy and governance, authors tried to prove the importance of nation’s domestic 
policies over the policies by international forums and organizations like United Nations and World 
trade organization. The results of study showed that nation’s internal structural policies specially 
trade policies and governance structure explain more than 60 percent variation in the economic 
performance of these developing nations. Moreover the speed of convergence towards integrated 
world is very high for poorer nations as compared to other nations.  
Nicolini (2006) proved for the economy of US that institutional quality is the fundamental factor 
in enhancing comparative advantage of nation using contract enforcement as a proxy for 
institutional quality.  
Jansen and Nordas (2004) aimed to relate institutions with trade flows and trade policies but not 
taking using trade policy endogenous. Using governance indicators as the proxy for institutions 
authors found positive impact of institutions on trade flows and observed no statistically significant 
impact of domestic tariff.  The results proved that institutions have not only direct but also indirect 
impact on trade reforms in nations through increasing the actual flow more after reducing tariff 
rates.  
Basu (2008) made a link between development with economic policy, institutions and geography. 
The finding of the study showed that role of institutions is stronger in case of any development 
perspective than economic policy and geography. No doubt all are contributing positively to the 
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development of an economy but in most case role of economic policy is not significant. The 
indicators used for economic policy are trade to GDP ratio, inflation, exchange rate policy, and 
capital liberalization policies. But this study observed the effect of all variables individually 
without capturing the endogeneity of either economic policy or institutions. 
Ahmed (2012) also made an attempt to make relation of openness and institutional quality 
independently with economic growth. The findings of study confirmed that openness measured 
through trade to GDP ratio has positive impact on economic growth. Similar results were found in 
case of proxies used for institutional quality. This study didn’t see the effect of incidence   based 
measure on economic growth and again problem of endogeneity was being ignored. 
Li (2013) recently worked on political economy of NTMs and captured the endogeneity of NTMs 
using various institutional variables. Author found that the relationship between various NTMs 
and maximum residue limit (protectionism level) is sensitive to the inclusion and exclusion of 
political institutional variable.  
Francois and Manchin (2013) in their analysis of North-South bilateral trade flows found that 
institutional quality of the regions is one of the most important factors for exporters to make trade 
agreements among nations because it is believed that better institutions help in reducing transaction 
costs. 
Zhao and Zhao (2013) recently made an attempt to find the determinant of high growth rates in 
Chinese economy during 1978-2008 for its 31 provinces and proved the hypothesis proposed by 
North (1990) that institutional change brought economic transformation in China. There the 
important institutional change has been observed in the form of improved property rights.  
Bown (2014) related different trade policy instrument choices to the institutional aspects of 
international trade organizations on trade flows of the world. Author summarized the recent trends 
in trade policy since the inception of GATT and concluded that all sort of agreements unilateral, 
bilateral or multilateral, all are the result of politico-economic vested interests.  
Assane and Chiang (2014) by extending gravity model proved empirically that poor performance 
of economic institutions along with more restrictive trade policies are responsible for lower 
bilateral trade among Sub Saharan African nations.  
From the discussions of past literature, it is quite evident that the debate over this burning  issue 
related to the role of institutions in policy making and the eventual effect of these policies on 
economic performance is still inconclusive which leaves the room for further contribution into this 
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literature. It is well acknowledged that institutions positively affect economic growth but 
institutions have diversity and to know which institution matters more for making various policies, 
this is now important question. The present study attempts to provide answer of this question in 
case of trade policies. Earlier mostly measures of openness have been used for relating trade with 
growth but this study has used extensive number of measures covering policy-based measures, 
outcome-based, price-based, and index-based measures to examine Trade policy-Growth analysis 
by capturing the endogeneity of trade policy through various institutional factors. Moreover 
another important contributions of this study is that both short run and long run impacts have been 
found by employing recent instrument technique because institutions always show their 
performance in long run therefore institutional analysis without incorporating this aspect is having 
no worth. Lastly, the whole analysis is based on the panel of developing nations. The rationale 
behind the selection of this panel is the poor quality of institutions of these nations which is actually 
becoming the main hurdle in the implementation process of even well knitted policies and causes 
in ambiguous results.  
4.3: Choice of Measures of Institutions 
After reviewing the broad literature related to economic policies, role of institutions and economic 
growth, now this section summarizes various measures of institutions used in past literature and 
helps in choosing the more refined and accurate measure for the present analysis. As it has been 
strongly believed and well acknowledged that sound economic development is the outcome of 
better institutions. But the problem arises which measure can be the best proxy for defining these 
institutions.146 Several authors and organizations have put forward various measures for this 
purpose but still it can be said that institutional measures are like black box of goodies.147 
According to North (1996), institutions are humanly devised constraints which contain two 
important elements; formal rules and laws, informal set of constraints which includes norms and 
culture. Hanson (2006) has discussed the difference between these two types of constraints which 
together shape institutions. According to his view, norms cannot be changed but rules can be and 
basically these are norms which give legitimacy to rules. It is believed that those economies have 
slow growth performances which follow the norms of other societies and therefore better 
                                                          
146 Recently Aron (2000) has critically discussed various quantitative measures of institutions in growth-institution 
empirical studies which can be misleading in their interpretations. And he concluded that the results after putting 
institutions in Solow’s growth model can be sensitive to the choice of appropriate measure of institutions.  
147 Hanson (2006). 
101 
 
enforcement of rules and laws requires better practice of norms and values by its citizens. Thus it 
can be said that norms actually help in determining rules. And both norms (informal rules) and 
rules (formal rules) collectively build institutional setup which ultimately pave ways to promote 
economic development. There is long debate these days on how to measure and not to measure 
institutions. Various subjective or objective, business or non- business and general or specific 
measures are available through different World organizations. But still many thinkers in this field 
believe that many of the available are actually either input based or outcome based like World 
Bank ‘governance indicators’. Bardhan (2005) concluded in an attempt to determine which 
institutions matter that political participatory index and democracy accountability index are 
important measures of institutions148 than property rights protection institutions (sometimes also 
known as market creating institutions). But recently it has been suggested that the best proxies for 
institutions should be based on two categories i.e. de jure (formally in legislation) and de facto 
classification (factually applied)149 which means rules approved in legislation and rules in practice 
(but not approved in black and white). A Table 4.1 given below gives a snapshot of those four 
important types of institutional measures which have been used by authors in literature up till 
present.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
148 Rodrik (2004) has considered such institutions as market legitimizing institutions while recently Mĳiyawa (n.d) 
have regarded democracy as market stabilizing institution as well. He concluded that politico-economic institutions 
are necessary for sustainable growth in nations.  
149 Voigt (2009). 
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Table: 4.1: Snapshot of Institutional Variables 
Type of measure Past Literature 
Social infrastructure  
 Mostly ICRG index (presented by Knack 
Keefer, 1995) is being used for this purpose. It 
covers five categories.  
Hall and Jones (1999) 
Expropriation Risk measure 
 This is also taken from a sub-index of ICRG 
dataset. Now this measure is no more available 
rather has been combined into contract 
viability.  
Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
Economic Freedom of the world by Fraser Institute La Porta et al. (2002), 
The Freedom House Index Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
Author’s own compilation of prominent institutional measures 
The first measure can be considered as both subjective and objective measure. It is non-business 
and a general sort of measure. Expropriation risk measure is basically a subjective, business and a 
specific nature of measure. EFW is also non business and general measure and covers both aspects 
of being subjective and objective measure. And in the last Freedom House index is not only non-
business measure in nature but also subjective and general institutional measure. According to 
Hansen (2006), the last measure covers all aspects of the definition of institutions given by North 
(1996) and it is more democratic approach towards institutional environment because this index 
tells us how institutions work actually rather than these intends to work. Statistically it has been 
observed that all these four measures are highly correlated with each other. After analyzing the 
perils and virtues of each measure, the present study also aims to make the use of last measure i.e. 
The Freedom House Index, and follow the classification of de jure150 and de facto151 institutional 
measures. The same classification has been used in the earlier analysis made for observing the role 
of institutions in maintaining welfarism in society through government policy decisions.  
                                                          
150 Following Pande and Udry (2005), these institutional measures include constitutional political institutions like 
Democracy, Autocracy and concentration of powers among political leaders. 
151 Such measures include Governance conditions after implementation of rules designed by formal political 
institutions. 
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4.4:  Taxonomy of Trade Policy Measures 
This section gives a clear a snapshot about trade policy measures in past literature and then reports 
about those measures which have been used in this study.   
Author’s own compilation of literature about trade policy variables.  
Table: 4.2: Snapshot of Trade Measures 
Authors Publication Trade policy measures 
Learner’s (1988) Measures of openness Regression based measure to 
estimate net trade flows, import 
penetration ratios. 
Dollar (1992) 
 
Outward-oriented developing 
economies really do grow more 
rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 
1976-1985. 
Price based measure in the form of 
constructing index of real exchange 
rate distortions. And index of real 
exchange rate variability.  
Anderson and Neary (1996) Trade reform with quotas, partial 
rent retention, and tariffs 
Trade restrictiveness index, 
incorporating the effects of both 
tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
However not available for large 
number of countries. 
Sachs and Warner (1995) Economic convergence and 
economic policies 
Composite measure of trade 
Harrison(1996) Openness and growth: A time-series, 
cross-country analysis for 
developing countries 
Seven indicators(trade share, 
Dollar’s Index, Black market 
premium, period based trade 
liberalization index, and indirect 
index measuring bias against 
agriculture and industrial protection 
and over valuation of exchange rate. 
Pritchett (1996) Measuring outward orientation in 
developing countries: Can it be 
done? 
Protection effect was generated 
through structural adjusted trade 
measure. A residual based measure. 
Edwards (1992, 1998)  Openness, trade 
liberalization, and growth 
in developing countries  
 Openness, productivity, 
and growth: What do we 
really know? 
Used the black market premium as a 
Proxy for trade restrictions 
Frankel and Romer (1999) Does trade cause growth? Used trade to GDP ratios in 
openness and income relation 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) Trade policy and economic growth: 
A skeptic’s guide to the cross-
national evidence. 
Used Dollar's index of real exchange 
rate distortion. 
Wacziarg (2001) Measuring the dynamic gains from 
trade. World Bank 
Developed a Trade openness index 
using three components: tariff non-
tariff, and liberalization status.  
Hiscox and Kastner (2002) A general measure of trade policy 
orientations: Gravity-model-based 
estimates for 82 nations 
Used trade adjusted measure using 
modification in gravity model.  
 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
Institutions, Trade and 
Growth(World Bank) 
Trade to GDP ratio 
Greenaway et al (2002) Trade liberalization and growth in 
developing countries 
Sachs–Warner liberalization index 
(1995), Dean et al. 1994 based on 
the outcomes of trade reforms and 
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From this review related to choice of policy variables, it can be seen now that there are two aspects 
of trade policy. One is ‘openness’ and the other is ‘restrictiveness’. First measure is related to trade 
ratios or residual measures while the latter one is related to trade taxes and controls like tariffs and 
quotas. Mostly work has been done between trade ratios and growth. Very few studies have been 
conducted for the relationship between tariffs and growth. Generally it has been observed that in 
the first type of nexus, the direction of relationship is positive while in case of latter it has negative 
effect.  Important issue in the selection of trade policy measures is its relevance with theory. Many 
times those variables are selected to measure trade policy effects for which there are no issue of 
data availability like exports and imports volume as a percentage of GDP. If one tries to analyze 
its theoretical justification then realizes that this measure does not show direct the effect of any 
trade policy rather it is the outcome of mixture of many other related policies in economy. Thus it 
is difficult to separate the effect of trade policy from this indicator easily. Keeping in view all these 
aspects, this study employs following indicators for evaluating Trade policy-Growth analysis in 
the light of political economy literature.  
                                   
Fig. 4: Taxonomy of Trade Policy 
           Author’s own compilation 
  
World Bank 1993 indicator taken as 
dummy variable. 
Frankel and Rose (2002) An estimate of the effect of common 
currencies on trade and growth. 
Trade (relative to GDP) 
Baldwin (2004) Openness and growth: What's the 
empirical relationship? 
Analysis of different empirical 
works. 
Yanikkaya(2003) Trade openness and economic 
growth: a cross-country empirical 
investigation 
Used broad list of trade openness for 
both developing and developed 
nations 
Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) Trade and productivity Emphasized upon the use of real 
trade ratios which is imports plus 
exports in exchange rate US$ 
divided by GDP in PPP US$. 
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4.5: Theoretical Framework 
After discussing past literature and the gaps in those studies, this section describes the theoretical 
framework for this analysis. It follows as: 
                           
                                                               Fig. 5: Theoretical Framework for Trade Policy-Growth Nexus 
 Author’s own compilation 
This schematic framework tries to show that economic policy is the outcome of either institutions 
or institutional quality. This study extends the analysis further by claiming that institutional 
performance is affected by political setups i.e. autocratic political system or democratic system 
because both systems have different sets/blend of institutions. Important is to see that institutions 
of which political systems are facilitating or restricting their policy makers in giving economic 
policy. Political institutions exert political power through political parties, legislation and domestic 
lobbies for their interests and design policies. While economic institutions try to keep balance in 
between allocation and distribution of resources through enforcing appropriate rule of law. Hence 
in this way policies are designed to maximize welfare of the societies.  Here comes the role of 
elected government which can protect the rights of the society by giving proper weight age to the 
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decision of majority. The proper working of these institutions increases the economic performance 
of an economy. But the improved economic performance again helps to affect indirectly the quality 
of institutions through confidence building of investors, stability in the economy, investment in 
human capital, and proper regulatory system.152 Moreover this framework also focuses that how 
such policy affected by institutional quality under different regimes actually produce economic 
effects in the form of increasing growth of these economies.   
4.6: Methodology  
4.6.1. Model 
The empirical model used in this study is as follows: 
𝒚𝒊,𝒕 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝒚𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜸𝑻𝑷𝒊,𝒕 + ∅𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
Where 𝒚𝒕 is the GDP growth rate of which measures economic performance in the analysis and 
𝒚𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 is its lag value which shows that the model is dynamic in its nature. In past, for measuring 
economic performance GDP per capita income has been used very frequently but this measure is 
considered more suitable for analyzing the improvement in the living standards of a nation through 
purchasing power capacity of its nationals. However GDP growth rate helps in knowing the 
consistent long term performance in every aspect due to a nation’s policy choice and reports 
increase or decrease in its magnitude as a sign of policy outcome. As this study is analyzing the 
effect of trade policy choice of nation on its overall economic performance that’s why it is 
considered most viable way to gauge such impact with the help of overall growth performance of 
GDP of these nations. 𝑻𝑷𝒊,𝒕  is referring to various measures of trade policy or it can be said that 
it’s showing a set of proxies used for trade policy. 𝑿𝒊,𝒕 is the vector of control variables which 
include inflation, size of country, health, employment level, level of integration and infrastructure. 
𝜀i,t is the overall error term with the assumption that with E(𝜀i,t) = 0 for all i and t.  
The main focus of the study is the effect of 𝜸 parameter on economic performance of developing 
nations and its expected sign varies with the choice of trade policy measures. Dynamic model has 
been applied due to the reason put forward by many authors153 that in case of large N and small T, 
such type of model specification helps in reducing panel bias. Additionally the problem of 
endogeneity can easily be solved through dynamic models as compared to static models. As in this 
                                                          
152 Rodrik (2000) related trade policy reforms to better economic performance and this ultimately add to the high 
quality of institutions.  
153Bond (2002), Baum, (2006), Roodman, (2009a), Sarafidis et al., (2006), Roodman (2009b), and Baltagi (2008). 
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case trade policy is taken as an endogenous variable and its endogeneity has been aimed to capture 
through various institutional variables, therefore the choice of dynamic model fits here for data 
analysis. Moreover the objective of the study is to see both the short run (SR) and long run (LR) 
effect of trade policy variables on the economic performance of the country, such type of analysis 
is much easier in case of dynamic model by the opinion of econometric experts.154 Proposed 
technique for dealing with endogeneity of policy variables is Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM). From the perspective of political economy empirical literature, it has also been observed 
that dynamic panels usually have to face bias in estimation.155 Therefore GMM has been suggested 
as a best solution to be used for addressing such biases. This technique was originally presented 
by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). But with the passage of time, it got recognition by the name of 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and recently Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Furthermore this estimator is being regarded as an efficient estimator only if heteroskedasticity is 
present in dataset.156 However there are two types of GMM in literature i.e. Difference-GMM and 
System-GMM. One has to choose between these two on the basis of strong reasoning. According 
to the past work related to this technique (Bond, 2002; Roodman 2009a; Baum, 2006), System 
GMM helps more sophisticatedly than Difference GMM in handling those variables which have 
random walk157 in their trend. And as the model specification used in this study also includes 
macroeconomic series as control variables therefore this validates the use of SGMM for having 
more precision in estimates.  Similarly it has been observed that small panels can face downward 
bias158 in standard error estimates and this bias can only be removed in SGMM using two step 
procedures with option “small” which will implement Windmeijer correction and generate more 
appropriate estimates. Baltagi (2008) also proved that SGMM is more efficient than DGMM 
because of the reason that it reduces the finite sample bias more efficiently in estimation procedure. 
The asymptotic efficiency of SGMM also increases through its orthogonality conditions. But 
sometimes it may lead to the proliferation of instruments exponentially159 in relation to time 
periods which ultimately results in over-fitting of endogenous regressors (Roodman 2009a). 
                                                          
154 Baltagi, (2008); Adnan et al., (2009). 
155 Hanusch and Keefer (2013). 
156 Baum et al. (2003) for details.  
157 Bond, (2002), Roodman (2009a, 2009b), Baum, (2006). 
158 Baltagi, (2008, p. 154) and Windmeijer, (2005). 
159 In the estimation of GMM, it has been observed that the count of instruments is equal to the square of the number 
of periods used in the study. 
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According to the rule of thumb, the number of instruments should be less than number of groups 
or cross sections. In addition the pre-requisite for the validity of instruments is that there must be 
first order autocorrelation (AR1) in first differenced residuals but not second order serial 
correlation (AR2) in errors. Moreover to see that whether GMM is the appropriate selection of 
technique or not, this is checked through the lower and upper bound of lagged dependent variable 
in these two models; Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects. This criterion tells us that the value of lagged 
dependent variable estimated through GMM must fall in this bound of values.160 
LDV FE   < LDV GMM   < LDV OLS 
This coefficient of LDV also indicates the convergence of model but the condition is this that its 
value should be less than unity. This is also known as the assumption for ‘steady state equilibrium’ 
(Roodman, 2009a) in literature. All these points are required for making this conclusion that model 
is best fit. Moreover as far as validity of instruments is concerned then it doesn’t confine to the 
entire set of instruments which is being evaluated by observing Hansen J-test rather validity of 
additional instruments like in levels, differenced and IV instruments is also very important. 
Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen test has been proposed for this purpose. It is also known as C-test 
(Baum et al. 2003; Roodman, 2009a). This test helps in evaluating the validity of subset of 
instruments in SGMM estimation or in other words a test for their exogeneity. Moreover this also 
tells whether the inclusion of these subsets of instruments has improved in J-statistics or not.161 
The null hypothesis of this test states that subset of instruments are exogenous. Optimal number 
of instruments will be obtained through putting restrictions on set of instruments in the form of 
lags. Mostly second lag (2 2) is being suggested by Roodman (2009b) but higher lags can also be 
used for controlling number of instruments. The same has been applied in this study. In the end, 
the joint significance tests of model i.e. F-test is also very important to be reported. Its null 
hypothesis states that all explanatory variables are jointly equal to zero.  
4.6.2: Test to check whether to GMM or Not to GMM 
It has been observed that switching towards any instrumental variable technique from OLS appears 
with the cost of efficiency loss of the former estimators. Wooldridge (2012) highlighted one of 
those costs in the form that asymptotic variance increase drastically in IV and GMM techniques 
as compared to asymptotic variances of estimators obtained from OLS. To avoid such losses, there 
                                                          
160 Bond (1991). 
161 Roodman (2009b). 
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is need to check the appropriateness of decision for the selection between these two estimates. This 
test actually helps us to know that whether to treat all or some of the endogenous regressors as 
exogenous or not? Orthogonality conditions (C-test also known as exogeneity test) from the model 
can also be used for knowing that whether to choose IV/GMM for more consistent and biased 
estimator is correct decision or not. But more precisely, Durbin- Wu-Hausman test has been 
recommended for checking the validity of any of these techniques. The null hypothesis of this test 
is OLS is gives more efficient and consistent estimates and IV/GMM is inefficient and biased 
estimator. This study has also employed the DWH test to see whether the selection between OLS 
and IV to address the problem of endogeneity of regressor is justified or not.  
4.6.3: Long-Run Coefficients Measurement 
In the equation of dynamic model, 𝛾 and ∅ are considered as short-run coefficients, which actually 
measures the immediate (within the year) response of growth rate of the economy due to the unit 
change in trade policy of an economy. However 𝛽 in the model reports the persistence of the 
process. it is assumed that if this value is closer to 1 then it means the dependent variable is highly 
persistent. This LDV coefficient also helps in knowing the speed of long run adjustment. Therefore 
long run coefficients are calculated as follows:  
𝜸
𝟏 − 𝜷⁄  
Following Papke and Wooldridge (2004), this has been derived from the baseline model of the 
study using STATA11 with the help of command “nlcom”.  
4.7: Results 
This section presents the results of estimation using the methodology explained above. Analysis 
has been divided in to three sections. Firstly, the dynamic model has been run for the whole panel 
but through two different ways; 1) each exogenous variable has been included into model 
specification individually for finding its influence on trade policy, 2) then all the possible variables 
have been divided into various groups like political institutions, economic institutions, governance, 
integration and geographical162 conditions.  
Secondly this whole panel has been divided into two broad categories based on regime difference, 
i.e., democratic and autocratic, to see whether trade policies of democratic nations are more 
                                                          
162 Wei (2001) has introduced the idea that more ‘natural openness’ leads to better institutions. Natural openness is 
measured by geography and size of the country because it helps in determining how much governments have to make 
expense on governance structure for better public administration. More naturally open economies have to invest less 
on such corruption-fighting programs and more focus is being kept on institution building.  
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conducive to economic growth or trade policies of autocratic nations are contributing much to their 
growth rates. In this analysis again the endogeneity of trade policy is being captured using various 
political and economic variables. Or in other words, the analysis aims to check which institutional 
aspect of such nations is affecting more to the decision of trade policy.  
Thirdly division of panel has been made on the basis of regions i.e. Asia, Africa, America and 
Europe. The purpose of this classification is to observe that which region is opening up their trade 
regime more and what has been the effect of this step on their economic growth. Moreover each 
region differs in their institutional setup/characteristics which are related to history and 
geographical concentration e.g. it has been seen that European nations are more open while on the 
other side Asian, Latin America and African nations are in the process of removing such trade 
barriers from their trade sector or in transition period of liberalization process. Therefore separate 
analysis has been conducted to analyze how various natures of institutional setups are affecting 
the trade policy decisions and ultimately their economic growth.  
To start, firstly Pooled OLS estimation has been applied but poolability test rejected its suitability 
here in this case. On the other side, results also showed the presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
model due to heterogeneity in panel. Therefore to overcome these problems, selection of panel 
fixed effect technique was made but still serial correlation and heteroskedasticity problem was 
observed in post estimation results. Then to deal with these two issues again in model, GMM has 
been applied because of the reason that it is considered as the most suitable remedy in this regard.  
All diagnostic tests for the validity of instruments are confirming that model is giving accurate 
estimates. Other requirements related to the assumptions of model are also being fulfilled in the 
estimation process which has been mentioned in methodology. Moreover in case of all models and 
for each set of instrument, Durbin- Wu-Hausman test (DWH) test validated that instrumental 
variable technique (which is GMM here) is more appropriate for obtaining consistent and efficient 
estimators here.  
4.7.1: Results based on Individual Instruments 
As now it is already known that various proxies for trade policy have been utilized for analyzing 
their role in economic growth. It is believed now that policy making is no more an important issue 
these days for developing nations rather it’s the implementation process which decides the ultimate 
destiny of any nation. But its implementation is basically related to the institutional channels of 
any nation. Many times institutional backwardness retards the speed of policy reforms and growth 
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process and in this way it can be said that relationship between policies and growth is not direct 
and smooth rather many intervening factors are involved in making such Policy -Growth analysis. 
Those particular set of factors then decide whether policy is going to be fruitful or not as many 
authors163 in past have held responsible institutions for the differences in the economic gains 
among nations. Earlier research work has been done for analyzing the direct impact of institutions 
on growth. But in those studies164 efforts have been made to capture the endogeneity of institutions 
but the present study is a bit different in its flavor. It deals with the institutional aspect of in 
designing trade policy in any nation. Many institutions govern trade sector in any nation and these 
institutions are considered as the product of social and political set up of any nation. In past it has 
been observed that these institutions kept on empowering the rulers of nations to use coercive 
powers for their economic gains.  Therefore it became obvious that political and economic 
exchanges have always been involved for trade as a major objective among nations.165 This has 
been tried to prove empirically now by applying econometric technique and results have been 
reported below. In each Table given below three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM). 
In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. Probabilities are given in parenthesis showing the significance level of coefficients. 
The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. 
The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values for the validity of the additional 
moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR (1) and AR (2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences 
equations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
163 North (1990), Olson (1982), Dawson (1998), Hall and Jones (1999), Méon and Weill, (2005), Kaufman and Kraay 
(2002), Parente and Prescott (1999). 
164 Acemoglu et al. (2005) 
165 Williamson(1985) 
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Table: 4.3:  Trade Policy= Tariff Rate (MFN) 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM
-2 
SGMM-2 SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
- 
2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
   BUR DUR CUL RL LSPR POLC WTO FI ML HI-Opo HI-Gov LL PG PS 
                 
Constant 2.3395 
(0.116) 
-38.985 
(0.068) 
5.6748 
(0.000) 
1.6564 
0.015 
4.3818 
(0.000) 
2.7075 
0.001 
3.0805 
(0.000) 
8.2671 
(0.000) 
1.9869 
0.058 
8.3860 
(0.000) 
7.6002 
(0.000) 
7.5653 
(0.000) 
7.6329 
(0.000) 
2.6170 
0.002 
10.5914 
(0.000) 
3.9492 
(0.000) 
Growtht-1 .4363 
(0.000) 
.2832 
(0.000) 
.3149 
(0.000) 
.3274 
(0.000) 
.3222 
(0.000) 
.3285 
(0.000) 
.3422 
(0.000) 
.3145 
(0.000) 
.3628 
(0.000) 
.3121 
(0.000) 
.3148 
(0.000) 
.3136 
(0.000) 
.3139 
(0.000) 
.3154 
(0.000) 
.3174 
(0.000) 
.3322 
(0.000) 
Trade 
Policy 
(SR) 
-.0138 
(0.375) 
-.0003 
(0.990) 
-.0601 
(0.000) 
-.0392 
(0.000) 
-.0474 
(0.000) 
-.0235 
(0.000) 
-.0126 
(0.004) 
-.0720 
(0.000) 
-.1164 
(0.000) 
-.0782 
(0.000) 
-.0695 
(0.000) 
-.0692 
(0.000) 
-.0711 
(0.000) 
-.0470 
(0.000) 
-.1001 
(0.000) 
-.0187 
(0.000) 
(LR)   -.0878 
0.000 
-.0584 
(0.000) 
-.0700 
(0.000) 
-.0350 
(0.000) 
-.0192 
(0.000) 
-.1051 
(0.000) 
-.1826 
(0.000) 
-.1137 
(0.000) 
-.1015 
(0.000) 
-.1009 
(0.000) 
-.1037 
(0.000) 
-.0686 
(0.000) 
-.1466 
(0.000) 
-.0281 
(0.000) 
Inflation -.00002 
(0.010) 
-3.87e-
06 
(0.749) 
-3.96e-
06 
( 0.748) 
-.00002 
(0.058) 
-.00001 
(0.269) 
-.00003 
(0.002) 
-.00002 
(0.017) 
7.26e-
06 
(0.599) 
-2.77e-
06 
(0.766) 
7.08e-
06 
(0.616 
1.82e-
06 
0.889 
.00001 
0.348 
7.69e-
06 
0.511 
-.00001 
0.156 
.00001 
0.386 
-.00003 
0.003 
Size of 
nation 
.0075 
0.926 
2.7089 
0.060 
.3704 
(0.000) 
.2264 
(0.000) 
.3318 
(0.000) 
.1023 
0.019 
.1986 
(0.000) 
.4289 
(0.000) 
.6867 
(0.000) 
.4548 
(0.000) 
.4196 
(0.000) 
.4111 
(0.000) 
.4196 
(0.000) 
.2846 
(0.000) 
.4663 
(0.000) 
.0510 
0.193 
Health .0112 
0.419 
-.0409 
0.606 
-.1564 
(0.000) 
-.0586 
(0.000) 
-.1431 
(0.000) 
-.0798 
(0.000) 
-.1246 
(0.000) 
-.2069 
(0.000) 
-.0676 
(0.000) 
-.2064 
(0.000) 
-.1962 
(0.000) 
-.1938 
(0.000) 
-.1949 
(0.000) 
-.0945 
(0.000) 
-.2212 
(0.000) 
-.0892 
(0.000) 
Globalizati
on 
-.0118 
0.338 
-.0067 
0.835 
.0344 
(0.000) 
.0282 
(0.000) 
.0514 
(0.000) 
.0785 
(0.000) 
.0857 
(0.000) 
.0301 
(0.000) 
-.1167 
(0.000) 
.0198 
0.003 
.0323 
(0.000) 
.0333 
(0.000) 
.0309 
(0.000) 
.0444 
(0.000) 
-.0061 
0.358 
.0769 
(0.000) 
Employme
nt 
.0043 
0.001 
.0222 
0.298 
.0036 
(0.000) 
.0040 
(0.000) 
.0036 
(0.000) 
.0051 
(0.000) 
.0042 
(0.000) 
.0035 
(0.000) 
-.0002 
0.278 
.0033 
(0.000) 
.0035 
(0.000) 
.0035 
(0.000) 
.0034 
(0.000) 
.0038 
(0.000) 
.0035 
(0.000) 
.0057 
(0.000) 
Infrastructu
re 
-.0069 
0.599 
.0150 
0.692 
.0092 
(0.095) 
.0193 
0.001 
.0126 
0.036 
-.0218 
0.001 
.0157 
(0.000) 
.0171 
0.010 
.1235 
(0.000) 
.0237 
0.002 
.0158 
0.012 
.0144 
0.018 
.0163 
0.010 
-.0079 
0.193 
.0346 -.0034 
0.575 
observation
s 
1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
F-test   7693.58 
 
8924.75 
 
8643.48 
 
8769.51 
 
15496.9
5 
7545.17 5378.42 8481.18 7833.31 7834.99 8090.37 7018.23 6774.71 10347.
22 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.292 0.385 0.355 0.490 0.493 0.253 0.309 0.244 0.272 0.243 0.250 0.345 0.229 0.499 
J-Test   0.209 0.190 0.194 0.142 0.149 0.260 0.162 0.176 0.259 0.218 0.233 0.207 0.247 0.152 
C-Test                 
GMM   0.998 0.993 0.996 0.972 0.975 0.999 0.968 0.987 0.998 0.994 0.996 0.998 0.996 0.976 
IV   0.197 0.629 0.249 0.361 0.760 0.964 0.927 0.148 0.965 0.207 0.317 0.468 0.528 0.601 
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Table: 4.4:  Trade Policy= Non-Tariff Barriers 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variable
s 
OLS FE SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
- 
2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
   BUR DUR CUL RL LSPR POLC WTO FI ML HI-Opo HI-Gov LL PG PS 
                 
Constant 1.6816 
0.316 
-
46.205
0 
0.037 
12.0848 
(0.000) 
9.5140 
(0.000) 
14.0613 
(0.000) 
7.1027 
(0.000) 
7.0739 
(0.000) 
16.5982 
(0.000) 
-.6576 
0.565 
18.9801 
(0.000) 
11.0307 
(0.000) 
10.6950 
(0.000) 
11.0232 
(0.000) 
10.0619 
(0.000) 
18.6546 
(0.000) 
9.0616 
(0.000) 
Growtht-
1 
.4465 .2903 .3479 .3510 .3462 .3618 .3662 .3552 .3878 .3456 .3507 .3516 .3491 .3501 .3670 .3624 
Trade 
Policy 
SR 
.0946 
0.364 
-.0404 
0.820 
-1.0845 
(0.000) 
-1.0283 
(0.000) 
 
-1.1391 
(0.000) 
-.8750 
(0.000) 
-.6301 
(0.000) 
-1.0966 
(0.000) 
-1.0324 
(0.000) 
-1.3356 
(0.000) 
-1.0891 
(0.000) 
-1.0755 
(0.000) 
-1.0835 
(0.000) 
-1.0504 
(0.000) 
-1.0348 
(0.000) 
-.8553 
(0.000) 
LR   -1.6631 
(0.000) 
-1.5846 
(0.000) 
-1.7425 
(0.000) 
-1.3712 
(0.000) 
-.9944 
(0.000) 
-1.7009 
(0.000) 
-1.6865 
(0.000) 
-2.041 
(0.000) 
-1.6775 
(0.000) 
-1.6589 
(0.000) 
-1.6648 
(0.000) 
-1.6165 
(0.000) 
-1.6350 
(0.000) 
-1.3416 
(0.000) 
Inflation -.00002 
0.012 
-3.99e-
06 
0.743 
-.00005 
0.002 
-.00004 
0.004 
-.00006 
(0.000) 
-.00005 
(0.000) 
-.00004 
0.005 
-.00005 
0.004 
-.00001 
0.160 
-.00008 
(0.000) 
-.00005 
0.001 
-.00005 
(0.000) 
-.00005 
0.001 
-.00005 
0.001 
-.00006 
0.001 
-.00004 
0.001 
Size of 
nation 
.0058 
0.943 
2.9549 
0.047 
-.0048 
0.924 
-.0121 
0.777 
-.0694 
0.107 
-.0557 
0.093 
.1209 
0.015 
-.1057 
0.080 
-.0029 
0.944 
-.1655 
0.015 
-.0222 
0.626 
-.0326 
0.477 
-.0036 
0.940 
-.0275 
0.503 
-.2240 
(0.000) 
-.0604 
(0.000) 
Health .0110 
0.452 
.0232 
0.796 
-.1487 
(0.000) 
-.0960 
(0.000) 
-.1585 
(0.000) 
-.0544 
(0.000) 
-.1210 
(0.000) 
-.1988 
(0.000) 
.1352 
(0.000) 
-.2190 
(0.000) 
-.1225 
(0.000) 
-.1143 
(0.000) 
-.1295 
(0.000) 
-.1026 
(0.000) 
-.1889 
(0.000) 
-.0883 
(0.000) 
Globaliz
ation 
-.0119 
0.410 
-.0213 
0.556 
.1083 
(0.000) 
.0868 
(0.000) 
.1116 
(0.000) 
.0775 
(0.000) 
.0705 
(0.000) 
.1168 
(0.000) 
-.0119 
0.076 
.1466 
(0.000) 
.1022 
(0.000) 
.1002 
(0.000) 
.1044 
(0.000) 
.0940 
(0.000) 
.0920 
(0.000) 
.0778 
(0.000) 
Employ
ment 
.0041 
0.002 
.0190 
0.361 
.0064 
(0.000) 
.0061 
(0.000) 
.0070 
(0.000) 
.0061 
(0.000) 
.0047 
(0.000) 
.0078 
(0.000) 
.0042 
(0.000) 
.0086 
(0.000) 
.0064 
(0.000) 
.0065 
(0.000) 
.0063 
(0.000) 
.0062 
(0.000) 
.0087 
(0.000) 
.0064 
(0.000) 
Infrastru
cture 
-.0063 
0.653 
.0236 
0.572 
.0453 
(0.000) 
.0536 
(0.000) 
.0309 
(0.000) 
.0580 
(0.000) 
.1066 
(0.000) 
.0357 
(0.000) 
.0525 
(0.000) 
.0064 
0.287 
.0432 
(0.000) 
.0414 
(0.000) 
.0435 
(0.000) 
.0452 
(0.000) 
.0506 
(0.000) 
.0764 
(0.000) 
observati
ons 
1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 
Countrie
s 
77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Instrume
nts 
  70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
F-test   10802.1
0 
8149.61 .3462 9434.06 13427.0
8 
13451.7
3 
5030.07 7614.77 9158.36 8546.68 8462.60 10809.1
8 
10823.7
0 
11824.3
8 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.440 0.397 0.490 0.493 0.438 0.443 0.274 0.610 0.438 0.441 0.433 0.431 0.522 0.452 
J-Test   0.220 0.192 0.197 0.201 0.229 0.216 0.160 0.204 0.191 0.203 0.211 0.182 0.199 0.209 
C-Test                 
GMM   0.990 0.986 0.987 0.987 0.994 0.993 0.983 0.990 0.983 0.985 0.987 0.990 0.988 0.989 
IV   0.828 0.261 0.421 0.301 0.509 0.825 0.164 0.433 0.269 0.438 0.543 0.205 0.495 0.357 
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Table: 4.5: Trade Policy=  Regulatory Trade Barriers 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
- 
2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
   BUR DUR CUL RL LSPR POLC WTO FI ML HI-
Opo 
HI-Gov LL PG PS 
                 
Constant 3.0334 
0.042 
-33.6264 
0.115 
4.8148 
(0.000) 
3.0070 
0.001 
4.4744 
(0.000) 
9.3282 
(0.000) 
11.2338 
(0.000) 
5.0006 
(0.000) 
1.9464 
(0.000) 
6.7737 
(0.000) 
5.6066 
(0.000) 
6.4796 
(0.000) 
5.1830 
(0.000) 
.6104 
0.501 
12.2464 
(0.000) 
11.4745 
(0.000) 
Growtht-1 .4343 
(0.000) 
.2818 
(0.000) 
.3289 
(0.000) 
.3506 
(0.000) 
.3324 
(0.000) 
.3524 
(0.000) 
.3788 
(0.000) 
.3275 
(0.000) 
.3358 
(0.000) 
.3267 
(0.000) 
.3280 
(0.000) 
.3343 
(0.000) 
.3309 
(0.000) 
.3348 
(0.000) 
.3475 
(0.000) 
.3517 
(0.000) 
Trade 
Policy 
SR 
-.2009 
0.008 
-.2783 
0.047 
-1.0507 
(0.000) 
-1.0293 
(0.000) 
-1.0885 
(0.000) 
-.9061 
(0.000) 
-.5209 
(0.000) 
-1.0503 
(0.000) 
-1.2117 
(0.000) 
-1.0532 
(0.000) 
-1.0329 
(0.000) 
-.9009 
(0.000) 
-1.0323 
(0.000) 
-1.0285 
(0.000) 
-.8710 
(0.000) 
-.8519 
(0.000) 
LR   -1.5659 
(0.000) 
-1.5852 
(0.000) 
-1.6306 
(0.000) 
-1.3993 
(0.000) 
-.8386 
(0.000) 
-1.5620 
(0.000) 
-1.8244 
(0.000) 
-1.5645 
(0.000) 
-1.5371 
(0.000) 
-1.3535 
(0.000) 
-1.5428 
(0.000) 
-1.5462 
(0.000) 
-1.3350 
(0.000) 
-1.3143 
(0.000) 
Inflation -.00003 
0.005 
-6.46e-
06 
0.594 
.00002 
0.350 
.00002 
0.313 
.00001 
0.565 
-.0001 
(0.000) 
-.0001 
(0.000) 
.00002 
0.495 
.00007 
0.015 
-5.61e-
06 
0.860 
.00002 
0.407 
.00002 
0.272 
.00003 
0.241 
-.00002 
0.296 
-5.86e-
07 
0.986 
-.0001 
(0.000) 
Size of 
nation 
-.0565 2.3625 
0.102 
.2139 
0.003 
.0601 
0.317 
.1908 
0.001 
-.3729 
(0.000) 
-.2421 
(0.000) 
.2130 
(0.000) 
.3620 
(0.000) 
.1678 
0.018 
.1908 
0.005 
.1331 
0.041 
.2044 
0.003 
.1226 
0.033 
-.0631 
0.403 
-.3589 
(0.000) 
Health .0187 
0.186 
-.0271 
0.733 
-.0609 
0.004 
.0433 
0.002 
-.0494 
0.010 
-.0194 
(0.000) 
-.1153 
(0.000) 
-.0655 
0.001 
-.0176 
0.203 
-.0888 
(0.000) 
-.0723 
0.001 
-.0842 
(0.000) 
-.0666 
0.001 
.0471 
0.002 
-.1151 
(0.000) 
-.0612 
0.003 
Globalizati
on 
.0046 
0.717 
.0115 
0.725 
.0772 
(0.000) 
.0187 
(0.000) 
.0794 
(0.000) 
.1175 
(0.000) 
.0980 
(0.000) 
.0801 
(0.000) 
.0438 
(0.000) 
.0912 
(0.000) 
.0817 
(0.000) 
.0847 
(0.000) 
.0778 
(0.000) 
.0558 .0636 
(0.000) 
.1093 
(0.000) 
Employme
nt 
.0048 
(0.000) 
.0228 
0.267 
.0048 
(0.000) 
.0052 
(0.000) 
.0049 
(0.000) 
.0100 
(0.000) 
.0087 
(0.000) 
.0048 
(0.000) 
.0029 
(0.000) 
.0055 
(0.000) 
.0050 
(0.000) 
.0056 
(0.000) 
.0049 
(0.000) 
.0046 .0075 
(0.000) 
.0103 
(0.000) 
Infrastructu
re 
-.0103 
0.432 
.0153 
0.679 
.0152 
0.021 
.0585 
(0.000) 
.0217 
(0.000) 
-.0372 
(0.000) 
.0465 
(0.000) 
.0142 
0.028 
.0427 
(0.000) 
.0063 
0.366 
.0154 
0.023 
.0053 
0.430 
.0158 
0.020 
-.0062 
0.354 
.0338 
(0.000) 
-.0005 
0.943 
                 
observation
s 
1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
F-test   12995.87 16179.0
8 
22307.4
3 
11860.8
6 
23485.1
2 
12952.2
4 
11127.2
3 
19303.9
1 
16951.6
7 
13857.
77 
14339.3
9 
14533.8
0 
18957.5
4 
20326.5
7 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.201 0.215 0.239 0.762 0.841 0.219 0.140 0.309 0.208 0.222 0.195 0.391 0.333 0.933 
J-Test   0.184 0.180 0.188 0.156 0.171 0.184 0.166 0.175 0.155 0.172 0.176 0.174 0.154 0.185 
C-Test                 
GMM   0.996 0.995 0.996 0.985 0.995 0.994 0.986 0.991 0.983 0.991 0.992 0.995 0.986 0.993 
IV   0.962 0.831 0.833 0.377 0.315 0.900 0.664 0.708 0.237 0.471 0.565 0.544 0.769 0.880 
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Table: 4.6: Trade Policy=  Black Market Premium 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM
-2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM- 
2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM-
2 
   BUR DUR CUL RL LSPR POLC WTO FI ML HI-
Opo 
HI-Gov LL PG PS 
                 
Constant -
1.224
3 
-
39.775
6 
0.060 
6.3088 
(0.000) 
2.0483 
0.105 
4.7710 
0.004 
2.4721 
0.016 
3.9380 
0.006 
8.5948 
(0.000) 
.4785 
0.771 
8.2242 
(0.000) 
7.3408 
(0.000) 
7.5333 
(0.000) 
6.7027 
(0.000) 
1.0683 
(0.000) 
12.840
6 
(0.000) 
5.1560 
(0.000) 
Growtht-1 .4248 
(0.000
) 
.2836 
(0.000) 
.3364 
(0.000) 
.3436 
(0.000) 
.3364 
(0.000) 
.3297 
(0.000) 
.3440 
(0.000) 
.3377 
(0.000) 
.3851 
(0.000) 
.3352 
(0.000) 
.3357 
(0.000) 
.3361 
(0.000) 
.3392 
(0.000) 
.3295 
(0.000) 
.3487 
(0.000) 
.3347 
(0.000) 
Trade Policy 
SR 
.3251 
(0.000
) 
.2736 
0.009 
.1069 
(0.000) 
.1860 
(0.000) 
.1115 
(0.000) 
.2142 
(0.000) 
.1605 
(0.000) 
.0785 
(0.000) 
.1743 
(0.000) 
.0922 
(0.000) 
.0950 
(0.000) 
.1035 
(0.000) 
.1102 
(0.000) 
.1579 
(0.000) 
.1011 
(0.000) 
.2096 
(0.000) 
LR   .1611 
(0.000) 
.2835 
(0.000) 
.1680 
(0.000) 
.3196 
(0.000) 
.2447 
(0.000) 
.1185 
(0.000) 
.2835 
(0.000) 
.1387 
(0.000) 
.1431 
(0.000) 
.1560 
(0.000) 
.1668 
(0.000) 
.2355 
(0.000) 
.1553 
(0.000) 
.3151 
(0.000) 
Inflation -
.0000
1 
0.083 
-5.52e-
06 
0.647 
-.00003 
(0.000) 
-5.20e-
06 
0.110 
-.00002 
(0.000) 
-8.24e-
06 
0.001 
-.00001 
(0.000) 
-.00004 
(0.000) 
-6.34e-
06 
0.111 
-.00004 
(0.000) 
-.00003 -
.00003 
(0.000) 
-.00003 
(0.000) 
-.00001 -.00004 
(0.000) 
-.00001 
(0.000) 
Size of 
nation 
.0459 
0.547 
2.7169 
(0.000) 
.7719 
(0.000) 
.6673 
(0.000) 
.7830 
(0.000) 
.3220 
(0.000) 
.6634 
(0.000) 
.7415 
(0.000) 
1.1403 
(0.000) 
.7339 
(0.000) 
.7691 
(0.000) 
.6993 
(0.000) 
.7350 
(0.000) 
.7067 
(0.000) 
.5957 
(0.000) 
.3691 
(0.000) 
Health .0084 
0.539 
-.0636 
0.424 
-.3217 
(0.000) 
-.2177 
(0.000) 
-.3012 
(0.000) 
-.1525 
(0.000) 
-.2595 
(0.000) 
-.3486 
(0.000) 
-.2991 
(0.000) 
-.3426 
(0.000) 
-.3369 
(0.000) 
-.3229 
(0.000) 
-.3179 
(0.000) 
-.2191 
(0.000) 
-.3737 
(0.000) 
-.2050 
(0.000) 
Globalizatio
n 
-.0142 
0.227 
-.0143 
0.650 
.0361 
(0.000) 
-.0039 
0.534 
.0317 
(0.000) 
.0291 
(0.000) 
.0182 
0.004 
.0415 
(0.000) 
-.0393 
(0.000) 
.0422 
(0.000) 
.0386 
(0.000) 
.0405 
(0.000) 
.0347 
(0.000) 
.0225 
(0.000) 
.0303 
(0.000) 
.0198 
(0.000) 
Employmen
t 
.0038 
0.003 
.0189 
0.359 
-.3217 
0.230 
-.0004 
0.297 
-.0009 
0.058 
.0029 
(0.000) 
-.00003 
0.934 
-.0002 
0.622 
-.0054 
(0.000) 
-.00031 
0.576 
-.0005 
0.278 
.00006 
0.901 
-.0002 
0.588 
-.0007 
0.061 
.0012 
0.042 
.0027 
(0.000) 
Infrastructur
e 
-.0040 
0.756 
.0152 
0.681 
.1615 .2120 .1840 .1223 .2086 .1599 .3040 .1573 .1624 .1490 .1609 .1582 .1650 .1622 
                 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
F- Test   9665.7
5 
16179.0
8 
11192.2
0 
11969.5
0 
17340.3
2 
7482.3
7 
27231.5
6 
7749.0
0 
8221.38 8557.3
7 
9404.12 9128.1
1 
10178.
42 
11845.1
7 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.521 0.360 0.477 0.354 0.430 0.566 0.457 0.562 0.544 0.536 0.520 0.386 0.625 0.382 
J-Test   0.143 0.161 0.153 0.138 0.153 0.149 0.162 0.129 0.144 0.150 0.141 0.135 0.150 0.154 
C-Test                 
GMM   0.996 0.998 0.997 0.994 0.997 0.996 0.999 0.997 0.995 0.996 0.995 0.996 0.996 0.997 
IV   0.502 0.947 0.616 0.338 0.452 0.780 0.900 0.324 0.522 0.872 0.443 0.292 0.946 0.714 
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Table: 4.7:  Trade Policy=  Free to Trade 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM
- 
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
   BUR DUR CUL RL LSPR POLC WTO FI ML HI-Opo HI-Gov LL PG PS 
                 
Constant -
1.062
8 
0.528 
-
63.348
6 
0.003 
-8.8035 
(0.000) 
-
14.5196 
(0.000) 
-4.8274 
0.031 
-7.3683 
0.001 
-4.4624 
0.054 
-3.4424 
0.102 
-
25.2999 
(0.000) 
-.2209 
0.911 
-9.3772 
(0.000) 
-9.3195 
(0.000) 
-9.1392 
(0.000) 
-
13.945
1 
(0.000) 
-.7518 
0.669 
-8.0972 
(0.000) 
Growtht-1 .4290 
(0.000
) 
.2847 
(0.000) 
.3328 
(0.000) 
.3417 
(0.000) 
.3298 
(0.000) 
.3322 
(0.000) 
.3266 
(0.000) 
.3387 
(0.000) 
.3924 
(0.000) 
.3308 
(0.000) 
.3345 
(0.000) 
.3329 
(0.000) 
.3324 
(0.000) 
.3344 
(0.000) 
.3520 
(0.000) 
.3316 
(0.000) 
Trade 
Policy 
SR 
.5438 
(0.000
) 
1.2272 
(0.000) 
2.2865 
(0.000) 
2.5028 
(0.000) 
2.1179 
(0.000) 
2.1721 
(0.000) 
1.9289 
(0.000) 
2.1050 
(0.000) 
2.3053 
(0.000) 
1.9792 
(0.000) 
2.2818 
(0.000) 
2.3016 
(0.000) 
2.2943 
(0.000) 
1.3641 
(0.000) 
2.2194 
(0.000) 
2.1789 
(0.000) 
LR   3.4272 
(0.000) 
3.8023 
(0.000) 
3.1604 
(0.000) 
3.2531 
(0.000) 
2.8646 
(0.000) 
3.1834 
(0.000) 
3.7944 
(0.000) 
2.9579 
(0.000) 
0.563 
(0.000) 
3.4505 
(0.000) 
3.4369 
(0.000) 
2.5519 
(0.000) 
3.4250 
(0.000) 
3.2600 
(0.000) 
Inflation -
.0000
2 
0.060 
6.31e-
07 
0.958 
-.00005 
0.006 
-.00001 
0.431 
-.00006 
(0.000) 
-.00005 
0.002 
-.00007 
(0.000) 
-.00005 
0.001 
.00005 
(0.000) 
-.00008 
(0.000) 
-.00004 
0.010 
-.00004 
0.008 
-.00004 
0.006 
-.00002 
0.173 
-.00006 
0.001 
-.00005 
0.002 
Size of 
nation 
.0907 
0.253 
3.8823 
0.007 
.8760 
(0.000) 
.8635 
(0.000) 
.7980 
(0.000) 
.8846 
(0.000) 
.8177 
(0.000) 
.7456 
(0.000) 
1.1263 
(0.000) 
.7233 
(0.000) 
.8810 
(0.000) 
.8960 
(0.000) 
.8866 
(0.000) 
.9096 
(0.000) 
.5473 
(0.000) 
.8954 
(0.000) 
Health .0039 
0.778 
-.0444 
0.573 
-.3528 
(0.000) 
-.2489 
(0.000) 
-.3870 
(0.000) 
-.3706 
(0.000) 
-.3845 
(0.000) 
-.3965 
(0.000) 
-.0398 
0.021 
-.4435 
(0.000) 
-.3434 
(0.000) 
-.3499 
(0.000) 
-.3503 
(0.000) 
-.2688 
(0.000) 
-.3815 
(0.000) 
-.3615 
(0.000) 
Globalizatio
n 
-.0350 
0.008 
-.0541 
0.101 
.0944 
(0.000) 
.0442 
(0.000) 
.1117 
(0.000) 
.1022 
(0.000) 
.1213 
(0.000) 
.1114 
(0.000) 
-.0909 
(0.000) 
.1374 
(0.000) 
.0925 
(0.000) 
.0920 
(0.000) 
.0934 
(0.000) 
.0665 
(0.000) 
.0857 
(0.000) 
.1008 
(0.000) 
Employmen
t 
.0033 
0.012 
.0018 
0.930 
-.0017 
0.006 
-.0025 
(0.000) 
-.0006 
0.306 
-.0017 
0.008 
-.0007 
0.239 
-.00008 
0.894 
-.0072 
(0.000) 
.0001 
0.761 
-.0018 
0.004 
-.0020 
0.001 
-.0018 
0.003 
-.0027 
(0.000) 
.0017 
0.007 
-.0018 
0.004 
Infrastructur
e 
.0016 
0.900 
.0467 
0.214 
.0548 
(0.000) 
.0892 
(0.000) 
.0270 
0.002 
.0490 
(0.000) 
.0170 
0.054 
.0367 
(0.000) 
.1837 
(0.000) 
.0203 
0.025 
.0538 
(0.000) 
.0581 
(0.000) 
.0552 
(0.000) 
.0647 
(0.000) 
.0449 
(0.000) 
.0466 
(0.000) 
F-Test   11146.5
6 
13209.0
1 
10177.7
1 
12724.9
3 
9524.4
9 
12705.2
0 
27840.0
0 
19205.6
2 
10502.7
3 
13027.7
1 
11787.9
9 
9794.5
8 
13943.9
3 
10615.0
6 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.745 0.554 0.826 0.784 0.853 0.820 0.334 0.947 0.733 0.737 0.740 0.592 0.855 0.774 
J-Test   0.138 0.144 0.135 0.128 0.123 0.132 0.125 0.117 0.134 0.139 0.139 0.123 0.135 0.129 
C-Test                 
GMM   0.992 0.996 0.991 0.989 0.987 0.989 0.993 0.989 0.991 0.992 0.992 0.995 0.991 0.989 
IV   0.987 0.952 0.965 0.514 0.402 0.673 0.289 0.222 0.563 0.936 0.934 0.235 0.839 0.492 
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Table: 4.8:  Trade Policy=  Trade% GDP  
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM 
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM
-2 
   BUR DUR CUL RL LSPR POLC WTO FI ML HI-
Opo 
HI-Gov LL PG PS 
                 
Constant .8769 
0.573 
-
36.752
8 
0.081 
8.8885 
0.002 
4.0789 
0.005 
5.5668 
0.014 
9.5246 
0.001 
10.711
4 
(0.000) 
5.9134 
0.013 
-1.0088 
.567 
6.3787 
0.014 
10.9580 
0.001 
11.9453 
(0.000) 
11.1760 
(0.000) 
-1.7583 
0.231 
8.8445 
0.003 
14.2680 
(0.000) 
Growtht-1 .4272 
(0.000
) 
.2760 
(0.000) 
.3268 
(0.000) 
.3565 
(0.000) 
.3299 
(0.000) 
.3044 
(0.000) 
.3283 
(0.000) 
.3260 
(0.000) 
.3929 
(0.000) 
.3134 
(0.000) 
.3157 
(0.000) 
.3138 
(0.000) 
.3220 
(0.000) 
.3199 
(0.000) 
.3110 
(0.000) 
.3204 
(0.000) 
Trade Policy 
SR 
.0081 
(0.000
) 
.0378 
(0.000) 
.0513 
(0.000) 
.0357 
(0.000) 
.0408 
(0.000) 
.0509 
(0.000) 
.0513 
(0.000) 
.0346 
(0.000) 
.0446 
(0.000) 
.0515 
(0.000) 
.0558 
(0.000) 
.0556 
(0.000) 
.0539 
(0.000) 
.0364 
(0.000) 
.0504 
(0.000) 
.0488 
(0.000) 
LR   .0763 
(0.000) 
.0555 
(0.000) 
.0610 
(0.000) 
.0732 
(0.000) 
.0765 
(0.000) 
.0513 
(0.000) 
.0735 
(0.000) 
.0750 
(0.000) 
.0816 
(0.000) 
.0811 
(0.000) 
.0796 
(0.000) 
.0536 
(0.000) 
.0731 
(0.000) 
.0718 
(0.000) 
Inflation -
.00002 
0.007 
-6.61e-
06 
0.582 
-.00007 
0.006 
-.00008 
0.001 
-.0001 
(0.000) 
-.0001 
0.001 
-.0001 
0.001 
-.0001 
(0.000) 
-.00001 
0.664 
-.00006 
0.017 
-.00007 
0.008 
-.00007 
0.011 
-.00007 
0.010 
-.0001 
(0.000) 
-.00008 
(0.000) 
-.0001 
0.002 
Size of 
nation 
.0736 
0.359 
2.5004 
0.080 
.8286 
(0.000) 
.4927 
(0.000) 
.7258 
(0.000) 
.3719 
0.001 
.6449 
(0.000) 
.7451 
(0.000) 
1.2505 
(0.000) 
.8767 
(0.000) 
.9030 
(0.000) 
.8653 
(0.000) 
.8215 
(0.000) 
.5893 
(0.000) 
.9585 
(0.000) 
.3419 
0.003 
Health .0157 
0.259 
-.0365 
0.644 
-.4243 
(0.000) 
-.1759 
(0.000) 
-.3513 
(0.000) 
-.3319 
(0.000) 
-.4299 
(0.000) 
-.3570 
(0.000) 
-.2526 
(0.000) 
-.3886 
(0.000) 
-.4927 
(0.000) 
-.4983 
(0.000) 
-.4713 
(0.000) 
-.1279 
(0.000) 
-.4809 
(0.000) 
-.4093 
(0.000) 
Globalizatio
n 
-.0246 
0.054 
-.0444 
(0.000) 
.0642 
(0.000) 
-.0393 
(0.000) 
.0780 
(0.000) 
.0963 
(0.000) 
.0896 
(0.000) 
.0877 
(0.000) 
-.1138 
(0.000) 
.0538 
(0.000) 
.0800 
(0.000) 
.0803 
(0.000) 
.0768 
(0.000) 
.0060 
0.427 
.0989 
(0.000) 
.1014 
(0.000) 
Employment .0042 
0.001 
.0175 
0.393 
.0042 
(0.000) 
.0041 
(0.000) 
.0038 
(0.000) 
.0083 
(0.000) 
.0061 
(0.000) 
.0029 
(0.000) 
.0028 
(0.000) 
.0036 
(0.000) 
.0045 
(0.000) 
.0047 
(0.000) 
.0049 
(0.000) 
.0029 
(0.000) 
.0033 
(0.000) 
.0090 
(0.000) 
Infrastructur
e 
-.0089 
0.493 
.0105 
0.776 
.0263 
0.008 
.1002 
(0.000) 
.0704 
(0.000) 
.0321 
(0.000) 
.0466 
(0.000) 
.0473 
(0.000) 
.1601 
(0.000) 
.0271 
0.006 
.0205 
0.042 
.0250 
0.013 
.0214 
0.031 
.0086 
0.325 
.0223 
0.020 
.0127 
0.171 
F-Test   5789.49 5279.67 9145.55 7863.11 7035.3
7 
10582.3
6 
4717.26 5918.68 4054.83 4059.47 4569.06 5444.52 5203.14 8765.38 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.865 0.841 0.887 0.852 0.893 0.926 0.526 0.743 0.860 0.838 0.848 0.951 0.862 0.926 
J-Test   0.243 0.265 0.293 0.242 0.305 0.319 0.212 0.296 0.285 0.244 0.283 0.233 0.304 0.287 
C-Test                 
GMM   0.996 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.967 0.989 0.995 0.997 0.998 0.993 0.998 0.993 0.998 0.999 
IV   0.157 0.288 0.123 0.214 0.258 0.476 0.750 0.645 0.876 0.232 0.509 0.102 0.624 0.370 
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Table: 4.9:  Trade Policy=  KOF- Trade Restriction Index 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM- 
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM
-2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
SGMM-
2 
   BUR DUR CUL RL LSPR POLC WTO FI ML HI-Opo HI-Gov LL PG PS 
                 
Constant 1.860 
 
(0.000) 
 
-
35.833 
0.097* 
11.9135 
(0.000) 
5.1989 
(0.000) 
9.1012 
(0.000) 
10.6390 
(0.000) 
12.6937 
(0.000) 
13.3795 
(0.000) 
-2.4298 
0.109 
10.1925 
(0.000) 
13.9834 
(0.000) 
14.1916 
(0.000) 
13.3580 
(0.000) 
2.0750 
0.042 
11.9380 
(0.000) 
14.104 
(0.000) 
Growtht-1 .4306 
(0.000) 
.2848 
(0.000) 
.3468 
(0.000) 
.3593 
(0.000) 
.3435 
(0.000) 
.3507 
(0.000) 
.3583 
(0.000) 
.3394 
(0.000) 
.4047 
(0.000) 
.3415 
(0.000) 
.3404 
(0.000) 
.3410 
(0.000) 
.3489 
(0.000) 
.3386 
(0.000) 
.3300 
(0.000) 
.3535 
(0.000) 
Trade 
Policy 
SR 
.0252 
(0.000) 
.0179 
0.350 
.1340 
(0.000) 
.1251 
(0.000) 
.1221 
(0.000) 
.1215 
(0.000) 
.1494 
(0.000) 
.1631 
(0.000) 
.1562 
(0.000) 
.1237 
(0.000) 
.1644 
(0.000) 
.1606 
(0.000) 
.1408 
(0.000) 
.0854 
(0.000) 
.1068 
(0.000) 
.1373 
(0.000) 
LR   .2052 
(0.000) 
.1953 
(0.000) 
.1860 
(0.000) 
.1872 
(0.000) 
.2329 
(0.000) 
.2470 
(0.000) 
.2624 
(0.000) 
.1879 
(0.000) 
.2493 
(0.000) 
.2437 
(0.000) 
.2163 
(0.000) 
.1291 
(0.000) 
.1594 
(0.000) 
.2123 
(0.000) 
Inflation -.00002 
(0.000) 
-3.27e-
06 
0.788 
-.00001 
0.466 
-.00003 
0.034 
-.00004 
(0.047) 
-.00006 
0.003 
-.00004 
0.049 
-.00002 
0.471 
-.00001 
0.493 
-.00002 
0.333 
-.00001 
0.638 
-.00002 
0.500 
-.00002 
0.357 
-.00006 
0.001 
-.00003 
0.124 
-.00004 
0.051 
Size of 
nation 
.0201 
(0.000) 
2.4590 
0.093 
.5832 
(0.000) 
.3913 
(0.000) 
.5727 
(0.000) 
.2705 
(0.000) 
.5351 
(0.000) 
.7324 
(0.000) 
.9383 
(0.000) 
.5349 
(0.000) 
.7218 
(0.000) 
.7027 
(0.000) 
.6017 
(0.000) 
.4310 
(0.000) 
.6464 
(0.000) 
.3260 
(0.000) 
Health .0099 
(0.000) 
-.0274 
0.735 
.3929 
(0.000) 
-.1842 
(0.000) 
-.3495 
(0.000) 
-.2941 
(0.000) 
-.4038 
(0.000) 
-.4603 
(0.000) 
-.1375 
(0.000) 
-.3557 
(0.000) 
-.4679 
(0.000) 
-.4683 
(0.000) 
-.4232 
(0.000) 
-.1556 
(0.000) 
-.4254 
(0.000) 
-.3691 
(0.000) 
Globalizat
ion 
-.0311 
(0.000) 
-.0243 
0.541 
-.0154 
0.180 
-.0865 
(0.000) 
-.0063 
0.559 
-.0018 
0.873 
-.0274 
(0.000) 
-.0392 
0.001 
-.2148 
(0.000) 
-.0008 
0.938 
-.0390 
0.001 
-.0328 
0.006 
-.0217 
(0.000) 
-.0203 
0.030 
.0336 
0.006 
-.0174 
0.123 
Employm
ent 
.0043 
(0.000) 
.0201 
0.333 
.0031 
(0.000) 
.0036 
(0.000) 
.0031 
(0.000) 
.0056 
(0.000) 
.0040 
0.017 
.0026 
(0.000) 
-.0027 
(0.000) 
.0033 
(0.000) 
.0026 
(0.000) 
.0029 
(0.000) 
.0034 
(0.000) 
.0025 
(0.000) 
.0027 
(0.000) 
.0059 
(0.000) 
Infrastruct
ure 
-.0113 
(0.000) 
.0190 
0.617 
.0709 
(0.000) 
.1050 
(0.000) 
.0988 
(0.000) 
.0600 
(0.000) 
.1132 
(0.000) 
.0918 
(0.000) 
.1627 
(0.000) 
.0636 
(0.000) 
.0920 
(0.000) 
.0900 
(0.000) 
.0831 
(0.000) 
.0481 
(0.000) 
.0660 
(0.000) 
.0964 
(0.000) 
F-Test   14137.5
7 
18337.8
8 
12945.4
5 
12254.1
9 
12314.6
2 
13707.1
1 
9569.8
0 
14209.0
7 
13031.1
7 
12357.4
0 
14271.1
8 
14133.1
8 
12306.9
2 
13710.6
2 
observatio
ns 
1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 
Countries 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Instrumen
ts 
  70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.639 0.677 0.742 0.882 0.844 0.652 0.622 0.632 0.626 0.667 0.695 0.799 0.704 0.797 
J-Test   0.207 0.183 0.223 0.146 0.223 0.271 0.189 0.244 0.264 0.267 0.276 0.164 0.267 0.248 
C-Test                 
GMM-   0.997 0.985 0.996 0.960 0.993 0.998 0.987 0.994 0.995 0.996 0.997 0.975 0.993 0.994 
IV   0.110 0.980 0.467 0.172 0.235 0.902 0.828 0.299 0.586 0.596 0.721 0.291 0.361 0.681 
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4.7.1.1: Model with Tariff Rate Policy 
In all models the relationship is same in nature as was expected i.e. tariff rates are affecting 
negatively to the performance of these economies of developing nations, but the changed 
magnitude of trade policy variable coefficient emphasize upon the importance various institutional 
factors in trade policy making. From the Table 4.3 it can be seen that political openness which is 
related to roles of embassies for facilitating nations and economic institutions like WTO are 
increasing the magnitude of the desired coefficient quite visibly as compared to other institutional 
factors both in short run and long run. Moreover the effect of cultural openness or informal 
institutional change is also showing greater impact on Trade policy-Growth nexus which shows 
that integration of civilizations also help to develop more trade relations among nations. And the 
curiosity to get those cross border high quality and cheaper goods, nations get involved in bringing 
down their tariff rates which ultimately help them to get more of goods at their disposal. All this 
will also cause to reduce poverty and inequality in nations and increasing their economic growth 
in long run. And this is also quite clear from the Table 4.3 that in the long run effect of political 
and economic institutions is much stronger on trade policy as compared to other factors. Thus it 
leads to the rejection of null hypothesis. Moreover control variables are showing their signs 
according to theory and significance is quite high for all variables. Diagnostics of the model reports 
the validity of SGMM results. Important assumptions of the model discussed in the methodology 
section are fully met. The condition of steady state can be seen from the absolute value of LDV 
which should be less than unity for the assumption to hold. Similarly instrument validity in each 
model can be observed from Hansen J-test. Orthogonality conditions through C-test for both 
subsets of instruments used for GMM and IV options are also leaving no sign to reject the 
hypothesis that these instruments are not exogenous. Probability of F-test is showing the overall 
joint significance of all explanatory variables of model.  
4.7.1.2: Model with Non-Tariff Barriers 
Now another important trade policy measure has been used for analyzing its impact on economic 
growth via different institutional features of an economy in Table 4.4. Nature of the relationship 
remains the same but co-efficient in magnitude has increased drastically for all instruments which 
supports the theory that non-tariff barriers are more restrictive than tariff barriers. Variables related 
to concentration of power and constraints on political leaders which are related to de jure 
institutions are showing more effect in this model on growth related to trade policy 
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supporting the theory that non-tariff barriers are linked with attaining licenses and political 
concentration of powers really help in this case. Each sector wants to have more and more of such 
licenses through finding political patronage so that they could have opportunity to be in the process 
of money making and all this activity causes the major source of rent seeking. Such political 
affiliation is obtained at the expense of providing financial support to political leaders at the time 
of their political campaign and in this way bureaucracy involves in policy making for the sake 
protecting the interests of these lobbies through the provision of such licenses to them. Maximum 
number of nations have been included in the analysis for which data for main variable i.e. trade 
policy, is available and then on the basis of the data used for instruments. Out of 133 developing 
nations, only 77 were having data for NTBs. All these nations have been included in the estimation. 
Diagnostics of the model are showing that estimation is correct and SGMM is valid. Moreover 
other macroeconomic variables are also having the expected and significant signs. In this model 
again null hypothesis has been rejected confirming the role of institutions over policy. 
4.7.1.3: Model with Regulatory Trade Barriers 
Now Table 4.5 shows the results using another proxy for trade policy which is regulatory trade 
barriers. It is actually one of the components of EFW index of freedom to trade. It incorporates the 
effect of nontariff barriers along with the cost incurred to exporters and imports during trade.  
It can be seen from results that again this trade policy proxy is affecting negatively the growth 
rates of the economies. And as this sub component of EFW index is also containing a part of NTBs 
that’s why the magnitude of trade policy coefficient are large showing a strong effect of such type 
of barriers on economic performance. Both short and long run estimates are negative and highly 
significant for institutional variables as compared to other dimension tested in analysis. 
Diagnostics of the model shows that all instruments are valid and are effectively contributing to 
the trade policy. All these proxies are direct measures of trade policy or sometimes called incidence 
based measures. Such policy measures affect directly the economic performance.  
 
Now the next part of the estimation is based on the outcome based measures. In this respect, firstly 
black market premium has been used.   
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4.7.1.4: Model with Black Market Premium 
Black market premium is considered as one type of trade restrictiveness measure. According to 
Global Development Network (GDN) database, in many African nations, from 1960s to 1990s the 
black market premium rose from 20% to 915.4% but in 1999s it reached to almost zero again.166 
All this is showing less control on foreign exchange market or in other words less capital controls 
and more economic activity. Lower level of premium increases the degree of openness and 
integration in an economy. And from the Table 4.6 it can be seen that this type of reform is 
contributing positively in growth when instrumented with different institutional variables. Or in 
other words less restrictive trade barriers in the form less controls on foreign exchange markets 
are growth enhancing. Again in this case stronger effect is when this variable is being instrumented 
with political openness, Rule of law and international organization. The effect of geographical 
variable is showing improvement here but still lesser in magnitude as compared to many 
institutional variables. Moreover role of financial institution is prominent in long run on the 
coefficient of this proxy variable. All the diagnostics are showing the validity of the model.  
4.7.1.5: Model with Composite Index 
Now another proxy variable for trade policy has been examined for its effect on the economic 
performance of developing nations under their institutional frame work. This is actually a 
composite index showing the extent of overall openness in a country using tariff, non-tariff, and 
capital control. From the Table 4.7 it can be seen that coefficients in both short and long run are 
showing positive and highly significant results. But the main thing to be focused that the magnitude 
of trade policy proxy has increased much more as compared to other outcome based measures. 
And again the effect of institutional variable related to durability of political system showing 
higher magnitude as compared to geographical indicator both in short run as well as in long run 
facilitating to the rejection of null hypothesis again. 
4.7.1.6: Model with Trade/GDP 
Now when trade to GDP ratio has been used as the proxy for trade policy then it is also showing 
the positive and significant results. But the magnitude of the coefficients has decreased too much 
extent. This measure is considered by many authors atheoratical. They think that this measure 
                                                          
166 The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000, volume 2, edited by nudulu.et.al. (2008), 
Cambridge University press.  
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doesn’t not show the direct impact of trade policy only rather it is the outcome of many other  
policies in an economy as well. That is the reason it’s showing a very little impact on economic 
performance of the nation.  Again this proxy if instrumented with international organization, 
political openness and concentration index of government and opposition is showing more impact 
on growth both in short run and long run as compared to fixed factor i.e. geography. All diagnostics 
are according the assumptions of the model which prove the validity of estimation procedure again. 
4.7.1.7: Model with KOF Sub Index 
This is also one of the proxies used for measuring the restrictiveness of trade barriers. KOF index 
tells us about the openness or extent of globalization in any economy. It includes a sub-index for 
trade policy. This shows the extent of openness of trade policies in the complete index.  The 
coefficient sign is showing again the positive167 and significant impact of the variable of on 
economic growth in Table 4.9. But the nature of relationship is very week. The reason is again that 
this sub index is including the mean tariff rates, hidden trade barriers on imports and capital 
controls. Moreover rating of nation has been considered as less globalized if that nation is 
collecting more tariff revenues. The impact is minor in its magnitude because ratings have been 
taken as a measure of restrictiveness/ openness. But the sign of the variable is according to the 
theory that openness leads to more growth of nation. Now the question arise which intervening 
variable is influencing more on this trade policy proxy for having its final impact on the economic 
performance. The role of international economic institution is prominent, and then indices of 
political party’s concentration and political and cultural openness are showing more magnitude on 
growth as compared to other factors. Post estimation of all models with different variables used as 
instruments prove their validity. Moreover steady state assumption is being hold in all models 
which shows that SGMM is the right choice of model. All other variables are also in line with the 
theory. And F test shows the joint significance of the model overall.
                                                          
167 Same index has been used by Aidt & Gassebner (2010) in their research work to see whether autocratic nations 
trade less or more after opening up of their regimes and they found a positive relationship between imports and this 
restriction sub index. They concluded that this is not due to the policy differences in these types of regimes rather it 
depends more on the lack of political accountability in such nations. Moreover they also found that there is a missing 
trade link in autocratic nations which is restricting the process of global integration in the way of development. That 
is the reason, now more international institutions have started focusing more on the ‘second generation’ reforms which 
are related to ‘good governance’.  
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4.7.2: Estimation of results using combined sets of Instruments 
 
So far the analysis has been conducted by treating each variable individually as an exogenous 
factor affecting trade policy and the coefficient of trade policy has shown the quite visible 
variability related to these different choices of instruments having their relevance with policy 
designing in past literature. But now an additional attempt has been made to see the overall impact 
of various institutional variables on policy outcome of these developing nations. For this purpose 
the whole set of intervening variables have been divided into different broad categories i.e. role of 
political institutions (de jure), economic institutions, geographical conditions, level of integration, 
and governance (de facto) and then each trade policy measure has been regressed on growth in 
baseline model. Role of political institutions has been captured by level of political constraints on 
leader, bureaucracy, durability of the political system, checks on executive, concentration of 
powers and role of military leader in a political system of any nation. Openness covers economic, 
social, cultural and political interconnectedness. This openness term has been used interchangeably 
with extent of integration in this analysis. Political openness here shows the role of embassies in 
connecting nations through policy relaxations. Role of economic institutions in trade policy 
making has been clipped with two variables, i.e. assurance of property rights in any economy 
which attracts the investors for investment and membership of international trade organization 
WTO. Land lockedness has been used as the geographical indicator in trade policy because this 
characteristic of nations increase or decrease the economic distance among them and either 
facilitate or reduce the trade. For observing the role of governance, freedom of expression, 
regulatory authority of government, political stability, and rule of law has been grouped in analysis. 
Both short run and long run estimates have been calculated because it is believed that institutions 
need a bit longer time to show their role in the economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors  
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is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values  
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
 
 
 
 
Table: 4.10: Trade Policy= Tariff Barriers 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
SGMM-2 
 
   Pol. Institutions Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
2.3395 
( 0.116) 
-38.985 
( 0.068) 
 
6.3541*** 
(0.000) 
12.5087*** 
(0.000) 
-2.6045*** 
(0.001) 
2.6170*** 
(0.002) 
.8868 
(0.100) 
Growtht-1 
.4363*** 
(0.000) 
.2832*** 
(0.000) 
.3968*** 
(0.000) 
.3696*** 
(0.000) 
.3928*** 
(0.000) 
.3154*** 
(0.000) 
.4177*** 
(0.000) 
Trade Policy 
(SR) 
-.0138 
( 0.375) 
-.0003 
( 0.990) 
-.0271*** 
(0.000) 
-.0804*** 
(0.000) 
-.0638*** 
(0.000) 
-.0470*** 
(0.000) 
-.0231*** 
(0.000) 
(LR)   
-.0449*** 
(0.000) 
-.1276*** 
(0.000) 
-.1052*** 
(0.000) 
-.0686*** 
(0.000) 
-.0398*** 
(0.000) 
Inflation 
-.00002** 
( 0.010) 
-3.87e-
06 
( 0.749) 
 
.00002*** 
(0.000) 
-.00006*** 
(0.000) 
-.00003*** 
(0.000) 
-.00001 
(0.156) -.00003*** 
(0.000) 
Size of nation 
.0075 
( 0.926) 
2.7089* 
( 0.060) 
.4061*** 
(0.000) 
-.1806*** 
(0.000) 
.5126*** 
(0.000) 
.2846*** 
(0.000) 
.3867*** 
(0.000) 
Health 
.0112 
( 0.419) 
-.0409 
( 0.606) 
-.1568*** 
(0.000) 
-.1071*** 
(0.000) 
-.0053 
( 0.547) 
-.0945*** 
(0.000) 
-.0939*** 
(0.000) 
Globalization 
-.0118 
( 0.338) 
-.0067 
( 0.835) 
 
-.0330*** 
(0.000) 
.0103* 
( 0.074) 
-.0655*** 
(0.000) 
.0444*** 
(0.000) 
      .0056 
(0.233) 
Employment 
4.32e-09* 
( 0.001) 
2.23e-08 
( 0.298) 
.0020 
(0.000) 
.0088*** 
(0.000) 
.0002 
( 0.265) 
.0038*** 
(0.000) 
.0015*** 
(0.000) 
Infrastructure 
-.0069 
( 0.599) 
.0150 
( 0.692) 
.1529*** 
(0.000) 
.0255*** 
(0.000) 
.1226*** 
(0.000) 
-.0079 
(0.193) 
.1192*** 
(0.000) 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
chi2                                                         359.14                 167.88                 225.62                 63.72                  202.13 
Prob >chi2                                                   (0.000)                 (0.000)                 (0.000)               (0.000)                  (0.000)  
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   
22751.43 
(0.000) 
20910.07 
(0.000) 
10049.48 
(0.000) 
10301.74 
(0.000) 
33295.60 
(0.000) 
AR(1)   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)   0.342 0.766 0.573 0.233 0.699 
J-Test   0.337 0.213 0.188 0.278 0.205 
C-Test        
GMM   0.989 0.983 0.985 0.998 0.972 
IV   0.976 0.337 0.774 0.836 0.744 
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Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table:4.11: Trade Policy= Non-Tariff Barriers 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
 
   Pol. Institutions Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governanc
e 
        
Constant 
1.6816 
( 0.316) 
-46.205** 
(0.037) 
10.535*** 
(0.000) 
22.6831**
* 
(0.000) 
-4.0612*** 
(0.001) 
10.0619*** 
(0.000) 
1.6606*** 
(0.003) 
Growtht-1 
.4465*** 
(0.000) 
.2903*** 
(0.000) 
.3978*** 
(0.000) 
.3965*** 
(0.000) 
.4004*** 
(0.000) 
.3501*** 
(0.000) 
.3963*** 
(0.000) 
Trade Policy 
(SR) 
.0946 
( 0.364) 
-.0404 
( 0.820) 
-.4156*** 
(0.000) 
-.7360*** 
(0.000) 
-.6935*** 
(0.000) 
-1.0504*** 
(0.000) 
-.7113*** 
(0.000) 
(LR) 
  -.6902*** 
(0.000) 
-1.2197*** 
(0.000) 
-1.1569*** 
(0.000) 
-1.6165*** 
(0.000) 
-1.1784*** 
(0.000) 
Inflation 
-.00002* 
(0.012) 
-3.99e-06 
( 0.743) 
.00003 
(0.046) 
-.00006*** 
(0.000) 
-4.64e-07 
(0.965) 
-.00005*** 
(0.001) 
-.00001** 
(0.049) 
Size of nation 
.0058 
(0.943) 
2.9549 
( 0.047) 
.2319*** 
(0.000) 
-.4325*** 
(0.000) 
.1175*** 
(0.009) 
-.0275 
(0.503) 
.1505*** 
(0.000) 
Health 
.0110 
( 0.452) 
.0232 
( 0.796) 
-.1801*** 
(0.000) 
-.2292*** 
(0.000) 
.1374*** 
(0.000) 
-.1026*** 
(0.000) 
.0094*** 
(0.312) 
Globalization 
-.0119 
( 0.410) 
-.0213 
( 0.556) 
.0097* 
(0.058) 
.0897*** 
(0.000) 
-.0331*** 
(0.000) 
.0940*** 
(0.000) 
.0050 
(0.401) 
Employment 
4.12e-
09*** 
( 0.002) 
1.91e-08 
( 0.361) 
.0036*** 
(0.000) 
   .0106*** 
(0.000) 
.0036*** 
(0.000) 
.0062*** 
(0.000) 
.0035*** 
(0.000) 
Infrastructure 
-.0063 
( 0.653) 
.0236 
( 0.572) 
.1487*** 
(0.000) 
.0879*** 
(0.000) 
.1022*** 
(0.000) 
.0452*** 
(0.000) 
.1184*** 
(0.000) 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
chi2 
Prob>chi2 
  304.49 
(0.000) 
700.46 
(0.000) 
799.38 
(0.000) 
193.78 
(0.000) 
301.33 
(0.000) 
observations 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 
Countries   77 77 77 77 77 
Instruments   76 74 71 70 75 
F-test   61764.08 17554.64 1901.35 17364.83 12319.91 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.225 0.666 0.265 0.436 0.334 
J-Test   0.296 0.252 0.175 0.233 0.276 
C-Test        
GMM   0.989 0.986 0.990 0.988 0.994 
IV   0.939 0.790 0.217 0.868 0.774 
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Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Table: 4.12: Trade Policy= Regulatory Trade Barriers 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
 
   Pol. Institutions Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
3.0334** 
(0.042) 
-33.626 
(0.115) 
3.3909*** 
(0.000) 
18.374*** 
(0.000) 
5.4396*** 
(0.000) 
.6104 
(0.501) 
4.6287*** 
(0.000) 
Growtht-1 
.4343*** 
(0.000) 
.2818**
* 
(0.000) 
.3734*** 
(0.000) 
.3714*** 
(0.000) 
.4081*** 
(0.000) 
.3348*** 
(0.000) 
.4117*** 
(0.000) 
Trade Policy 
(SR)  
-.2009*** 
(0.008) 
-.2783** 
(0.047) 
-.6392*** 
(0.000) 
-.8097*** 
(0.000) 
-.7614*** 
(0.000) 
-1.0285*** 
(0.000) 
-.9068*** 
(0.000) 
(LR) 
  -1.0202*** 
(0.000) 
-
1.2884*** 
(0.000) 
-1.2866*** 
(0.000) 
-1.5462*** 
(0.000) 
-1.5414*** 
(0.000) 
Inflation 
-.00003 
(0.005) 
-6.46e-
06 
(0.594) 
.0002*** 
(0.000) 
-.0001*** 
(0.000) 
-.00007*** 
(0.004) 
-.00002*** 
(0.296) 
-.00003*** 
( 0.026) 
Size of nation 
-.0565 
(0.462) 
2.3625 
(0.102) 
.3615*** 
(0.000) 
-.6257*** 
(0.000) 
-.0086 
(0.855) 
.1226** 
(0.033) 
-.0890** 
(0.038) 
Health 
.0187 
(0.186) 
-.0271 
(0.733) 
-.0503*** 
(0.000) 
-.0954*** 
(0.000) 
-.0179 
(0.194) 
.0471*** 
(0.002) 
.0171 
(0.170) 
Globalization 
.0046 
(0.717) 
.0115 
(0.725) 
-.0283*** 
(0.000) 
.0958*** 
(0.000) 
.0267*** 
(0.002) 
.0558*** 
(0.000) 
.0446*** 
(0.000) 
Employment 
4.86e-09 
(0.000) 
2.29e-08 
(0.267) 
.0022*** 
(0.000) 
.0128*** 
(0.000) 
.0054*** 
(0.000) 
.0046*** 
(0.000) 
.0064*** 
(0.000) 
Infrastructur
e 
-.0103 
(0.432) 
.0153 
(0.679) 
.1394*** 
(0.000) 
.0045 
(0.510) 
.1119*** 
(0.000) 
-.0062 
(0.354) 
.0726*** 
(0.000) 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  233.69 
(0.000) 
31.84 
(0.000) 
186.82 
(0.000) 
145.74 
(0.000) 
261.74 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries   83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   23787.45 32451.71 27290.25 12583.38 23744.27 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.181 0.770 0.861 0.725 0.640 
J-Test   0.261 0.170 0.198 0.202 0.147 
C-Test        
GMM   0.985 0.963 0.994 0.992 0.938 
IV   0.928 0.516 0.579 0.986 0.240 
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 Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
 
Table:  4.13: Trade Policy= Black Market Premium 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
        
Constant 
-1.2243 
(0.464) 
-39.775* 
(0.060) 
6.1555*** 
(0.000) 
14.592*** 
(0.000) 
-.2872 
(0.847) 
1.0683*** 
(0.000) 
-2.6991*** 
(0.000) 
Growtht-1 
.4248*** 
(0.000) 
.2836**
* 
(0.000) 
.3825*** 
(0.000) 
.3675*** 
(0.000) 
.3830*** 
(0.000) 
.3295*** 
(0.000) 
.3652*** 
(0.000) 
Trade Policy 
 (SR)  
.3251*** 
(0.000) 
.2736**
* 
(0.009) 
.1089*** 
(0.000) 
.2262*** 
(0.000) 
 .2002*** 
(0.000) 
.1579*** 
(0.000) 
.2854*** 
(0.000) 
(LR) 
  .1763*** 
(0.000) 
.3576*** 
(0.000) 
.3246*** 
(0.000) 
.2355*** 
(0.000) 
.4497*** 
(0.000) 
Inflation 
-.00001* 
(0.083) 
-5.52e-
06 
(0.647) 
4.10e-06 
(0.163) 
-.00002*** 
(0.000) 
4.05e-07 
(0.913) 
-.00001*** 
(0.000) 
3.55e-07 
(0.851) 
Size of nation 
.0459 
(0.547) 
2.7169* 
(0.058) 
.7081*** 
(0.000) 
-.0973 
(0.127) 
1.0306*** 
(0.000) 
.7067*** 
(0.000) 
.5792*** 
(0.000) 
Health 
.0084 
(0.539) 
-.0636 
(0.424) 
-.2745*** 
(0.000) 
-.2325*** 
(0.000) 
-.2642*** 
(0.000) 
-.2191*** 
(0.000) 
-.1405*** 
(0.000) 
Globalization 
-.0142 
(0.227) 
-.0143 
(0.650) 
 
-.0274*** 
(0.000) 
.0156*** 
(0.002) 
-.0390*** 
(0.000) 
.0225*** 
(0.000) 
.0091** 
(0.015) 
Employment 
3.82e-09*** 
(0.003) 
1.89e-08 
(0.359) 
-.0007** 
(0.026) 
.0074*** 
(0.000) 
-.0044*** 
(0.000) 
-.0007 
(0.061) 
-.00007 
(0.786) 
Infrastructure 
-.0040 
(0.756) 
.0152 
(0.681) 
.2725*** 
(0.000) 
.1466*** 
(0.000) 
.3064*** 
(0.000) 
.1582*** 
(0.000) 
.1615*** 
(0.000) 
                                                                            Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  40186.99 
(0.000) 
2621.01 
(0.000) 
5445.92 
(0.000) 
141.26 
(0.000) 
484.79 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries   83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   84224.27 66061.39 31280.05 19391.11 36386.85 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.403 0.515 0.421 0.286 0.400 
J-Test   0.287 0.160 0.180 0.164 0.269 
C-Test        
GMM   0.998 0.994 0.999 0.994 0.999 
IV   0.983 0.574 0.806 0.944 0.999 
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Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations 
Table: 4.14: Trade Policy= Trade %GDP 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
 
   Pol. Institutions Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geograph
y 
Governance 
        
Constant 
.8769 
(0.573) 
-36.752* 
( 0.081) 
2.8227*** 
(0.006) 
5.5187*** 
(0.000) 
-.0707 
(0.960) 
-1.7583 
(0.231) 
2.1820 
(0.146) 
Growtht-1 
.4272*** 
(0.000) 
.2760*** 
(0.000) 
.3586*** 
(0.000) 
.3632*** 
(0.000) 
.4030*** 
(0.000) 
.3199*** 
(0.000) 
.3198*** 
(0.000) 
Trade Policy 
(SR)  
.0081*** 
(0.001) 
.0378*** 
(0.000) 
.0301*** 
(0.000) 
.0327*** 
(0.000) 
.0396*** 
(0.000) 
.0364*** 
(0.000) 
.0439*** 
(0.000) 
(LR) 
  .0470*** 
(0.000) 
.0513*** 
(0.000) 
.0663*** 
(0.000) 
.0536*** 
(0.000) 
.0646*** 
(0.000) 
Inflation 
-
.00002*** 
(0.007) 
-6.61e-
06 
(0.582) 
-.0001*** 
(0.000) 
-.00003 
(0.148) 
-.00004* 
( 0.057) 
-.0001*** 
(0.000) 
-.0001*** 
(0.000) 
Size of nation 
.0736 
( 0.359) 
2.5004 
( 0.080) 
.6336*** 
(0.000) 
.4254*** 
(0.000) 
.9765*** 
(0.000) 
.5893*** 
(0.000) 
.5101*** 
(0.000) 
Health 
.0157 
( 0.259) 
-.0365 
( 0.644) 
-.1972*** 
(0.000) 
-.1812*** 
(0.000) 
-.2056*** 
(0.000) 
-.1279*** 
(0.000) 
-.2021*** 
(0.000) 
Globalization 
-.0246* 
( 0.054) 
-.0444 
(0.172) 
-.0281 
(0.000) 
-.0380*** 
(0.000) 
-.0995*** 
(0.000) 
.0060 
(0.427) 
.0372*** 
(0.000) 
Employment 
4.24e-
09*** 
( 0.001) 
1.75e-08 
( 0.393) 
      .0022*** 
(0.000) 
.0046*** 
(0.000) 
-.0010 
(0.038) 
.0029*** 
(0.000) 
.0051*** 
(0.000) 
Infrastructure 
-.0089 
( 0.493) 
.0105 
( 0.776) 
.1254*** 
(0.000) 
.1094*** 
(0.000) 
.1786*** 
(0.000) 
.0086 
(0.325) 
-.0053 
( 0.450) 
                                                                            Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  810.82 
(0.000) 
502.63 
(0.000) 
1567.09 
(0.000) 
187.34 
(0.000) 
811.07 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries   83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   7798.08 7183.62 4290.25 11056.86 13351.70 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.992 0.561 0.723 0.469 0.993 
J-Test   0.392 0.229 0.189 0.335 0.320 
C-Test        
GMM   0.999 0.990 0.992 0.999 0.999 
IV   0.877 0.284 0.194 0.932 0.459 
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Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations 
Table: 4.15: Trade Policy= Free to trade(composite index) 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
 
   Pol. Institutions Openness Eco. Institutions Geography Governanc
e 
        
Constant 
-1.0628 
( 0.528) 
-63.348 
(0.003) 
-7.6279*** 
(0.000) 
4.3288*** 
(0.001) 
-17.099*** 
(0.000) 
-
13.9451*** 
(0.000) 
-
16.1481*** 
(0.000) 
Growtht-1 
.4290*** 
(0.000) 
.2847*** 
(0.000) 
.4147*** 
(0.000) 
.3731*** 
(0.000) 
.3885*** 
(0.000) 
.3344*** 
(0.000) 
.3885*** 
(0.000) 
Trade Policy 
(SR) 
.5438*** 
(0.000) 
1.227*** 
(0.000) 
2.0248*** 
(0.000) 
.8860*** 
(0.000) 
1.2884*** 
(0.000) 
1.3641*** 
(0.000) 
1.9837*** 
(0.000) 
(LR) 
  3.4595*** 
(0.000) 
1.4134*** 
(0.000) 
2.1072*** 
(0.000) 
2.5519*** 
(0.000) 
3.2440*** 
(0.000) 
Inflation 
-.00002* 
(0.060) 
6.31e-07 
(0.958) 
4.62e-06 
(0.681) 
-6.79e-06 
( 0.425) 
.00002 
(0.068) 
-.00002 
(0.173) 
.00002 
(0.072) 
Size of nation 
.0907 
(0.253) 
3.8823 
(0.007) 
.9204*** 
(0.000) 
.0057 
( 0.898) 
1.0418*** 
(0.000) 
.9096*** 
(0.000) 
1.2945*** 
(0.000) 
Health 
.0039 
(0.778) 
-.0444 
(0.573) 
 
-.3103*** 
(0.000) 
-.1025*** 
(0.000) 
-.0518*** 
(0.000) 
-.2688*** 
(0.000) 
-.2533*** 
(0.000) 
Globalization 
-
.0350*** 
(0.008) 
-.0541 
(0.101) 
 
.0010 
(0.907) 
-.0291*** 
(0.000) 
-.0637*** 
(0.000) 
.0665*** 
(0.000) 
-.0139 
(0.209) 
Employment 
3.34e-
09** 
(0.012) 
1.83e-09 
(0.930) 
-.0030*** 
(0.000) 
   .0052*** 
(0.000) 
-.0061*** 
(0.000) 
-.0027*** 
(0.000) 
-.0071*** 
(0.000) 
Infrastructure 
.0016 
(0.900) 
.0467 
(0.214) 
.1867*** 
(0.000) 
.0545*** 
(0.000) 
.1002*** 
(0.000) 
.0647*** 
(0.000) 
.1827*** 
(0.000) 
                                                                            Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  1101.42 
(0.000) 
182.98 
(0.000) 
617.56 
(0.000) 
1020.66 
(0.000) 
651.41 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries   83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   82672.71 15737.42 23583.81 11814.89 56769.15 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.620 0.458 0.381 0.393 0.467 
J-Test   0.284 0.169 0.149 0.108 0.227 
C-Test        
GMM   0.998 0.997 0.993 0.963 0.997 
IV   1.000 0.661 0.636 0.299 0.953 
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Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
 
Table: 4.16: Trade Policy= KOF Restriction Index 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-
2 
SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
 
   Pol. Institutions Opennes
s 
Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governanc
e 
        
Constant 
1.8600 
(0.235) 
-35.833* 
(0.097) 
 
7.4519*** 
(0.000) 
8.3985**
* 
(0.000) 
-2.4507* 
(0.063) 
2.0750** 
(0.042) 
-.4367 
(0.620) 
Growtht-1 
.4306*** 
(0.000) 
.2848*** 
(0.000) 
.4232*** 
(0.000) 
.3623*** 
(0.000) 
.4081*** 
(0.000) 
.3386*** 
(0.000) 
.4046*** 
(0.000) 
Trade Policy 
(SR) 
.0252*** 
(0.008) 
.0179 
( 0.350) 
.0898*** 
(0.000) 
.0564*** 
(0.000) 
.1514*** 
(0.000) 
.0854*** 
(0.000) 
.0766*** 
(0.000) 
(LR) 
  .1557*** 
(0.000) 
.0885*** 
(0.000) 
.2559*** 
(0.000) 
.1291*** 
(0.000) 
.1288*** 
(0.000) 
Inflation 
-
.00002** 
( 0.018) 
-3.27e-06 
(0.788) 
1.03e-06 
(0.943) 
-.00001 
(0.310) 
-.00002 
(0.167) 
-.00006*** 
(0.001) 
-.00001 
(0.193) 
Size of nation 
.0201 
(0.803) 
2.4590* 
(0.093) 
.4898*** 
(0.000) 
.0689 
(0.115) 
.8664*** 
(0.000) 
.4310*** 
(0.000) 
.6204*** 
(0.000) 
Health 
.0099 
(0.476) 
-.0274 
( 0.735) 
-.2212*** 
(0.000) 
-
.1232*** 
(0.000) 
-.1238*** 
(0.000) 
-.1556*** 
(0.000) 
-.1442*** 
(0.000) 
Globalization 
-.0311 
(0.038) 
-.0243 
(0.541) 
-.1019*** 
(0.000) 
-
.0501*** 
(0.000) 
-.2058*** 
(0.000) 
-.0203** 
(0.030) 
-.0642*** 
(0.000) 
Employment 
4.33e-
09*** 
(0.001) 
2.02e-08 
(0.333) 
.0016*** 
(0.000) 
.0055*** 
(0.000) 
-.0021*** 
(0.000) 
.0025*** 
(0.000) 
.00001 
(0.944) 
Infrastructure 
-.0113 
(0.394) 
.0190 
(0.617) 
.1883*** 
(0.000) 
.0758*** 
(0.000) 
.1688*** 
(0.000) 
.0481*** 
(0.000) 
.1468*** 
(0.000) 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  491.56 
(0.000) 
174.82 
(0.000) 
950.71 
(0.000) 
237.50 
(0.000) 
475.19 
(0.000) 
observations 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 
Countries   81 81 81 81 81 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   62307.44 20307.98 8036.51 14654.41 64206.19 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.604 0.529 0.700 0.539 0.650 
J-Test   0.271 0.220 0.203 0.161 0.229 
C-Test        
GMM   0.965 0.977 0.989 0.961 0.979 
IV   0.500 0.454 0.981 0.876 0.446 
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4.7.2.1: Model with Tariff Rate 
Table 4.10 reports the results of model using MFN Tariff rates as a trade policy indicator. Here it 
can be seen that five various models have been run using various sets of institutional and 
geographical factors for capturing the endogeneity of trade policy. The negative sign of trade 
policy is showing that with decreasing trade taxes, the overall economic growth is increasing in 
developing countries. And this magnitude gets higher both in short run and long run when 
endogeneity of trade policy has been captured by openness indicators because it includes political 
integration and cultural interconnectedness among nation’s institutions. After openness factors, 
the magnitude of variable is showing rise when it is instrumented with economic institutional 
factors. From the long run estimates, it can be seen that improvement is more in case of institutional 
variables as compared to other indicators. Moreover control variables are showing their signs 
according to theory and significance is quite high for all variables. Diagnostics of the model reports 
the validity of SGMM results. Hausman between OLS and GMM supports the later one as the 
most suitable technique for analysis.  The condition of steady state can be seen from the absolute 
value of LDV. Similarly Hansen J-test confirms instrument validity. Orthogonality conditions 
through C-test for both subsets of instruments used for GMM and IV options are also leaving no 
sign to reject the hypothesis that these instruments are not exogenous. Probability of F-test is 
showing the overall joint significance of all explanatory variables of model.  
4.7.2.2: Model with Non-Tariff Barriers 
Now another important trade policy measure has been used for analyzing its impact on economic 
growth via different institutional features of an economy in Table 4.11. Nature of the relationship 
remains the same but co-efficient in magnitude has increased drastically for all instruments which 
supports the theory that non-tariff barriers are more restrictive than tariff barriers and their removal 
can be more helpful in increasing economic growth.  But here results are showing that when trade 
policy is being endogenized by geographical indicator then the coefficient of trade policy becomes 
high as compared to other institutional variables. Diagnostics proves that model is valid. Moreover 
other control variables are also having the expected and significant signs.  
4.7.2.3: Model with Regulatory Trade barrier 
This trade policy proxy is also showing negative effect on growth rates of the economies. As this 
sub component of EFW index is also containing a part of NTBs that’s why the magnitude of trade 
policy coefficient are large showing a strong effect of such type of barriers on economic 
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performance. Both short and long run estimates are negative and highly significant but more in 
magnitude for the model capturing the endogeneity of trade policy by geography. Diagnostics 
supports the validity of instruments and model overall. All these three proxies are direct measures 
of trade policy or sometimes called incidence based measures. Such policy measures affect directly 
the economic performance. Now the remaining analysis is based on the outcome based measures. 
In this respect, firstly black market premium has been used.   
4.7.2.4: Model with Black Market Premium 
Black market premium is also considered as one types of trade restrictiveness measure. An 
economy is to be called more open if it is showing less control on foreign exchange market or in 
other words less capital controls leads to more economic activity. And lower level of premium 
increases the degree of openness in an economy. Data set also reports that the discrepancy between 
black market and official exchange rates is decreasing in developing nations which is showing 
movements towards more open exchange markets. Hence the proposed relationship between BMP 
and growth is assumed to be positive. From the Table 4.13, it is clear that this type of reform is 
contributing positively in growth when instrumented with different institutional variables. Or in 
other words less restrictive trade barriers in the form less controls on foreign exchange markets 
are growth enhancing. Here again models instrumented with institutional and governance factors 
are showing high magnitude of trade policy variables as compared to model coalesced with 
geography.  All diagnostics are showing the validity of the model.  
4.7.2.5: Model with composite index 
Now another proxy variable for trade policy has been examined for its effect on the economic 
performance of developing nations under their institutional frame work. This is actually a 
composite index showing the extent of overall openness in a country using tariff, non-tariff, and 
capital control. From the Table 4.14, it can be seen that coefficients in both short run and long run 
are showing positive and highly significant results. But the main thing to be focused that the 
magnitude of trade policy proxy has increased much more as compared to other outcome based 
measures. But the institutional-coalesced models are showing high magnitude for growth in case 
of this trade policy proxy as compared to geographical indicator. Firstly the role of political 
institutions which are de jure rules and then governance factors showing de facto institutions is 
very prominent. Diagnostics of the model again validates all the assumptions which are needed to 
be fulfilled for best fit.  
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4.7.2.6: Model with Trade/GDP 
Now when trade to GDP ratio has been used as the proxy for trade policy in Table 4.15 then it is 
also showing that more liberal policies lead to more economic growth. Relationship is being 
observed highly significant. But the magnitude of the coefficients has decreased to larger extent. 
This measure is considered by many authors atheoratical and does not the direct impact of trade 
policy only rather it is the outcome of many other  policies in an economy as well. That is the 
reason it’s showing a very little impact on economic performance of the nation.  Again this proxy 
if instrumented with governance and economic institutional factors then effect on growth is more 
as compared to other models supporting the findings given by Stensnes (2006). All diagnostics are 
according the assumptions of the model which prove the validity of estimation procedure again. 
4.7.2.7: Model with KOF sub index 
This is also one of the proxies used for measuring the restrictiveness of trade barriers. KOF index 
tells us about the openness or extent of globalization in any economy. It includes a sub-index for 
trade policy. This shows the extent of openness of trade policies in the complete index. The 
coefficient sign is showing again the positive and significant impact of the variable of on economic 
growth in Table 4.16. Sign of the variable is according to the theory that openness leads to more 
growth of nation. Now again the question arise which exogenous factors explains more to trade 
policy? The role of economic and political institutions is very prominent showing their 
effectiveness in making trade policy more liberal. Using this proxy as well, post estimation of all 
models confirms the validity of assumption.  
       4.7.3: Whether Regimes matter in developing Policy-Growth nexus? 
Now in this section of the study, efforts have been made to develop Trade Policy-Growth link by 
taking into consideration the different nature of political regimes and their institutional capacities.  
Earlier no such empirical analysis has been conducted in this regard separately. Only detailed 
descriptive studies are available showing the situation of the restrictiveness of trade policy in 
developing nations. In past attempts have been made to discuss only African nations with respect 
to the role of trade policies in their economic performance but those studies are completely 
belonging to discipline of economics not including the flavor of political economy of these nations. 
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) conducted a detailed study and found that trade reforms are often 
preceded by political or democratic reforms and after 4 years of democracy in a nation, the 
probability of a nation to be open to international trade increases 30 percentage points more as 
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compared to the time before democratization. But startling fact which these two authors also 
observed that even economic liberalization has a positive relationship with political liberalization 
but still it has been found that on average those nations which are in transitory process of 
democracy are not following significant accelerating growth rates and better economic policies. 
The question arises that why is it so? Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) have answered it in a way that 
“sequence” matters in case of liberalizations and concluded that to have better results, the sequence 
of reforms should be from economic to political side. The present study is making this attempt for 
the first time and covered almost all developing nations into analysis. Only those nations have 
been dropped from analysis for which either trade policy data is not available or other institutional 
variables are missing. Moreover in this section these nations have been divided according to their 
political regime and this division is based on the database of Freedom of the World. The procedure 
of this division has been discussed in detail in second chapter of this research work.  
Now moving towards discussion, how tariff are affecting in democratic and autocratic nations. 
Again the same model structure has been used with only this difference that now its vector of 
control variables i.e. 𝑿𝒊,𝒕  contains new variable related to regime. OLS and FE estimates have 
been provided to check the feasibility of desired technique. It can be seen that in case of democratic 
nations, the models using political institutions and economic institutions as intervening variables 
are showing large magnitude of trade policy coefficient. While the nature and significance of the 
variable is same as above in models. For autocratic nations, impact of openness and governance 
factors is more prominent than any other set of external factors. Moreover from results it can be 
seen from values of coefficients that in democratic nations such policy reforms work more 
efficiently through their institutional setups as compared to autocratic nations. All diagnostics are 
again supporting the validity of the model.  
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Table: 4.17: Trade Policy= Tariff Rate (MFN) 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. Institutions Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
2.1910 
(0.141) 
-38.794* 
(0.071) 
-.2863 
(0.637) 
13.812*** 
(0.000) 
-4.5146*** 
(0.000) 
1.4016 
(0.086) 
1.8797*** 
(0.002) 
GDPt-1 
.4331*** 
(0.000) 
.2831*** 
(0.000) 
.3193*** 
(0.000) 
.3739*** 
(0.000) 
.3740*** 
(0.000) 
.3030*** 
(0.000) 
.3710*** 
(0.000) 
Tariff*Demo 
-.0364** 
(0.029) 
.0046 
(0.959) 
-.1103*** 
(0.000) 
.0685*** 
(0.000) 
-.0830*** 
(0.000) 
-.0457* 
(0.083) 
-.0117** 
(0.017) 
Tariff 
-.0103 
(0.512) 
-.0017 
(0.932) 
-.0238*** 
(0.000) 
-.0939*** 
(0.000) 
-.0361*** 
(0.000) 
-.0440*** 
(0.000) 
-.0537*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  220.77 
(0.000) 
264.53 
(0.000) 
185.78 
(0.000) 
64.88 
(0.000) 
59.74 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   21272.41 15516.69 10769.32 7816.44 28048.79 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.287 0.657 0.564 0.290 0.547 
J-Test   0.305 0.229 0.189 0.214 0.176 
C-Test        
GMM   0.997 0.991 0.993 0.999 0.967 
IV   0.956 0.430 0.525 0.767 0.543 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Controls included: health, 
size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
 
Similarly in the case of non-tariff barriers, results in Table 4.18 are depicting that geographical 
factor is showing strong impact in case of this policy use. But from institutional sets of variables, 
it is quite obvious that the models incorporating the role of political institutions along with 
governance situations are performing better as compared to other factors. This can be seen from 
the improvement in the coefficient of the trade policy on economic growth. Moreover the effect of 
trade policy on economic performance is higher in case of democratic nations if comparing with 
autocratic nations. Reason is obvious that former nations are having more open trade regimes than 
later one due to their more competitive institutional structure in such nations. Again results are 
confirming that more openness leads to more growth and the strong evidence from democratic 
nations is emphasizing on the importance of both aspects that developing countries should not only 
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try to pursue open trade policies by removing high barriers rather these should also make effort to 
focus on political reforms as well. Because results are clearly showing that in both regimes the 
relationship is of same nature mostly but the intensity reduces in case of autocratic nations of such 
policy reforms as compared to democratic nations.  
Table: 4.18: Trade Policy= Non-Tariff Barriers 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
1.4576 
(0.384) 
-37.074* 
(0.098) 
7.7666*** 
(0.000) 
20.3474*** 
(0.000) 
-4.4547*** 
(0.000) 
8.7616*** 
(0.000) 
4.614*** 
(0.000) 
GDPt-1 
.4378*** 
(0.000) 
.2872*** 
(0.000) 
.3402*** 
(0.000) 
.3870*** 
(0.000) 
.3757*** 
(0.000) 
.3428*** 
(0.000) 
.3739*** 
(0.000) 
NTB*Demo 
-
.1250*** 
(0.001) 
-
.8345*** 
(0.009) 
-.2328*** 
(0.000) 
-.1188*** 
(0.000) 
-.2822*** 
(0.000) 
-.0968*** 
(0.004) 
-.1279*** 
(0.000) 
NTB 
.1618 
(0.126) 
.3764 
(0.114) 
-.7459*** 
(0.000) 
-.5956*** 
(0.000) 
-.3822*** 
(0.000) 
-.9636*** 
(0.000) 
-.7483*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  176.07 
(0.000) 
42.82 
(0.000) 
14.34 
(0.000) 
192.92 
(0.000) 
321.70 
(0.000) 
Observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   76 74 71 70 75 
F-test   26340.16 18175.35 11838.81 11296.38 39416.53 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.382 0.669 0.344 0.442 0.417 
J-Test   0.255 0.265 0.143 0.173 0.237 
C-Test        
GMM   0.978 0.994 0.985 0.993 0.991 
IV   0.843 0.837 0.208 0.210 0.735 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
Now another restrictive measure of trade policy has been regressed on the economic growth to see 
its impact on different types of regimes. Again from the Table 4.19 it is clear that in case of both 
types of nations, there is negative effect of trade barriers on the growth of these economies. 
Moreover after observing the highlighted impact of geography here too in this policy proxy, for 
democratic nations the models instrumented with political and economic institutional variables are 
showing more effect on growth than autocratic nations. On the other hand for autocratic nations, 
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the model incorporating the role of integration i.e. political, economic or social openness of 
system, performed better as compared to democratic nations. It means interconnectedness through 
these factors can be helpful for such nations to have healthier policy outcomes.  
Table: 4.19: Trade Policy= Regulatory Trade Barriers 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. Institutions Geography Governance 
Constant 
2.875* 
(0.053) 
-33.645 
(0.116) 
2.8820*** 
(0.000) 
20.742*** 
(0.000) 
5.8720*** 
(0.000) 
1.1507 
(0.238) 
6.183*** 
(0.000) 
GDPt-1 
.4290*** 
(0.000) 
.2818*** 
(0.000) 
.3527*** 
(0.000) 
.3773*** 
(0.000) 
.4083*** 
(0.000) 
.3361*** 
(0.000) 
.3842*** 
(0.000) 
Reg*Demo 
-
.0912*** 
(0.008) 
.0027*** 
(0.992) 
-.1337*** 
(0.000) 
.2851*** 
(0.000) 
-.4052*** 
(0.000) 
.0491 
(0.044) 
-.0689*** 
(0.000) 
Reg 
-.1650** 
(0.032) 
-.2791* 
(0.092) 
-.6939*** 
(0.000) 
-.9673*** 
(0.000) 
-.4842*** 
(0.000) 
-1.0395*** 
(0.000) 
-.8386*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  325.94 
(0.000) 
236.78 
(0.000) 
21.52 
(0.000) 
283.44 
(0.000) 
119.11 
(0.000) 
Observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 72 70 75 
F-test   142920.24 23531.89 26405.89 12509.78 20637.65 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.247 0.999 0.561 0.376 0.675 
J-Test   0.295 0.143 0.150 0.152 0.182 
C-Test        
GMM   0.994 0.952 0.979 0.991 0.984 
IV   0.943 0.651 0.532 0.565 0.430 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
In Table 4.20, market based measure of trade policy has been employed to see its role on the 
economic performance of these nations. Again in all models the sign of this variable is positive 
and significant. This proxy is showing that in autocratic nations, their political and economic 
institutions are performing better in getting maximum benefit from this policy. These results are 
also supporting the theory where it is believed that mostly autocratic leaders try to manage 
exchange rate policies by lowering down such premiums but in case of democracies, exchange 
rate systems are kept flexible and no controls are observed and this sometimes creates a wedge 
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between official and market prices of currencies. For democratic nations, role of governance is 
showing very effective results in extracting maximum benefits from such trade reforms.  
Table: 4.20: Trade Policy= Black Market Premium 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. Institutions Geography Governance 
Constant 
-1.824 
(0.275) 
-37.620* 
(0.077) 
3.7057*** 
(0.000) 
14.647*** 
(0.000) 
.5863 
(0.741) 
1.3464 
(0.313) 
-.7705 
(0.374) 
GDPt-1 
.4146*** 
(0.000) 
.2832*** 
(0.000) 
.3430*** 
(0.000) 
.3676*** 
(0.000) 
.3694*** 
(0.000) 
.3292*** 
(0.000) 
.3328*** 
(0.000) 
BMP*Demo 
-
.0807*** 
(0.000) 
-.3885 
(0.402) 
-.0561*** 
(0.001) 
.0027 
(0.882) 
-.0907*** 
(0.000) 
.0202 
(0.360) 
-.0602*** 
(0.000) 
BMP 
.3777*** 
(0.000) 
.2889*** 
(0.007) 
.1885*** 
(0.000) 
.2277*** 
(0.000) 
.2289*** 
(0.000) 
.1594*** 
(0.000) 
.3071*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  107.15 
(0.000) 
2819.55 
(0.000) 
2681.00 
(0.000) 
1351.98 
(0.000) 
392.17 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   107841.03 58634.75 19914.77 8221.37 23808.90 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.373 0.513 0.469 0.378 0.363 
J-Test   0.272 0.140 0.149 0.126 0.247 
C-Test        
GMM   0.999 0.994 0.998 0.995 0.999 
IV   0.988 0.576 0.776 0.323 0.993 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
In case of outcome based measure of trade policy shown in Table 4.21, again nature of the 
relationship is same for both types of regimes. Models coalesced with governance factors and 
economic institutional variables are showing large impact on economic growth of these nations 
but effect is greater for democratic nations as compared to autocratic regimes. These results are 
again confirming the importance of human made institutions over fixed factors in determining the 
policy effect on economic performance of nations.  
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Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
So far the impact of incidence based, outcome based and market based measures of trade policies 
has been evaluated for both types of regimes separately. Now another category of trade policy 
measure has been used for analyzing its impact on the growth of developing nations in Table 4.22 
given below. Free to trade means the extent of openness in nations. The same sets of variables 
have been used for analyzing the Trade Policy-Growth. For both democratic and autocratic nations, 
again role of political institutions is very prominent for having better results from trade reforms. 
Similarly the model incorporating the role of economic institutions which include the role of 
international trade organization, security of property rights in nation, is also showing large effect 
of trade policy on economic growth, indicating the importance of these institutional factors. 
Table: 4.21: Trade Policy= Trade %GDP 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. Institutions Geography Governance 
Constant 
1.399 
(0.373) 
-
43.235** 
(0.042) 
2.2781** 
(0.036) 
.6273 
(0.670) 
-2.6427*** 
(0.004) 
-4.6333*** 
(0.000) 
.2795 
(0.861) 
GDPt-1 
.4234*** 
(0.000) 
.2744*** 
(0.000) 
.3696*** 
(0.000) 
.3621*** 
(0.000) 
.3998*** 
(0.000) 
.2960*** 
(0.000) 
.3194*** 
(0.000) 
T/GDP*Demo 
-.0049 
(0.033) 
.0370 
(0.026) 
.0057*** 
(0.008) 
.0246*** 
(0.000) 
.0152*** 
(0.006) 
-.0398*** 
(0.000) 
.0092*** 
(0.000) 
T/GDP 
.0082*** 
(0.001) 
.0245** 
(0.018) 
.0334*** 
(0.000) 
.0348*** 
(0.000) 
.0417*** 
(0.000) 
.0422*** 
(0.000) 
.0521*** 
(0.000) 
Controls        
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  299.34 
(0.000) 
413.71 
(0.000) 
1279.33 
(0.000) 
164.32 
(0.000) 
1189.04 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   5225.10 13288.42 4472.09 5597.08 7528.70 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.852 0.378 0.608 0.727 0.976 
J-Test   0.348 0.202 0.170 0.189 0.329 
C-Test        
GMM   0.999 0.991 0.987 0.989 0.999 
IV   0.884 0.575 0.332 0.212 0.732 
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Table: 4.22: Trade Policy= Free to trade 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
2.9576** 
(0.047) 
-49.466** 
(0.022) 
-15.963*** 
(0.000) 
4.8413*** 
(0.003) 
-21.729*** 
(0.000) 
-9.8278*** 
(0.000) 
-14.0825*** 
(0.000) 
GDPt-1 
.4287*** 
(0.000) 
.2801*** 
(0.000) 
.3359*** 
(0.000) 
.3750*** 
(0.000) 
.3453*** 
(0.000) 
.3397*** 
(0.000) 
0.3536*** 
(0.000) 
FTD*Demo 
-
.0799*** 
(0.009) 
1.7392*** 
(0.000) 
-.2256*** 
(0.000) 
.0399 
(0.251) 
-.6268*** 
(0.000) 
.2124*** 
(0.000) 
-.1132*** 
(0.000) 
FTD 
-.1840** 
(0.016) 
-.3564** 
(0.011) 
2.6128*** 
(0.000) 
.8545*** 
(0.000) 
2.1776*** 
(0.000) 
2.1551*** 
(0.000) 
2.0067*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  783.76 
(0.000) 
220.57 
(0.000) 
568.58 
(0.000) 
1307.03 
(0.000) 
63.85 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   16676.80 12141.25 20104.32 8174.48 34540.50 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.583 0.450 0.744 0.563 0.433 
J-Test   0.244 0.149 0.108 0.105 0.186 
C-Test        
GMM   0.996 0.997 0.981 0.989 0.996 
IV   0.939 0.673 0.673 0.395 0.825 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
Table 4.23 represents the effect of another trade policy measure. KOF restriction is a sub-index 
extracted from KOF globalization index. This variable actually shows that how much a nation is 
lowering down its tariff, non-tariff and capital controls on imports. The nature of relationship 
remains same as in case of above models. More a nation is reducing its barriers, more it is open 
and globalized. Therefore the positive sign of this variable on growth is showing the direct impact 
of openness on the economic performance of the nations. Again role of political and economic 
institutions is prominent in improving the magnitude of trade policy for economic growth for both 
type of regimes i.e. democracy and autocracy. All this confirms the importance of institutional 
framework in policy making of any nation.  
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Table:  4.23: Trade Policy=  KOF- Trade Restriction Index 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. Institutions Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
1.630 
(0.295) 
-31.334 
(0.149) 
2.8237*** 
(0.000) 
10.097*** 
(0.000) 
-1.7907 
(0.178) 
6.7220*** 
(0.000) 
2.7905*** 
(0.002) 
GDPt-1 
.4179*** 
(0.000) 
.2825*** 
(0.000) 
.3666*** 
(0.000) 
.3722*** 
(0.000) 
.3813*** 
(0.000) 
.3531*** 
(0.000) 
.3676*** 
(0.000) 
KOF*Demo 
-
.0155*** 
(0.000) 
-.0476* 
(0.085) 
-.0249*** 
(0.000) 
.0277*** 
(0.000) 
-.0440*** 
(0.000) 
-.0512*** 
(0.000) 
-.0152*** 
(0.000) 
KOF 
.0341*** 
(0.000) 
.0387* 
(0.088) 
.1265*** 
(0.000) 
.0471*** 
(0.000) 
.1634*** 
(0.000) 
.0650*** 
(0.000) 
.0628*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  530.81 
(0.000) 
154.90 
(0.000) 
405.93 
(0.000) 
1786.44 
(0.000) 
251.09 
(0.000) 
observations 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 1456 
Countries 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   88379.61 10882.56 6417.76 9443.02 46498.38 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.728 0.478 0.944 0.652 0.661 
J-Test   0.279 0.171 0.189 0.162 0.225 
C-Test        
GMM   0.989 0.940 0.983 0.963 0.986 
IV   0.771 0.424 0.333 0.333 0.536 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
 
4.7.4: Regional Effects of Trade Reforms 
In this section the relationship between trade policies of developing nations and their economic 
performance has been analyzed region wise. Twenty two developing nations from Asia, thirty one 
from Africa, twenty from America, and ten from Europe have been included in the sample. The 
selection of nations from each continent is based upon the availability of data. In appendix figure 
8 shows the nature of trade restrictiveness in different continents using Tariff as a trade policy. 
According to WTO agenda, all developing nations are supposed to reduce their taxes if these want 
to have access into developed nation’s market. As this study is trying to focus on the political 
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economy aspect of trade policies of these nations, therefore this regional division has also been 
made. This classification helps in such a way that the institutional setup is different in all regions 
of the world. The continents having more number of developed nations are having overall better 
political and economic institutions. Moreover governance indicators also give the surety of the 
safe and healthy environment for better policy making. Facts show that Europe and America are 
having more civilized economies and strong political and economic institutions as compared to 
Asia and Africa. And due to this reason policy reform process gets slow leading to slow growth of 
economies in the long run. Therefore in this analysis efforts have been made to evaluate the role 
of lowering trade barriers on the economic performance of these continents which vary in their 
institutional frameworks by augmenting the baseline model i.e. same model has been used with 
the only exception of interaction terms.  
Thus starting again from first trade policy measure i.e. tariff, the results in Table 4.24 are showing 
that the nature of relationship is same as has been observed in above models for almost all 
continents except for Asia. In case of Asia the desired sign of policy variable is only in case of 
geographical indicators while for all other sets of instruments the nature of the relationship has 
changed showing positive but mostly insignificant relationship between trade policy and growth 
rate. For other regions the nature of relationship is the same as expected. In case of Africa, level 
of integration and economic institutions are playing prominent role in affecting trade policies. For 
America models instrumented with economic and political institutions are showing large effect on 
their economic performance. But it is surprising that in case of Europe, coefficients for all models 
have increased attractively and especially in case of political and economic institutional variables. 
Conditions for the validity of instruments are also fulfilled in the model. C-test is showing that all 
subsets of instruments are exogenous. Steady state condition in the model is giving the validity of 
SGMM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard 
errors is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ 
J-test reports the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test 
are the p-values for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for 
AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
       Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
Now when the same models have been applied by changing the proxy for trade policy, results are 
same again in their nature for all regions except for Asia. And it can be seen from the Table 4.25 
that non-tariff barriers are affecting negatively on growth performance of Asia if this trade proxy 
is capturing the effect economic institutions and governance factors. This shows that the domestic 
political environment of this region is not conducive for policy making and its implementation. 
But coefficient of the model with governance indicators as intervening factor for trade policy is 
showing the lowering trade barriers are improving their economic performance but very little in 
its magnitude. On the other hand the negative coefficient of trade policy in case of model 
Table: 4.24: Trade Policy= Tariff Rate (MFN) 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
1.0063 
(0.541) 
-33.058 
(0.133) 
5.3002*** 
(0.000) 
15.209*** 
(0.000) 
2.0681 
(0.171) 
6.0638*** 
(0.000) 
5.5451*** 
(0.000) 
GDPt-1 
.4199*** 
(0.000) 
.2824*** 
(0.000) 
.3094*** 
(0.000) 
.3331*** 
(0.000) 
.3293*** 
(0.000) 
.3262*** 
(0.000) 
.3504*** 
(0.000) 
Asia*Tariff 
-.0081 
(0.691) 
-.0126 
(0.770) 
.0031 
(0.570) 
.0003 
(0.958) 
.0159** 
(0.020) 
.0121* 
(0.074) 
.0545*** 
(0.000) 
Africa*Tariff 
-.0057 
(0.737) 
.0071 
(0.853) 
-.0581*** 
(0.000) 
-.1455*** 
(0.000) 
-.0702*** 
(0.000) 
-.0731*** 
(0.000) 
-.0359*** 
(0.001) 
America*Tariff 
-.0762** 
(0.011) 
-.0426 
(0.668) 
-.2723*** 
(0.000) 
-.1860*** 
(0.000) 
-.2981*** 
(0.000) 
-.1616*** 
(0.000) 
-.1573*** 
(0.000) 
Europe*Tariff 
.1777*** 
(0.003) 
.1534 
(0.311) 
-.5509*** 
(0.000) 
-.1616** 
(0.025) 
.7090*** 
(0.000) 
-.4601*** 
(0.000) 
.4066*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  389.81 
(0.000) 
506.65 
(0.000) 
575.86 
(0.000) 
570.87 
(0.000) 
312.43 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   13746.53 8544.45 4660.58 3848.08 14028.37 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.327 0.507 0.430 0.275 0.433 
J-Test   0.287 0.164 0.194 0.203 0.181 
C-Test        
GMM   0.992 0.977 0.993 0.987 0.961 
IV   0.990 0.680 0.885 0.997 0.707 
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instrumented with economic institutions is showing large impact on the economic performance of 
these nations. In case of Africa, political institutions, for America economic institutions, and for 
Europe extent of integration in economies have improved their economic performance through the 
impact of factors mentioned above. All these results are showing the importance of institutional 
features of the regions in determining the fortune of a nation.  
  
Table:  4.25: Trade Policy= Non-Tariff Barriers 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
1.0698 
(0.514) 
-25.974 
(0.240) 
21.086*** 
(0.000) 
19.479*** 
(0.000) 
16.466*** 
(0.000) 
17.6302*** 
(0.000) 
11.283*** 
(0.000) 
GDPt-1 
.4252*** 
(0.000) 
.2820*** 
(0.000) 
.3453*** 
(0.000) 
.3238*** 
(0.000) 
.4068*** 
(0.000) 
.3260*** 
(0.000) 
.3559*** 
(0.000) 
Asia*NTB 
.0629 
(0.402) 
.0578 
(0.884) 
.1951*** 
(0.000) 
.2092*** 
(0.000) 
-.3154*** 
(0.000) 
.5466*** 
(0.000) 
-.0762** 
(0.011) 
Africa*NTB 
.0595 
(0.378) 
.2321 
(0.344) 
-.7665*** 
(0.000) 
-.3912*** 
(0.000) 
-.5660*** 
(0.000) 
-.4884*** 
(0.000) 
-.5316*** 
(0.000) 
America*NTB 
-.1188 
(0.147) 
-.3473 
(0.276) 
-.1789*** 
(0.005) 
-.4985*** 
(0.000) 
-1.2022*** 
(0.000) 
.2254 
(0.020) 
-.2686*** 
(0.000) 
Europe*NTB 
.0475 
(0.584) 
-.7335 
(0.106) 
-.6926*** 
(0.000) 
-.8901*** 
(0.000) 
-.7502*** 
(0.000) 
-.7578*** 
(0.000) 
-.2204** 
(0.013) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  484.58 
(0.000) 
218.29 
(0.000) 
80.26 
(0.000) 
239.31 
(0.000) 
844.59 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 72 70 75 
F-test   9956.68 2895.83 16636.31 3582.32 12763.78 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.989 0.673 0.945 0.962 0.360 
J-Test   0.262 0.183 0.10 0.234 0.10 
C-Test        
GMM   0.977 0.996 0.935 0.996 0.963 
IV   0.774 0.779 0.224 0.407 0.142 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
Now the same estimation procedure has been done using another proxy of trade policy. Results 
are striking even for Asia now. Regulatory trade barriers are actually a mix of non-tariff barriers 
along with the cost incurred to the trade partners during import and export. Thus from the Table 
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4.26 it can be seen that the coefficient of trade policy variable has improved drastically by adding 
this additional component in the policy variable. And now for Asia too, the signs are in right 
direction showing the importance of integration and governance indicators in policy designing. 
And large coefficient of policy variable in case of model instrumented with level of integration is 
proving this fact that interconnection among economies is helpful in reducing trade costs and 
improving economic performance more than other political economy factors. In case of Africa and 
America, again the role of economic institutions on trade policy has been more as compared to 
other sets of instruments. For Europe too, the model with economic institutions is showing drastic 
improvement in its coefficient on growth rates of these economies right after the geographical 
factors.  
Table:  4.26: Trade Policy= Regulatory Trade Barriers 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
1.9512 
(0.237) 
-23.492 
(0.292) 
16.377*** 
(0.000) 
21.809*** 
(0.000) 
17.1075*** 
(0.000) 
5.4370*** 
(0.001) 
20.6512*** 
(0.000) 
GDPt-1 
.4236*** 
(0.000) 
.2819*** 
(0.000) 
.3483*** 
(0.000) 
.3417*** 
(0.000) 
.3463*** 
(0.000) 
.3238*** 
(0.000) 
.3541*** 
(0.000) 
Asia*Reg 
-.1998** 
(0.018) 
-.3984 
(0.124) 
-.2011*** 
(0.000) 
-.5496*** 
(0.000) 
-.3766*** 
(0.000) 
-.5254*** 
(0.000) 
-.4521*** 
(0.000) 
Africa*Reg 
-.2023** 
(0.010) 
-.0676 
(0.739) 
-1.0316*** 
(0.000) 
-
1.1523*** 
(0.000) 
-1.2859*** 
(0.000) 
-.7983*** 
(0.000) 
-1.2017*** 
(0.000) 
America*Reg 
.3616*** 
(0.000) 
-.3692 
(0.219) 
-.6334*** 
(0.000) 
-.8752*** 
(0.000) 
-1.1176*** 
(0.000) 
-.5183*** 
(0.000) 
-.7314*** 
(0.000) 
Europe*Reg 
-.2425** 
(0.012) 
-.8918** 
(0.041) 
-.8031*** 
(0.000) 
-.2716 
(0.144) 
-1.0512*** 
(0.000) 
-1.4408*** 
(0.000) 
-.7016*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  191.36 
(0.000) 
512.17 
(0.000) 
207.28 
(0.000) 
505.44 
(0.000) 
32.97 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   27864.19 4441.88 5322.63 5227.32 22978.86 
AR(1)   (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.789 0.611 0.902 0.786 0.368 
J-Test   0.227 0.139 0.202 0.208 0.147 
C-Test        
GMM   0.977 0.985 0.997 0.999 0.980 
IV   0.931 0.762 0.797 0.608 0.719 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
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the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Controls included: health, 
size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
 
Now another proxy for analyzing the restrictiveness of trade policy in past literature has also been 
employed to see its effect in the economic performance of developing countries in Table 4.27. 
Black market premium actually tells the difference between two exchange rates i.e. official and 
black market rates. The proxy used here is showing the openness of the exchange rate market 
which means how much exchange controls are present in the economy. Such exchange controls 
restrict the importers and exporters to enter in to the market because this gap creates a gap in the 
payments and receipts of the imports and exports. For example if an importer finances its imports 
through the purchase of foreign exchange from black market but on the same time the exporters 
transfer all the receipts to the central bank at the official exchange rate then this may lead to 
distortions in the resource allocation in any economy. But if the exporters are also having this 
liberty to bring their foreign earnings directly into such unofficial markets then this discrepancy 
can be removed from the market. Many economists believe that this type of wedges in exchange 
rate markets act a restriction on trade as well. But on the other side many even don’t consider it 
the accurate proxy for trade restrictions. Because it is being observed that different thresholds, 
while using BMP as a measure of restrictiveness, are used to decide whether an economy is open 
or close.168 It is believed that such black market premiums are the results of macroeconomic 
imbalances, governance failures, and high level of bureaucracy in any economy. This study has 
used not directly the data on black market premium, which earlier studies have used mostly, rather 
this is an index showing extent of openness in exchange rate market. This index has considered 
those economies having no black market where premium rate is less than 50% and all those having 
more than 50% premium rate are being considered as closed economies. From the descriptive 
analysis of data, almost all developing countries are showing the trend towards more openness in 
their economies i.e. reducing the difference between official and black market exchange rates. 
Therefore the predicted sign of this proxy is positive showing direct relationship between openness 
and economic growth. Again almost in all regions the nature of relationship is same, except for 
few models. In Asia again the role of globalization is more in determining the impact of trade 
                                                          
168 Sachs and Warner considered an economy closed if the black market premium was more than 20% during whole 
decade.  
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policy on growth as in above cases. In case of America and Africa, the model using political 
institutions as exogenous factor for trade policy, are showing large impact of trade policy on 
growth and in case of Europe, again role of economic institutions is more prominent in developing 
this Policy-Growth relation.  
Table: 4.27: Trade Policy= Black market Premium 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. Institutions Geography Governance 
Constant 
-2.613 
(0.168) 
-38.016* 
(0.079) 
5.3554*** 
(0.001) 
19.848*** 
(0.000) 
2.7306 
(0.124) 
.6106 
(0.793) 
9.4279*** 
(0.000) 
GDPt-1 
.4133*** 
(0.000) 
.2832*** 
(0.000) 
.3392*** 
(0.000) 
.3416*** 
(0.000) 
.3417*** 
(0.000) 
.3411*** 
(0.000) 
.3512*** 
(0.000) 
Asia*BMP 
.3360*** 
(0.000) 
.0030 
(0.989) 
.2239*** 
(0.000) 
.3110*** 
(0.000) 
.1960*** 
(0.000) 
.0368 
(0.284) 
.2716*** 
(0.000) 
Africa*BMP 
.3424*** 
(0.000) 
.3950*** 
(0.007) 
.2357*** 
(0.000) 
-.0508*** 
(0.005) 
.1348*** 
(0.000) 
.1539*** 
(0.000) 
.0003 
(0.988) 
America*BMP 
.2476*** 
(0.001) 
.3188 
(0.119) 
.3540*** 
       (0.000) 
.0523 
(0.121) 
-.0573** 
(0.043) 
.2002*** 
 (0.000) 
.1311*** 
(0.000) 
Europe*BMP 
.3553*** 
(0.000) 
-.7556 
(0.457) 
-.1199** 
(0.015) 
.1594** 
(0.018) 
.3611*** 
(0.000) 
.2019** 
(0.041) 
.3170*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  940.68 
(0.000) 
646.62 
(0.000) 
1479.55 
(0.000) 
932.92 
(0.000) 
548.40 
(0.000) 
Observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   37200.56 39642.00 9482.81 7073.13 30726.99 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.460 0.473 0.391 0.437 0.411 
J-Test   0.216 0.115 0.124 0.239 0.156 
C-Test        
GMM   0.997 0.989 0.997 0.994 0.996 
IV   0.945 0.507 0.719 0.376 0.866 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
Table 4.28 shows the results using composite index which measures the extent of openness in a 
nation. The nature of relationship is same as has been observed with this proxy in earlier models. 
More an economy is open, more better performance it is having. All regions of the world are 
experiencing the same and expected nature of relationship. In Asia, Africa and America, models 
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incorporating the effects of political institutions in trade policy decision making process are 
showing relatively better results as compared to other factors employed in the analysis. Only in 
case of developing countries from Europe continent, first Economic Institutions and then political 
institutions are explaining more to their trade policies.  
Table: 4.28: Trade Policy= Free to Trade 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
-3.339* 
(0.090) 
-
68.414*** 
(0.002) 
-6.4434*** 
(0.002) 
9.9648*** 
(0.000) 
-15.4288*** 
(0.000) 
-1.8949 
(0.512) 
-10.941*** 
(0.000) 
GDPt-1 
.4155*** 
(0.000) 
.2818*** 
(0.000) 
.3229*** 
(0.000) 
.3479*** 
(0.000) 
.3672*** 
(0.000) 
.3208*** 
(0.000) 
.3500*** 
(0.000) 
Asia*FTD 
.6179*** 
(0.000) 
.5116 
(0.342) 
2.7656*** 
(0.000) 
.6515*** 
(0.000) 
1.3787*** 
(0.000) 
2.598*** 
(0.000) 
1.9643*** 
(0.000) 
Africa*FTD 
.6476*** 
(0.000) 
1.1410*** 
(0.005) 
2.1254*** 
(0.000) 
.2905*** 
(0.000) 
1.4409*** 
(0.000) 
1.8487*** 
(0.000) 
1.8473*** 
(0.000) 
America*FTD 
.4870*** 
(0.000) 
1.3620*** 
(0.003) 
 2.3168*** 
       (0.000) 
.4739*** 
(0.000) 
1.6712*** 
(0.000) 
2.0767*** 
 (0.000) 
1.8646*** 
(0.000) 
Europe*FTD 
.6729*** 
(0.000) 
3.4377*** 
(0.000) 
2.0907*** 
(0.000) 
1.114*** 
(0.000) 
3.3348*** 
(0.000) 
2.2632*** 
(0.000) 
1.7654*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  3646.96 
(0.000) 
205.05 
(0.000) 
968.87 
(0.000) 
1287.06 
(0.000) 
3314.97 
(0.000) 
Observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 81 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   22298.97 3445.09 9911.28 5442.32 26543.26 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.670 0.690 0.768 0.559 0.468 
J-Test   0.267 0.160 0.107 0.308 0.141 
C-Test        
GMM   0.999 0.998 0.963 0.973 0.987 
IV   0.988 0.511 0.176 0.335 0.987 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
Now here Trade % GDP is an outcome measure which does not show directly the restrictiveness 
of trade policy rather the result of all these restrictive or open measures. The estimation results in 
Table 4.29 are experiencing expected signs as have already been reported in past literature. Here 
for Asia and Africa role of economic institutions is more as compared to other factors and for 
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America and Europe political institutions are showing much importance in determining the role of 
trade policy on their growth of the economies. All results are highly significant and diagnostics of 
the model are showing the validity of the estimated model. 
Table: 4.29: Trade Policy= Trade %of GDP 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
.3723 
(0.839) 
-
49.335** 
(0.020) 
-23.432*** 
(0.000) 
-3.2052* 
(0.058) 
-17.3359*** 
(0.000) 
-4.5991*** 
(0.004) 
-11.1710*** 
(0.000) 
GDPt-1 
.4253*** 
(0.000) 
.2728*** 
(0.000) 
.3240*** 
(0.000) 
.3577*** 
(0.000) 
.2867*** 
(0.000) 
.3785*** 
(0.000) 
.3018*** 
(0.000) 
Asia*T/GDP 
.0076*** 
(0.003) 
.0263** 
(0.033) 
.0317*** 
(0.000) 
.0350*** 
(0.000) 
.0543*** 
(0.000) 
.0353*** 
(0.000) 
.0455*** 
(0.000) 
Africa*T/GDP 
.0075* 
(0.076) 
.0026 
(0.847) 
.1231*** 
(0.000) 
.0581*** 
(0.000) 
.1515*** 
(0.000) 
.0469*** 
(0.000) 
.0811*** 
(0.000) 
America*T/GDP 
.0019 
(0.685) 
.0653*** 
(0.002) 
.0688*** 
(0.000) 
.0571*** 
(0.000) 
.0385** 
(0.032) 
.0553*** 
(0.000) 
.0529*** 
(0.000) 
Europe*T/GDP 
.0135*** 
(0.005) 
.1050*** 
(0.000) 
.0664*** 
(0.000) 
.0537*** 
(0.000) 
.2017*** 
(0.000) 
.0543*** 
(0.000) 
.0713*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  72.38 
(0.000) 
927.78 
(0.000) 
7117.29 
(0.000) 
99.61 
(0.000) 
1098.50 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 81 81 81 81 81 
Instruments   77 74 71 70 75 
F-test   4587.39 7130.41 1248.92 6207.94 1597.98 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.740 0.496 0.849 0.348 0.803 
J-Test   0.227 0.172 0.210 0.232 0.176 
C-Test        
GMM   0.988 0.972 0.944 0.990 0.981 
IV   0.490 0.302 0.786 0.900 0.625 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order auto correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. 
Controls included: health, size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
Lastly another composite index is being used to see the effect of openness on growth in different 
institutional frameworks of developing countries in Table 4.30. Again it is very clear from the 
Table that the policy contribution to growth is more when trade policy is being instrumented by 
political and economic institutions in case of all regions of the world.  
 
150 
 
Three methods of estimation have used. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects Model (FE), and System Generalized 
Method of Moments (SGMM). In the case of two-step GMM, the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction for standard errors 
is employed. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The row for the Hansen/ J-test reports 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for the Diff-in-Hansen/ C- test are the p-values 
for the validity of the additional moment restriction necessary for system GMM. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the p-values for first and second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations. Controls included: health, 
size of country, infrastructure, employment and inflation. 
 
4.8: Discussion 
This section attempted to observe the relationship between economic performance and different 
direct and indirect trade policy indicators through the prism of various institutional dimensions. 
Using the recent econometric instrumental technique SGMM to capture endogeneity of trade 
policy by various institutional parameters of nations, the results show that lower tariff and non-
tariff barriers are resulting in increased economic growth which means that there is negative 
relationship between economic growth and trade liberalization process in case of developing 
Table:  4.30: Trade Policy= KOF Trade Restriction Index 
Dependent Variable: Economic Performance(Growth rate of GDP) 
Variables OLS FE SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 SGMM-2 
   Pol. 
Institutions 
Openness Eco. 
Institutions 
Geography Governance 
Constant 
.1141 
(0.944) 
-32.4589 
(0.155) 
4.7962*** 
(0.000) 
6.9718*** 
(0.000) 
.4899*** 
(0.000) 
1.7800 
(0.162) 
7.6747*** 
(0.000) 
GDPt-1 
.4138*** 
(0.000) 
.2843*** 
(0.000) 
.3519*** 
(0.000) 
.3456*** 
(0.000) 
.3407*** 
(0.000) 
.3302*** 
(0.000) 
.3596*** 
(0.000) 
Asia*KOF 
.0319*** 
(0.000) 
.0681* 
(0.088) 
.1602*** 
(0.000) 
.0762*** 
(0.000) 
.1505*** 
(0.000) 
.0914*** 
(0.000) 
.1115*** 
(0.000) 
Africa*KOF 
.0361*** 
(0.000) 
.0065 
(0.788) 
.1501*** 
(0.000) 
.0570*** 
(0.000) 
.2095*** 
(0.000) 
.0983*** 
(0.000) 
.0892*** 
(0.000) 
America*KOF 
.0128 
(0.114) 
.0264 
(0.360) 
.1014*** 
(0.000) 
.0256*** 
(0.000) 
.0952*** 
(0.000) 
.0723*** 
(0.000) 
.0722*** 
(0.000) 
Europe*KOF 
.0286*** 
(0.001) 
-.0017 
(0.957) 
.1131*** 
(0.000) 
.0680*** 
(0.000) 
.1940*** 
(0.000) 
.0514*** 
(0.000) 
.1029*** 
(0.000) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hausman test for  OLS & GMM 
Chi 2 
Prob>chi2 
  68.39 
(0.000) 
911.52 
(0.000) 
491.54 
(0.000) 
357.63 
(0.000) 
293.63 
(0.000) 
observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Countries 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Instruments   77 74 71 72 75 
F-test   14504.65 22455.49 7082.53 8011.00 17925.27 
AR(1)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2)   0.695 0.677 0.264 0.697 0.482 
J-Test   0.183 0.156 0.109 0.391 0.170 
C-Test        
GMM   0.960 0.986 0.917 0.945 0.966 
IV   0.889 0.661 0.752 0.442 0.718 
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countries confirming the results of study by Chalkual et al. (2013) that less restrictive trade policies 
result in high economic growth. 
Overall 203 econometric models have been run using STATA software for different categories of 
nations, and it is found that mostly in case of each proxy of trade policy, models incorporating the 
role of economic institutions, political institutions and governance indicators are affecting more to 
the trade policies in their impact on economic growth. Estimation has been done in four steps i.e. 
firstly treating all intervening factors individually and then dividing all these factors into their 
relevant categories. Moreover the analysis is being divided into both regime and region wise as 
well. The models where political institutions, governance conditions, extent of openness and 
economic institutions are used for explaining trade policy, there trade policies are showing more 
impact on growth in the form of high magnitude of trade policy variables. In individual estimation 
of results, the models with various political factors are showing improvement in the magnitude of 
intended relationship. More specifically the role of embassies in the form of political openness and 
political stability is very visible. In the combined analysis, models knotted with all institutional 
factors performed very well in explaining this traditional nexus of policy reform and growth 
performance confirming the supremacy of institutions over fixed factors like geography in case of 
developing nations. Moreover one of the most important factors which proved the relationship 
between two main variables more strong is the level of integration among nations. This confirms 
the idea given by Rodrik (2001) that integration of economies increase more due to institutional 
reforms.  As the developing nations are in the process of institutional reforms therefore this 
variable worked quite effectively. The high value of trade policy indicators in all models using this 
factor shows that more interconnectedness increases the positive effects of trade reforms. In 
estimation procedure where the regime difference has been taken into account in evaluating the 
effects of these external factors in policy outcome, again the role of political institutions appeared 
more favorable for getting better policy outcomes. When the same efforts have been made for 
viewing the regional effect of these reforms keeping in view the variation in their institutional 
capacities, then the results show variations according to the specific characteristics of these 
regions. As Asian and African nations have poor institutional setups as compared to Europe and 
American nations, therefore the results showed the supremacy of political and economic 
institutions for the latter regions in most of the models as compared to the former regions. Role of 
economic institutions in case of Europe is very impressive in growth enhancing effect of 
152 
 
contemporary trade reforms confirming that the role of international organizations and 
enforcement of property rights is more effectual in trade policy designing and also supporting the 
findings of Rose (2004) and Gil-Pareja et al. (2013). Role of geography has also been incorporated 
in all models because whenever trade shares and trade policies are discussed, role of fixed factors 
like geographical and endowment conditions of region and nation cannot be ignored. This study 
also observes in few models the prominent effect of this factor on growth via trade policy but in 
most of the cases the role of institution has remained more prominent supporting the recent 
findings of Jacob & Osang (2010). Overall it can be concluded that results are in line with the idea 
presented by Rodrik et al. (2004) that institutions play more important role in determining trade 
policies as compared to level of integration and geography. The findings also gave support to the 
ideas forwarded by Segura-Cayuela (2006) who blamed the role of ‘inefficient institutions’ 
responsible for less efficient economic policies even with reforms in trade regimes. Similarly 
recently Eris et al. (2013) also worked using these two variable trade openness and growth and 
found no evidence of direct relationship between these two variables in long run without the role 
of economic institutions. The present study proved once again not only the supremacy of 
institutions over geography in trade policy decision but also highlighted the role of de jure 
institutions (political institutions) more imperative in most of the cases. In the end it can concluded 
that following the lines of past debate, this study also incorporated the role of geography in trade 
policy analysis, but only in case of non-tariff barriers this factor showed improvement while for 
all other cases institutional factors appeared important contributors to Trade policy- Growth nexus 
for developing nations 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1: Main Contributions of the Research 
In this chapter major findings are underlined and conclusions are drawn on their basis for analyzing 
that how this study has contributed in existing literature. Since the last few decades, focus of the 
world is turning intensively towards the improvement of the economic performance of developing 
counties. Vast literature relating to the role of institutions and economic growth is available. And 
results are suggesting that institutions are actually providing a ‘base’ to nations for the 
implementation of the rules of game in an effective manner. In policymaking process, institutions 
play essentially a key role. It is believed now that policy making process is the result of political 
institutions and these political institutions comes into existence through political games. These 
games are played by political actors keeping in view different incentives provided to them (Spiller 
et al., 2003). Policy economists always try to make those policies which improve the welfare of 
the societies overall but in case of developing countries this aim has not been so far been achieved 
and the reason is only the improper institutional infrastructure. Here institutional infrastructure 
means the political and economic environment through which the collective interests of citizens 
are protected and facilitated. The present study has tried to shed light on this recent ‘constituent’ 
of developmental trajectory. It has a new touch in itself because for the first time such effort has 
been made exclusively by taking into consideration the ‘institutional features’ of developing 
nations on the policy decisions of their governments. Earlier this important aspect has been 
remained ignored while discussing the government welfare concerns in policy designing which is 
not justice with the conclusions and recommendations given of those research works. Moreover 
this study has also its contribution in literature because of the reason that the analysis aims to 
observe the role of both de jure and de facto institutions in the policy making process which is 
missing in past studies.  In addition, not only the direct impact of different institutional parameters 
on trade policy decisions by their government was targeted to find rather indirect impact of these 
institutionally-coalesced trade policies on the economic growth of developing nations has also 
been evaluated. In short this study actually attempts to deal with the political economy aspect of 
policy making in developing countries that how the government policy decisiveness is actually 
being affected by their own institutional and constitutional setups despite a long series of policy 
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reforms. Furthermore the role of political parties under different political regimes having 
ideological variations has also been taken into account seriously with special reference to trade 
policy. Unfortunately party institutionalization which is considered as one of the most important 
pillar of State in recent times lacks in developing countries due to many internal problems of such 
nations like unstable or poor financial positions169 of party entrepreneurs and party rules provided 
by their own governments. This study has intended to incorporate all these features of developing 
nations in analysis so that policy prescription should be according to proper diagnostics of problem 
under discussion. 
5.2: Summary of Major Findings 
“This is about politics. Politics determines how resources are used and policies are made. 
And politics determines who benefits.”170  
                                                        (DFID, 2006, p.23)   
This section summarizes all parts of the study. First chapter is covering the introduction and main 
objectives of the study. Further the study has been divided into three essays. In the first essay 
(chapter 2), Welfarism/public regardedness has been estimated to observe in the trade policies of 
developing nations which means that how much their governments are trying to maximize social 
welfare of their citizens while taking such decisions. For this purpose G-H (1994) model has been 
used. The analysis is comprised of both quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantitative results 
showed that the trade policies designed by autocratic governments are not promoting ‘welfarism’ 
through their policy decisions but the in case of democratic nations, governments seems more 
welfare oriented in designing their trade policy choices confirming  the first main hypothesis of 
the study. However the qualitative analysis showed that only political regimes do not decide the 
welfare concerns of government s rather their constitutional nature matters more in this regard. To 
fulfill this gap the next section of the study is designed to incorporate all such factors into the 
model for empirical analysis. 
Second essay (chapter 3) is a detailed analysis to see the effect of various institutional factors in 
explaining the extent of ‘welfarism’ in the government policy decisions of these economies. 
Different variables under three broad headings i.e. Governance, political environment, and 
constitutional distribution of power in various parts of the governments, have been tested with the 
                                                          
169 Abeje (2013) for relating the party institutionalization in Ethiopia with poor financial base of this nation.  
170 DFID’s White Paper on Making Governance Work for the Poor. 
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help of suitable econometric techniques. Here again the results proved the second main hypothesis 
that these three factors play significant role in decision making process of governments. But 
political party orientation is a major factor affecting the power of a government to be welfare 
oriented in policymaking process in these nations. Moreover distribution of powers by 
constitutions in each regime actually decides whether the governments are social welfare 
maximize or patronizing the interests of special cluster of the society. In this analysis it has also 
been observed that no doubt political regime matters i.e. democracies positively contribute to the 
welfarism in the society and autocracies do negatively but the results become clearer when another 
institutional factor, political party orientation or the powers designated to ruling parties in these 
different regimes has been taken into account. For example a democracy can be a parliamentary 
or presidential democracy. Both are different systems of powers used by ruling parties. Findings 
of the study proved that the governments under parliamentary democracies are positively 
contributing to increase the social welfare of the society their policy choices while the presidential 
democracies are negatively affecting the extent of welfarism in developing nations confirming the 
idea presented by Gerring et al. (2009). On the other hand an autocratic nation can also be 
presidential or parliamentary. Moreover results showed that autocracy in both cases is harmful for 
the social welfare. On the other side it has also been observed for complete panel of developing  
nations ruled by political parties having socialists171 view are involved more in such policymaking 
which promotes the social welfare as compared to those developing nations run by political parties 
having liberal view or are centrist. But if the whole panel is being divided according to both regime 
wise and constitutional powers wise then it can be seen that in case of democratic nations, 
centrist172 are more welfare oriented while in case of autocratic nations, all three types of 
partisanship are positively affecting the policymaking process but role of liberals and socialists is 
more prominent for their societies.173 Another interesting result has been found in case of 
concentration of power in both systems. It is being observed that in case of democracies 
concentration of power both in the hands of ruling political parties and opposition parties are 
negatively affecting welfarism in government policies but in case of autocracies, the concentration 
                                                          
171These results are for the whole panel without its regime wise division. India, Nepal, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, 
Tunisia and China are such nations from the panel in which ruling parties are mostly of socialists view. 
172 It can be seen from the results for Brazil, Latvia and Philippines from Table A9 given in appendix. 
173 This has been reported in Table A10 given in appendix for China, Nepal, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan. 
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of power in case of ruler is positively contributing towards social welfare but role of opposition is 
negative.  
In the third section after reviewing that whether the governments of developing nations are trying 
to maximize social welfare through their trade policies and the main trajectory of this 
welfarism/public regardedness in these nations, now the nexus was being developed between trade 
policies of developing nations and their economic performance by incorporating the role of their 
various institutional parameters in policy designing. Like Chapter 2, in Chapter 4 again trade 
policy has been assumed as an endogenous variable. Different institutional factors have been used 
to capture the endogeneity of this variable. These are political institutions (de jure), economic 
institutions, level of integration, governance (de facto) and geographical conditions. Seven trade 
measures including policy based, outcome based, composite indices, and market based measures, 
have been used and the time span is from 1995-2013. The selection of sample is based on the 
availability of data either for trade measures or for all institutional variables. World Bank definition 
for developing nations has been used and out of 133 developing nations, 83 were left after 
trimming the dataset for making it a balanced panel. In this section, all the above mentioned 
institutional variables have been treated as instruments for trade policy by applying SGMM 
technique. Diagnostics of model proved that model specification is correct and valid in all cases 
as all of its assumptions have been fulfilled. Overall the study shows that lower tariff rate policy 
is growth-enhancing for developing countries supporting the results of these studies Dollar (1992); 
Lee (1993); Sachs & Warner (1995); Harrison (1996); Edwards (1998); Dollar & Kraay (2004); 
Lee et al. (2004); Wacziarg & Welch (2008); Ahmed (2012) and Kwon(2013). The analysis has 
been done for both short run and long run impact of trade policies. At first place, each expected 
intervening variable has been used individually against each trade policy measure as an 
instrument/exogenous variable. After this all these variables have been converted in few broad 
headings to see the overall impact of that specific category in shaping the policies in developing 
nations. In the second part, the same exercise has been done keeping in view the political regime 
differences among nations. And lastly the analysis is being made region wise for observing the 
role of political economy of trade policy on the economic growth of these nations. In group wise 
analysis, when endogeneity is captured by geographical factors, the effect on economic 
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performance becomes more significant and larger for most cases in short run174 but this impact of 
trade policies on economic performance in long run increases much more when endogeneity of 
trade policies is being captured by various governance and institutional variables confirming the 
third main hypothesis of the study. 
Moreover after incorporating the role of political institutions and economic institutions in trade 
policies, results are showing a huge effect on their economic growth confirming the idea given by 
Acemoglu et al. (2012) recently that growth is actually the result of ‘inclusive economic 
institutions’175 and ‘inclusive political institutions’.176 Both of these concepts are related to the 
presence of rules for property rights and nature of political systems in an economy. The present 
analysis has tried actually to incorporate all those variables which have been included in the 
definition of above two dimensions along with many other new additional factors. Moreover these 
authors also proved that poverty traps in failed nations are caused by actually the difference in 
their politico-economic situations viz a viz developed nation.  Earlier it was believed that these are 
the policies which determine the economic growth but now the world outlook is changing. The 
reason is this that almost all developing countries are trying to make such policies which are 
already being practiced in developed nations but still the catch up effect is very slow. Consequently 
thinkers and analysts are compelled to think that there is some ‘invisible’177 force that is affecting 
the whole mechanism and this force appears in the form of either formal or informal institutions. 
Therefore now it is believed that politics determine the policies actually178 and institutions restrict 
or facilitate the political actors in choice making regarding different policies which ultimately 
                                                          
174 These results confirm the findings by the authors Gallup.et.al (1999) and Sachs (2003). Both of these authors 
considers geography most important factor in case of development of nations in their estimation procedures. They 
have included variables related to institutions but still concluded that it is the geography which decides the speed of 
development process among nations. 
175 It includes property rights, law and order, easy to enter and open a new business, regulation and enforcement of 
contracts. 
176 It includes the political participation, checks on politicians, and political constraints.  
177 Idea given by Adam Smith in his book ‘The Wealth of Nations’. 
178 Przeworski &Limongi (1993) and Charnock (2007) presented the idea about politics of policies. These authors are 
of the view that growth process is not related to difference in the political regimes like democracy or dictatorship 
rather it is related to process of transformation of political system or the simply ‘politics’ in these two regimes. State 
autonomy can be said the better solution for having good results from policies. The degree of the state autonomy 
determines the credibility of policies. Example of Asian Tigers can be quoted here. Those were mostly controlled 
nations by a central authority but their hold on the use of political power decided the destiny of these nations. It has 
been observed that democracies promote more such policies which are more distributive in nature. The most important 
difference between these two types of regimes is the degree of political competition. According to Mulligan et al. 
(2003), autocracies make huge expenditure for the suppression of maximum political participation in decision making 
process.   
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determines the path of success. The neo-liberal idea about the effectiveness of institutions is this that 
those institutions should be evolved which facilitates the nations in promoting the welfare of society 
and hinders from those actions which harms the interests of majority in a society. If institutions are not 
meritocratic then governance issues and policy failures arise. Institutions pursuing the special interests 
of elite class have been considered as the ‘fetter’ (term used by Karl Marx) for the societies. Many 
authors in past have given the solution in this regard in this form of ‘trigger-punishment strategy’ which 
means that audience for whom policies are being offered and designed they will themselves monitor 
the working of institutions.179 And in this way social welfare will be maximized at zero cost in nations. 
Moreover information asymmetries are being considered as one of the main reason for making wrong 
policies (Keefer, 2004). Sometimes it has also been witnessed that political agents divert policymakers 
towards narrow interests of the societies and ignore the majority. Therefore institutional commitments 
and collective actions can only be helpful in removing such difficulties from the system.   
Recently Williams et al. (2008) has also provided an analytical framework related to politics and 
growth and proved that economic growth is always affected by political processes. Therefore now 
the important question is not this which institutions are needed for higher economic performance 
rather attention has been diverted towards that how these have been evolved or the political process 
of building these institutions. These authors have related politics through weak institutional 
capacities as the main reason for the absence of growth in economies. Political tribulations provide 
opportunities to powerful interest groups for extracting benefits through predation, patronage and 
rent-seeking activities. DFID’s Drivers of change studies are also bringing the attention towards 
this important issue that political factors are actually impeding the growth process in developing 
countries. And political incentives are the main root cause of all institutional evils in their 
economies because these incentives shape the decision making capacities of the leaders (Landell-
Mills et al., 2007). Williams et al. (2008) also clearly mentioned in their research that political 
regimes do not make much difference in improving economic performance. These are the 
governance conditions in both the systems like democracy and autocracy which decides the fortune 
of nations. Governance indicators are actually the outcomes and do not describe the causes of some 
economic phenomenon. For example, if secured property rights are considered as one of the major 
factor of good governance then which factors are involved in the protection of these rights this is 
                                                          
179 Lohman (2003) gave the idea of ‘political fiat’ which means when policymakers have to incur some political cost 
after disrupting the working of institutions. Such hazards results in credible institutions. And credibility and flexibility 
of policies confirms the prevalence of ‘fiat institutions’.  
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important and it is only politics based on different incentives (DFIDs, 2006). This study has also 
supported the recent view of Rodrik (2013) that for developing countries the key first and foremost 
important driver of growth is the development of institutions along with human capital. Moreover 
he also related positively the healthy national economies (having strong regulatory, legal and 
political institutions) and societies with healthy world economy.   
5.3: A Step towards an Integrated Policy Structure 
This section aims at to observe that how much the findings of this study are related to present 
scenario and further can contribute in shaping an integrated policy framework for the region 
analyzed. Recalling again here the objective of this study which was to analyze the role of various 
types of institutions in decision making process of the governments of developing nations 
regarding trade policies and how much these policies are adding pace to their economic 
development. But in the real world, policy making is a murkier and complex process. Moreover it 
is dynamic not static in nature. With the passage of time the preferences of political leaders and 
societal actors (interest groups) get change and the better mix of these two interests can only lead 
to welfare maximization of the society. Therefore it can be concluded that these two actors serve 
as the most imperative pillars of any state in making policy decisions. That is why one of the 
renowned political economists Bates (2008) asserted that there cannot be any development without 
the role of state i.e. ‘no state no development’. It means that if state institutions like electoral laws, 
constitutional frameworks and political party rules are not strongly defined then less chances will 
be of economic improvement. The reason for this is, these institutions interact collaboratively and 
help the politicians and citizens (voters) to make the right choice between various incentives and 
policy choices. Various opinions by recent researchers in political economy have also proved the 
supremacy of political institutions in policy making. Like according to Haggard & McCubbins 
(2001) policymaking is done through the interplay of different institutions like legal, electoral 
rules, legislative procedures. Few have emphasized upon the role of different types of veto players 
in different political system180 to affect policy decisions (Tsebelis, 1995). Spiller et al. (2003) 
proposed a new analytical framework relating the policy outcomes as an important function of 
transaction-cost-politics which means that policy outcome are affected by the inter-temporal 
                                                          
180 According to Tsebelis (1995), political institutions matters in policy decisions  through two types of veto players 
i.e. institutional veto players like presidents and chambers in case of presidential system and partisan  veto players 
like political parties  in case of parliamentary political systems.  
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transactions among political players. And these transactions can only be controlled if the 
economies are having good governance structures (Williamson, 1985). Recently Scartascini, et al. 
(2013) also found inter temporal cooperation of political institutions as one of the main ingredient 
of the quality of public policies and found that higher numbers of veto players are positively related 
to stability and adaptability qualities of policies but these findings are opposite to the Haggard & 
McCubbins (2001) who proved that policy failures occur in presidential democracies with higher 
number of veto players due to the reason that willingness to change policies frequently by them is 
less. This may lead to sustainability of policies but reduce the adaptive capacity of presidential 
system to the changing circumstances. Levy and Spiller (1996) also emphasized the regulatory 
role of governments to have a desired outcome from the interaction of various political and 
economic institutions. All these findings from different research works provide this opportunity to 
conclude that these are only the political institutions actually which can be regarded as a ‘stage of 
play’ and credibility of political rules shape the economic and other related institutions.  
Moreover the results of the present study in Chapter 3 which has tried to relate different dimensions 
of institutional framework of developing nations to the policy decisions taken by their governments 
also validates these theoretical views.  Variables related to governance, regime differences and 
constitutional setups have been included in the analysis and results showed that a country’s 
constitutional setup also known as de jure institutions is affecting more deeply to the extent of 
welfarism in policy decisions by the governments of these nations. Leaders from different political 
ideologies (as in case of liberal or socialist leaders) purpose different policies. Similarly when 
index of concentration of political powers was included in model, its explanatory power increased 
much as compared to the other models. And this variable showed negative impact on the decisions 
regarding welfare of the society. As it is believed that State defines its rules through constitutional 
clause and amendments but if these rules become biased towards particular segment of the society 
and leaders are not accountable for misuse of power then system will collapse. All this shows that 
Stateness181 is the main ingredient of any economic system. Stateness connotes here only state 
monopoly on the use of force, more legitimacy of nation, no interference by religious groups and 
distributed structure of powers from top to bottom for serving the interest of public. Democratic 
                                                          
181 Recently Brettleman transformation index report put forward the idea that stateness is one of those factors which 
help the nation’s transformation into more democratic setup. 
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nations have more of all these features as compared to autocratic or less democratic nations182 
because of more traditional and differentiated structures of power hence proving the importance 
of democratic system. Therefore it is supposed now that the States which are more competitive in 
nature can act only as ‘welfare magnets’ through their social policy choices (Peterson and Rom 
1990). On the other side it is also well recognized fact that strength of interest groups plays a 
crucial role in policymaking but developing countries does not have strong involvement of such 
interest groups in their decision making process and this ultimately results in weak party 
institutionalization in these nations. Less party institutionalization and frequent regime change are 
reducing political legitimacy of these nations and making them more fragile. This can also be seen 
from the results of chapter three of this study. All this shows that the need of time for developing 
nations is to follow Statist approach183 to increase economic development which means domestic 
political institutions184 should be improved in bringing economic change. Chapter four of this 
study also confirms this recommendation that in case of Trade policy-Growth analysis as well, 
when the endogeneity of trade policies is captured through political and economic institutions then 
magnitude of trade policy variables increase. Furthermore a researcher must keep this thing in 
mind that the literature of political economy works on the ‘content of policies’ that which policy 
should be chosen for improving the interests of special groups. Such groups can be representative 
of middle class or elite class depending upon the incentives provided to policy makers on the basis 
of policy outcome. This is the reason that Washington Consensus was finalized to deal with the 
most common problems of developing countries especially. But that prescription didn’t work well 
collectively for all such underdeveloped nations and World’s view directed towards ‘growth 
diagnosis’ of deceased economies first and then finding the root of cause of the observed problem. 
Now on the basis of this sequential strategy, it is thought that such prescribed policy will be the 
best solution for developing economies.  
What seems conclusive on the basis of all these findings and discussion, neoliberal policies can be 
fruitful for developing nations if incorporated with ‘New Institutionalism’ which emphasizes both 
on the role of governance and political institutions simultaneously. New Institutionalism 
                                                          
182 Table A7 in Addendums can be seen for detailed present situation of developing countries about their political 
setups.  
183 Laffont & Tirole (1989).  
184 Mansfield & Busch (1995) who also found important role of domestic parliamentary institutions help in setting 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs) suggesting that such institutions insulates domestic policy makers from domestic pressure 
groups for national interests.  
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framework is also more desirable approach for better policy making in case of developing countries 
for the reason that this approach abandons the assumption of ‘homo economicus’185 anymore in 
its idea building186 and asserts that it is not possible to be perfectly informed and rational in real 
world. No doubt this leads to uncertainty in market economy and transaction costs incur as a result. 
And these are the problems actually developing countries are also facing but the solution provided 
by Williamson (1985), the originator of this approach, is this that the only way to reduce such 
transaction costs is the building of proper formal (related to de jure institutions) and informal 
institutions. Moreover this approach believes that formal institutions should be amended according 
to the change in the informal settings of the society because it helps in introducing those new ‘rules 
of game’ with which societal actors will be more comfortable. Therefore this study suggests such 
a policy framework for better economic performance of developing nations which covers both the 
aspects i.e. New Institutionalism and Neo-liberalism simultaneously in policy making.  
5.4: Limitations and Future Research Directions 
In this study focus has been made entirely on the role of institutions in making trade policy 
decisions and ultimately the effect of these institutionally-instrumented policies on the economic 
performance of developing nations. In past literature, attempts have been made to highlight the 
importance of institutions in policy making but this study was new in its nature because it explored 
in detail that which type of institutions affects more to the policy decisions actually. But during 
analysis the study faced data related issues both for trade policy proxies and institutional variables 
which had to drop in the end. And it has also been observed during estimation process that results 
are sensitive to the choice of institutional variables. Various proxies of the same variable can have 
different implications. The reason can be the subjective nature of most of such institutional 
variables. Mostly are perception-based like Worldwide Governance Indicators and are considered 
to be the effect not the cause of change. It means that the change in the score itself is showing the 
result of some blend of other policies and circumstances. Therefore such data sets can generate 
bias results due to misconception in their score ratings. Moreover the same is true in case of the 
proxy selection for geographical variables. As this study not only aimed to see the effect of 
institutions on policy making and then economic performance but also tried to revisit the 
                                                          
185 An assumption of ‘rational behavior’ in neo-classical theory.  
186 But it retains the other two important assumption of scarcity of resources and competition (Shirley and Menard 
;2008).  
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hypothesis that whether institutions matter more or geography in economic development directly 
or indirectly through trade policy choices. This study supports the Rodrik’s view that institutions 
matter more and rejects Sach’s view (2003) that geography has more role in economic 
development in case of developing nations. However this can be due to the choice of geographical 
indicator in this study. In nut shell, it can be concluded that to make analysis about institutional 
performance and indicators, one cannot be very precise and accurate. Accuracy is affected due to 
the wrong choice of data selection and sometimes different methodologies applied by the same 
organization for the collection of earlier designed variables. 
This study has been confined to mostly tariff and non-tariff barriers but has not included the non-
tariff measures which are now being given more importance by WTO in case of developing 
countries as well. The reason was data availability for very short time period because recently 
world has started focusing on these new form of protectionist policies. It has been observed that 
tariff and non-tariff measures (NTMs) are substitute of each other. The nations involved in 
lowering down their tariff rates are increasing the use of Non- Tariff Measures (NTMs) and vice 
versa. But in a recent report of World Bank (2012), it has been asserted that the effective 
implementation of NTMs requires strong institutional set up. More institutionalized political 
systems can regulate the process of penetration of these measures in the economy after controlling 
the diverse and complex nature of this new frontier of trade policy. In addition it has also been 
observed that such measures are mostly hidden e.g. Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary measures (SPS) which actually harm the trade competitiveness due to 
imposition of new quality standards and certification because such standards are difficult to 
maintain for developing nations. But presently as these nations are forced to reduce their trade 
barriers therefore for them there is no other option for them except to shift towards this new 
dimension of barriers NTMs. Thus the further prospects for new researchers exists in using the 
data set of such measures  and evaluating their policy effects in the poorly governed and less 
institutionalized political set ups of developing countries.  
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ADDENDUM A 
 
INDUSTRIES USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
 
Classification based on ISIC-digit2, rev:3 
 
1-Food Products And Beverages 
2-Tobacco Products 
3-Textiles 
4-Apparel; Dressing and Dyeing 
5-Tanning and Dressing of Leather 
6-Wood and Products of Wood 
7-Paper and Paper Products 
8-Publishing and Printing 
9-Petroleum Products 
10-Chemicals and Chemical Products 
11-Rubber and Plastic Products 
12-Non- Metallic Mineral Products 
13-Basic Metals 
14-Fabricated Metal Products 
15-Machinery and Equipment 
16-Electrical Machinery 
17-Radio, Television and Communication 
18-Medical, Precision and apparatus Instruments 
19-Motor Vehicles 
20-Furniture 
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ADDENDUM B 
 
 
LIST OF COUNTRY INCLUDED IN SAMPLE FOR TARIFF-GROWTH ANALYSIS 
 
Albania Bolivia Chile Estonia  India Kyrgistan Mauratius Nigeria 
Algeria Bostwana China Ethopia Iran Lativia Mexico Oman  
Angola Brazil Colombia Gabon Jamaica Lesotho Mongolia Pakistan 
Argentina Brundi Costa rica Georgia Jordan Madgascar Morocco Panam 
Armenia Bulgaria Domnican 
Republic 
Ghana Kazakistan Malawi Namibia Paraguay 
Azerbaijan Camroon Egypt Guinea Kenya Malaysia Nepal Peru 
Bangladesh  Central 
Africa 
Elsalvador Guetamala Korea 
Republic 
Mali Nicargua Philipines 
Rawanda Russia Singapore Syria Togo Turkey Ukraine Veitnma 
Romania Senegal Srilanka Thialand Tunesia Uganda Uruguay Venezuala 
Behrain Chad  Ecuador Haiti Kuwait Maritania Niger Poland 
Zambia Zimbabwe Benin  
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ADDENDUM C 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN THE COUNTRY-WISE ANALYSIS 
                                                            Trade Measures 
MFN Tariff rate It is defined as an “unweighted average of most favored nation rates for all 
products subject to tariffs calculated for all traded goods. Data are classified 
using the Harmonized System of trade at the six- or eight-digit level. Tariff 
line data were matched to Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) revision 3 codes to define commodity groups”. Source: World Bank 
Indicators (2013). 
Non-Tariff 
Barriers 
It is a sub-component of EFW Index under the area of freedom to trade 
internationally. Source: Gwartney, Hall & Lawson (2011) Economic 
Freedom Dataset Published in Economic Freedom of the World 2013: 
Annual Report. 
Regulatory 
Trade Barriers 
“It covers basically two components: i) Non-Tariff barriers, ii)compliance 
cost of importing and exporting”. Source: Gwartney, Hall & Lawson (2011) 
Economic Freedom Dataset Published in Economic Freedom of the World 
2013: Annual Report. 
Black Market 
Premiums 
This is extracted from EFW Index under the area of freedom to trade 
internationally.  It is defined as: “This component is based on the percentage 
difference between the official and the parallel (black) market exchange 
rate. The formula used to calculate the zero-to-10 ratings for this component 
was the following: (Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax − Vmin) multiplied by 10. Vi is 
the country’s black-market exchange rate premium. The values for Vmin 
and Vmax were set at 0% and 50%, respectively. This formula will allocate 
a rating of 10 to countries without a black-market exchange rate; that is, 
those with a domestic currency that is fully convertible without restrictions. 
When exchange-rate controls are present and a black market exists, the 
ratings will decline toward zero as the black market premium increases 
toward 50%. A zero rating is given when the black market premium is equal 
to, or greater than, 50%”. Source: Gwartney, Hall & Lawson (2011) 
Economic Freedom Dataset Published in Economic Freedom of the World 
2013: Annual Report. 
Freedom to 
Trade 
“It is comprised of: i) taxes on international trade, ii) Regulatory Trade 
Barriers, iii) Size of trade sector relative,  iv) Black market exchange rates, 
v) International capital and market controls”. Source: Gwartney, Hall & 
Lawson (2011) Economic Freedom Dataset Published in Economic 
Freedom of the World 2013: Annual Report. 
Trade (% of 
GDP) 
It is defined as; “Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of gross domestic product”. Source: World 
Bank Indicators (2013). 
KOF 
Restrictions 
“This covers the restrictions on trade and capital using hidden import 
barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade (as a share of current 
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revenue) and an index of capital controls. Given a certain level of trade, a 
country with higher revenues from tariffs is less globalized. To proxy 
restrictions of the capital account, an index constructed by Gwartney et al. 
(2011) is employed. This index is based on the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and includes 13 
different types of capital controls. It has been constructed by subtracting the 
number of restrictions from 13 and multiplying the result by 10. The indices 
on mean tariff rates and hidden import barriers are also derived from 
Gwartney et al. (2011). Mean tariff rates originate from various sources. 
Gwartney et al. allocated a rating of 10 to countries that do not impose any 
tariffs. As the mean tariff rate increases, countries are assigned lower 
ratings. The rating will decline toward zero as the mean tariff rate 
approaches 50 percent (which is usually not exceeded by most countries 
among their sample). The original source for hidden import barriers, finally, 
is the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (various 
issues)” 2013. 
                                                         Political Variables 
State Repression 
 
For this purpose political Terror Scale has been used as proxy variable. It is 
defined as: “The PTS measures levels of political violence and terror that a 
country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level “terror scale” 
originally developed by Freedom House. “1” shows that countries under a 
secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is 
rare or exceptional. “5” shows that terror has expanded to the whole 
population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or 
thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals”. 
Source: Amnesty International and US. State Department.  
193 
 
Political 
Competition 
This variable measures this concept in two ways: (1) by the degree of 
institutionalization or "regulation" of political participation, and (2) by the 
extent of government restriction on political competition. “By combining 
scores on Regulation of Political Participation and the Competitiveness of 
Participation, a relatively detailed picture of the extent of political 
competition and opposition emerges. The competitiveness of participation 
refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and 
leadership can be pursued in the political arena. It measures the extent that 
non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression: 
the greater the extent of the franchise and the more that alternative 
preferences for policies and leadership can be pursued in the political arena, 
the higher the score. It ranges from zero (unregulated) to five (fully 
competitive), with 5 indicating open competition for political leadership. 
The one to five scale captures the idea of competition as a continuum and 
provides a finer level of discrimination that a simple democracy/dictatorship 
dichotomy—consistent with other findings that there is considerable 
variation within the categories of democracy and non-democracy. 
Participation is regulated to the extent 
 that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences 
are expressed. This is also 5-point scale based measure. 1 is highly 
unregulated political system. Political grouping starts towards particular 
interests groups which harms the political activity in nation. ‘5’ shows 
highly regulated and stable political system”.  
Source: Gurr.R.T, Jaggers. K & Marshall. G. M, Polity IV Project (2013): 
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions. 
Political 
Constraint 
Index 
 
“The measure of political constraints estimates the feasibility of policy 
change i.e. the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor 
may lead to a change in government policy. This is categorized as a polar 
case in which political discretion (political constraints equals 0) = 1 and 
more stable environment when political constraints are maximum (1) and 
no political discretion.   Discretion is operationalized as the expected range 
of policies for which all political actors with veto power can agree upon a 
change in the status quo”. Source: Henisz, W. J. (2002). "The Institutional 
Environment for Infrastructure Investment." Industrial and Corporate 
Change 11(2). 
Regime Change “This variable is a modified version of the POLITY variable added in order 
to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analysis. 
It scores between -10 to +10. ‘-10’ shows autocracy and ‘+10’ shows 
democracy”. Source: Gurr.R.T, Jaggers. K & Marshall. G. M, Polity IV 
Project (2013): Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions. 
Durability of 
Political System 
“The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a 
three point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) 
or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political 
institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the 
DURABLE value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is 
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established is coded as the baseline “year zero” (value = 0) and each 
subsequent year adds one to the value of the DURABLE variable 
consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs”. 
Source: Gurr.R.T, Jaggers. K & Marshall. G. M, Polity IV Project (2013): 
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions. 
 Bureaucracy It is measured through “regulation of chief executive recruitment”. 
Source: Gurr.R.T, Jaggers. K & Marshall. G. M, Polity IV Project (2013): 
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions. 
Stability of 
system 
“These variables count the percent of veto players who drop from the 
government in any given year. In presidential systems, if the president does 
not control the legislature (via closed list and a majority), then veto players 
are the president, and each chamber. In parliamentary systems, if members 
of the government coalition in t-1 are no longer in government in t, that 
number of veto players changes”. Source: Database of Political Institutions; 
DPI (2013) 
Political 
Effectiveness 
This variable reports the Regime/Governance Stability, 1995-2013. Three 
indicators are used to calculate the Regime/Governance Stability score: 
Regime Durability (Polity IV, 2013); Current Leader’s Years in Office 
(Leadership Duration, 2010); and Total Number of Coup Events 1995- 
2013, including successful, attempted, plotted, alleged coups and forced 
resignations or assassinations of chief executives, but not including coup 
events associated with Polity adverse regime changes. These indicators are 
scored such that: Durability < 10 years = 1; Leader Years in Office > 12 
years = 1; and Total Coup Events: 1-2 = 1 and >2 = 2. These indicators are 
then added to produce the Regime/Governance Stability score (scores of 4 
are recoded as 3). Source: Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, 
Center for Systemic Peace. 
Political 
Legitimacy 
This variable explains Regime/Governance Inclusion, 2010. Four indicators 
were used to determine the Regime/Governance Inclusion score: 
Factionalism (Polity IV, parcomp value 3 = 1); Ethnic Group Political 
Discrimination against 5% or more of the population (Discrimination: 
POLDIS values 2, 3, 4 = 1); Political Salience of Elite Ethnicity (Elite 
Leadership Characteristics: ELETH values 1 or 2 = 1); and Polity 
Fragmentation (Polity IV, fragment value greater than 0 = 1). To these 
indicators, we have added Exclusionary Ideology of Ruling Elite (Elite 
Leadership Characteristics: ELITI value 1 = 1). Political Legitimacy Score 
is calculated by adding these five indicators; scores of 4 or 5 (rare) are 
recoded as 3. Source: Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, Center for 
Systemic Peace. 
Party 
Orientation 
This data has been taken from Database of Political Institutions; DPI (2013). 
This variable is being divided in to three categories such as R=1, L=3, and 
C=2. But in this analysis these categories have been converted into binary 
variable for treating each variable individually. 
Liberals (Right): For parties that are defined as conservative, Christian 
democratic, or right-wing.    
195 
 
Socialists (Left): For parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social 
democratic, or left-wing.  
Socio-Liberals (Centerist): For parties that are defined as centrist or when 
party position can best be described as centrist (e.g. party advocates 
strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). Not described 
as centrist if competing factions “average out” to a centrist position (e.g. a 
party of “right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists”). Source: 
Database of Political Institutions; DPI (2013). 
Concentration 
of Power by 
Government 
This is measured by Herfindhal Index. It is calculated as “The sum of the 
squared seat shares of all parties in the government”. Source: Database of 
Political Institutions; DPI (2013) 
Concentration 
of Power by  
This is also measured by Herfindhal Index and has been calculated in the 
same manner as the Herfindahl Government. Source: Database of Political 
Institutions; DPI (2013) 
                                                       Globalization Indicators 
Integration  It is measured with the help of Overall Globalization index. This variable is 
composed of three indices: economic globalization, political globalization 
and social globalization. Source: Dreher, Axel; Noel Gaston and Pim 
Martens, 2008, Measuring Globalization- Gauging its Consequence, New 
York: Springer. 
Role of 
Embassies  
This is measured with the help of political globalization also known as 
political openness. It includes number of Embassies in Country, 
Membership in International Organizations, Participation in U.N. Security 
Council Missions, and International Treaties. Source: Europa World 
Yearbook, CIA World Factbook, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations,UN, and United Nations Treaties Collection respectively  
Economic 
openness 
It covers the data on actual flows like trade % of GDP, Foreign Direct 
investment, portfolio investment, and income payments to foreign 
nationals, and data on restrictions like capital account restrictions, hidden 
import barriers, mean tariff rates, and international trade taxes. Sources: 
World Bank (2012), UNCTAD (2012), IMF (2012), Gwartney et al. (2012),  
Cultural 
openness 
It measures the openness by “number of McDonald's Restaurants (per 
capita), number of Ikea (per capita), Trade in books (percent of GDP)”. 
Sources: Ikea, UNESCO (various years), and United Nations Commodity 
Trade Statistics Database (2013) respectively. 
Social openness It includes three components: “data on personal contact, Data on 
information flows, and data on cultural proximity”. Sources: World Bank 
(2012),  International Telecommunication Union (2012), Ikea, UNESCO 
(various years), and United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(2012). 
                                                       Governance Indicators 
Media This variable is proxied by ‘Freedom of expression’. It is categorized as a 
scale from 0-100 indicating 0 for most free and 100 for Not free. Source: 
Freedom House by World Bank. 
196 
 
Legal System & 
Property Rights 
“A component of EFW Index under the area of Legal Structure and Security 
of Property Rights”. Source: Gwartney, Hall & Lawson (2011) Economic 
Freedom Dataset Published in Economic Freedom of the World 2010: 
Annual Report. 
Political 
Stability/ 
Absence of 
corruption 
It reports “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically‐motivated violence and terrorism”. Estimate of governance 
(ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance. Source: Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo 
Mastruzzi , produced by World Bank . 
Govt. 
Effectiveness 
It informs about the “perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies”. Estimate of 
governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
governance performance). Source: Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and 
Massimo Mastruzzi , produced by World Bank . 
Regulatory  
Quality 
It covers the data about the “perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development”. Estimate of governance (ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). 
Source: Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi , produced 
by World Bank (2013) . 
Rule of Law It captures the “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence”. Estimate of governance (ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance). 
Source: Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi , produced 
by World Bank (2013). 
State Fragility 
Index 
Fragility Index scores cover both aspects i.e. Effectiveness and Legitimacy 
in a system of nation. Four performance dimensions: Security, Political, 
Economic, and Social, at the end of the year 2010. Each of the indicators is 
rated on a four-point fragility scale: 0 “no fragility,” 1 “low fragility,” 2 
“medium fragility,” and 3 “high fragility” with the exception of the 
Economic Effectiveness indicator, which is rated on a five-point fragility 
scale (including 4 “extreme fragility”). The State Fragility Index, then, 
combines scores on the eight indicators and ranges from 0 “no fragility” to 
25 “extreme fragility.” Source: Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, 
Center for Systemic Peace. 
                                                              Dummy Variables 
Land 
Lockedness  
A dummy variable for the being land locked nation. “1” for land lock 
nations, “0” for non-landlock.  
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Membership of 
WTO 
A dummy variable for the membership of WTO. “0” for non- member 
nations, “1” for member-nations. Source: World Trade Organization. 
Military If chief executives were described as officers with no indication of formal 
retirement then the variable takes ‘1’ value and If chief executives were 
formally retired military officers upon taking office, then this variable gets 
a 0. Source: Database of Political Institutions; DPI (2013). 
Presidential 
System 
‘1’ for the nations having presidential system of the government, ‘0’ for any 
other system. Source: Database of Political Institutions; DPI (2013). 
Parliamentary 
System 
‘1’ for the nations having parliamentary system of the government, ‘0’ for 
any other system. Source: Database of Political Institutions; DPI (2013). 
                                                            Economic Variables 
Financial 
Institutions  
This variable has been proxied by the variable Domestic credit provided by 
banking sector. It is defined as “Domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the 
exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The banking 
sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as 
other banking institutions where data are available (including institutions 
that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time 
and savings deposits)”. Source: World Bank Indicators (2013). 
GDP Growth It is defined as: “Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices 
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 
U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included 
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources”. Source: World Bank Indicators (2013). 
Health  This variable has been proxied with life expectancy at birth. It is defined as: 
“Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant 
would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to 
stay the same throughout its life”. Source: World Bank Indicators (2013). 
Size of nation  Population has been used to measure the size of nation. It is defined as: 
“Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for 
refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are 
generally considered part of the population of their country of origin”. 
Source: World Bank Indicators (2013). 
Infrastructure This has been proxied with variable number of Telephone lines. Defining 
this variable as: "Telephone lines are fixed telephone lines that connect a 
subscriber's terminal equipment to the public switched telephone network 
and that have a port on a telephone exchange. Integrated services digital 
network channels and fixed wireless subscribers are included”. Source: 
World Bank Indicators (2013). 
Employment  It is taken as: “Employment to population ratio is the proportion of a 
country's population that is employed. Ages 15 and older are generally 
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considered the working-age population”. Source: World Bank Indicators 
(2013). 
Inflation It is measured by using this variable Consumer price index (2005 = 100). It 
is defined as: “changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a 
basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified 
intervals, such as yearly”. Source: World Bank Indicators (2013). 
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ADDENDUM  D 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF TRADE REGIMES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Country  Trade Regimes 
Albania  
 
“Albania has been an active participant in the WTO since its accession in 2000. It has 
an open trade regime underpinned by its extensive WTO commitments, and is not 
reliant on customs duties for government revenue.  Albania's overall simple average 
applied tariff was 5.2% in 2009, with a highest applied rate of 15%.  Its average bound 
tariff is 6.6%, and the highest bound rate is 20%.  All tariffs are ad valorem and no 
tariff-rate quotas are applied”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Angola  “Angola views trade liberalization as a means to secure the foundations for sustainable 
economic growth and to support the ongoing reform program aimed, inter alia, at 
poverty reduction.  However, the authorities regard import substitution, at least in the 
short to medium term, as a necessary stage in promoting reconstruction of its agriculture 
and industry. The customs tariff is Angola's main trade policy instrument.  A revised 
tariff, introduced in February 2005, reduced the maximum applied rate to 30%, with six 
levels ranging from 2%, and the simple average MFN rate from 8.8% to 7.4%.  All 
imports are subject to a consumption tax of between 2% and 30%, and other charges”. 
Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Argentina 
 
“Argentina considers regional and multilateral negotiations as tools to foster welfare 
and increase social equity.  Argentina is an original Member of the WTO and an active 
participant in the multilateral trading system. The main area of interest for Argentina is 
agriculture, although it also gives high priority to the negotiations on services, market 
access for non-agricultural products, special and differential treatment for developing 
countries, and the reduction of barriers to the trade of environmental goods and services. 
The average MFN tariff has fallen by just over three percentage points, to 10.4 per cent.  
Tariffs take the form of ad valorem duties, except for some 8 per cent of lines which, 
since 2000, are subject to compound duties (ad valorem duties plus minimum specific 
import duties). The tariff shows signs of escalation. Argentina has bound its whole tariff 
in the WTO, thus enhancing the predictability of its trade regime.  However, there is a 
large gap between applied tariff levels and bound tariffs, with the average for the latter 
being 30.7 per cent”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Armenia  
 
“Armenia's average applied MFN tariff is 2.7% with a simple tariff structure:  no tariff 
quotas;  73% of tariff lines are duty free;  and almost all the rest subject to a 10% tariff 
rate.  Armenia does not apply quantitative restrictions to imports.  Anti-dumping and 
safeguard legislation has been in 5 place since before accession to the WTO. Armenia 
does not apply export taxes, although its legislation permits them.  Export prohibitions 
apply only to a limited range of products such as weapons, ammunition, explosives, and 
narcotics”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Bangladesh “Bangladesh, a contracting party to the GATT since 16 December 1972, is an original 
Member of the WTO.  It grants at least MFN treatment to all its trading partners and 
receives the special and differential treatment provided for in the WTO Agreements.  
Trade is at the heart of Bangladesh's development strategy and poverty reduction 
efforts. The customs tariff is Bangladesh's main trade policy instrument as well as a 
major source of government revenue (26.4% of total tax revenue).  Almost all tariff 
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rates are ad valorem, thus ensuring a high degree of transparency of the customs tariff. 
The tariff comprises four tiers:  zero, 6% (basic raw materials), 13% (intermediate 
goods) and 25% (finished goods).  The average applied MFN tariff (exclusive of 
specific duties and other charges) fell from 22.2% in 1999/00 to 15.5% in 2005/06.  The 
average customs duty on agricultural products (WTO definition) (19.6%) remains 
higher than for industrial goods (14.7%)”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Behrain Bahrain has applied the GCC common external tariff (CET) since 1 January 2003.  The 
adoption of the CET by Bahrain decreased its simple average applied MFN tariff from 
7.7% in 2000 to 5.3% in 2007. All rates are ad valorem (except on tobacco), and there 
are no tariff quotas and no other duties and taxes on imports. On aggregate, Bahrain's 
tariff displays positive escalation, from first-stage processed products, with an average 
tariff of 4%, to semi-finished goods, with an average rate of 4.9%, and fully processed 
products, on which tariffs average 5.8%. Bahrain has bound 72.7% of its tariff lines (all 
agricultural goods and 67.3% of non-agricultural tariff lines) at rates ranging from 35% 
to 200%, i.e. an average bound rate of 35.6%; this leaves ample margins for applied 
tariff increases. The services sector is a key component in Bahrain's overall policy of 
economic diversification; financial services, in particular, have developed strongly over 
the last few years”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Benin 
 
Same as Mali. 
Bolivia 
 
“Bolivia has been a Member of the WTO since September 1995.  It plays an active role 
in the multilateral trading system. The country's primary areas of interest are 
agricultural trade, trade facilitation, special and differential treatment for landlocked 
developing countries. Tariffs are the main instrument of protection at the border.  The 
arithmetic average of the MFN tariff applied in 2005 fell to 8.2 per cent from the 9.7 
per cent registered in 1999.  All tariffs are ad valorem.  Bolivia has bound all its tariffs, 
thereby enhancing the predictability of its trade regime.  Predictability would 
nevertheless be improved if the gap between applied tariffs and bound tariffs was 
narrowed.  The average bound tariff is 40 per cent. Non-tariff measures do not, on the 
whole, appear to be a major barrier to trade.  Bolivia applied no anti-dumping, 
countervailing or safeguard measures during the period under review”.  Source: WTO 
Trade Policy Review. 
Botswana 
 
“The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), in place since 1910, is the oldest 
customs union in the world. Since their last Trade Policy Review (TPR) in 1998, the 
five member states of SACU (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland), have continued their economic reform programmes.  Further liberalization 
of trade and investment, driven both by their commitments in the WTO, and by their 
participation in bilateral and regional trade agreements, have been major features in this 
process. SACU's applied MFN tariff structure has been somewhat simplified, and the 
simple average MFN applied rate declined from 15% in 1997 to 11.4% in 2002.  By 
ISIC sector, tariff protection on manufacturing is 11.8% (down from 15.6% in 1997); 
tariffs average 5.5% in agriculture (down from 5.6% in 1997); and 0.7% in mining and 
quarrying (down from 1.4% in 1997).  Using the WTO definition, tariff protection for 
agricultural products is 9.6% (up from 9.4% in 1997), against 11.6% for non-
agricultural products (down from 15.7% in 1997). The tariff remains complex, still 
comprising ad valorem, specific, mixed, compound, and formula duties”.  Source: WTO 
Trade Policy Review. 
Brazil 
 
Brazil is a genuine global trader, with considerable diversification in the geographic 
distribution of its exports and imports.  Brazil considers the multilateral trading system 
to be at the core of its trade regime.  It is an original Member of the WTO, and an active 
participant. Brazil has continued to take gradual steps to simplify and modernize its 
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customs procedures.  Brazil increased overall tariff protection;  the simple average 
applied MFN tariff rose from 10.4% in January 2004 to 11.5% in January 2008.  This 
was mainly due to an increase of 1.1 percentage points in the average tariff of non-
agricultural products to 11.6%; the average for agricultural products (WTO definition) 
remained practically constant, at 10.1%.  Brazil's tariff structure still shows low 
dispersion but the presence of tariff peaks and escalation increases the effective rates of 
tariff protection.  All tariffs applied by Brazil are ad valorem. Brazil's entire tariff 
schedule is bound at an average of 30.2%.  Reducing bound rates to close the gap 
between them and applied tariffs would further increase the predictability of Brazil’s 
trade regime. Brazil continues to be an active user of anti-dumping (AD) measures.  At 
end-October 2008, it had 63 AD measures in force, affecting the exports of 23 trading 
partners”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Bulgaria 
 
“Bulgaria's trade liberalization is confirmed by the fall in the average applied MFN 
tariff rate for all products from 17.2% in 1996, on accession to WTO, to 11.6% in 2003. 
Duties range from 0% to maxima of 40% in industrial and 80% in agricultural products. 
Industrial trade liberalization has progressed more rapidly than that in agriculture: in 
2003 the average applied MFN rate for agricultural goods was 22.4% while that for 
industrial products was 8.7%. All duties on industrial products are ad valorem, while 
16% of duties on agricultural goods are either specific, mixed,  compound or seasonal 
duties. Average applied MFN tariff rates are well above preferential rates; the average 
preferential rates for all products range between 2.5% to 5.9% depending on the 
agreement. Bulgaria bound all its tariffs at ceiling rates on accession to WTO. In 2003, 
the average MFN bound rate was 28.2%, with a maximum of 200%. The wide gap 
between Bulgaria's applied and bound MFN rates could give it considerable latitude to 
increase tariff levels. A reduction in its bound rates would enhance the predictability of 
its trade regime”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Burundi “Burundi is one of the original Members of the WTO and as a minimum grants MFN 
treatment to all its trade partners. Burundi's major trade policy instrument is customs 
duties.  The tariff structure remained unchanged between 1993 and 1 January 2003, 
when the maximum rates were lowered from 100 to 40 per cent.  This reform has caused 
the simple average rate of MFN duties to fall from 30.8 to 23.5 per cent.  All duties are 
ad valorem and there are eight rates.  Burundi's tariff structure shows mixed escalation;  
setting aside incentives, such a situation does little to encourage investment in certain 
processing activities”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review.   
Camroon 
 
“Cameroon is a founding Member of the WTO and participates in its ministerial 
meetings.  It gives at least most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment to all its trading 
partners. Cameroon is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community (CEMAC), whose common currency is pegged to the euro. Having adopted 
a common external tariff (CET) in 1993, CEMAC members are currently setting up a 
customs union.  Cameroon generally applies CEMAC decisions with regard to customs.  
Barring a few exceptions, its customs tariffs are based on the CEMAC CET;  all the 
rates are ad valorem.  The simple average tariff is 19.1 per cent.  Agricultural products 
(WTO definition) are subject to higher taxation (simple average of 22.6 per cent) than 
non-agricultural products (simple average of 18.6 per cent).  Overall, the tariff shows 
mixed escalation, which does not encourage the setting up of certain industries or favour 
the competitiveness of certain locally manufactured products on international markets”. 
Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Central 
African 
Republic 
 
“The Central African Republic inherited the status of GATT contracting party on 3 May 
1963, and has been a member of the WTO since 31 May 1995.  It is recognized as a 
least developed country (LDC).  The Central African Republic has a long history of 
regional integration with its neighbors in central Africa.  It is a member of the Central 
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African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC).The Central African Republic 
applies the CEMAC's Customs Code.  Apart from a few exceptions, its customs tariff 
is based on the CEMAC's CET.  The simple average of its applied MFN tariff is 18.2 
per cent, with considerably higher tariff protection (22.7 per cent) for agricultural 
products (WTO definition).  Overall, the tariff shows mixed escalation owing to the 
relatively high degree of protection afforded to unprocessed agricultural products. The 
country's land-locked situation is in itself a natural barrier to trade and tends to push up 
costs.  However, trade facilitation measures, including the streamlining of institutional 
structures and the various taxation systems (import and export) which add to the costs 
of the goods traded, could help to contain its effects”. Source: WTO Trade Policy 
Review. 
Chad 
 
“Chad is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(CAEMC), whose common currency is pegged to the euro.  However, intra-CAEMC 
trade is still limited. Chad took over the status of GATT contracting party on 4 July 
1963 and became a Member of the WTO on 19 October 1996.  It accords most-
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment as a minimum to all its trading partners With a few 
exceptions, the MFN tariff applied by Chad is based on the CAEMC CET.  Its rates are 
all ad valorem and vary from zero to 30 per cent, with an average of 18.4 per cent. The 
tariff protection accorded to agricultural products (WTO definition) is higher (22.8 per 
cent) than that accorded to non-agricultural goods (17.6 per cent).  As defined by ISIC, 
agriculture remains the most protected sector (23.2 per cent), followed by 
manufacturing (18.1 per cent) and the extractive industries (11.4 per cent).  The tariff is 
characterized by mixed escalation due to the heavier protection for unprocessed 
agricultural products”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review.  
Chile “Chile participates actively in the WTO and the DDA. It considers that the multilateral 
trading system should be further strengthened and that certain issues on the trade 
agenda, such as the elimination of agricultural subsidies, can only be resolved in the 
multilateral sphere. One of the most prominent features of Chile's trade policy regime 
is the central role it gives to RTAs.  As at mid-2009 Chile had in force 21 RTAs with 
57 trading partners;  13 of these agreements, with 18 partners, were concluded during 
the review period.  As a result, just over 92 per cent of Chile's total merchandise trade 
is carried out with preferential partners. Chile has continued to adopt measures to 
facilitate trade and to modernize customs, including new valuation regulations.  As a 
result of previous unilateral tariff reductions, since 2003 Chile has applied a single MFN 
tariff rate of 6 per cent, with a few exceptions that reduce somewhat the otherwise 
noteworthy simplicity and neutrality of Chile's tariff structure.  All tariff lines are 
bound, most at 25 per cent; a number of agricultural products are bound at 31.5 per cent.  
Although Chile's applied tariff rates have been stable in practice, reducing bound rates 
would enhance certainty to MFN traders. Chile does not apply quantitative import 
restrictions or import licenses”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
China 
 
“Since its previous Trade Policy Review in 2008, China has continued the gradual 
liberalization of its international trade and investment regime. China's average applied 
MFN tariff was 9.5% in 2009, slightly lower than in 2007 (9.7%).  Bound rates are close 
to the applied rates, giving the tariff a high degree of predictability.  Nonetheless, the 
tariff could be complex, as, for example, the applied MFN tariff contains 60 different 
ad valorem rates. China still uses various non-tariff border measures, such as import 
and export licensing or state trading to "guide" the allocation of resources.  China's trade 
remedy activity is assuming increasing importance, while China remains the most 
frequent target of anti-dumping measures. China's export barriers have not been falling 
at the same pace as its import barriers. It still uses various export restrictions, including 
prohibitions, licensing, quotas, taxes, and less-than-full VAT rebates, to manage certain 
203 
 
exports on grounds of natural resource and energy conservation. While China has 
recently intensified its pursuit of bilateral/regional free-trade agreements, preferential 
margins provided by China are still small and trade with FTA partners still accounts for 
a minor share of its total trade”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Colombia “Colombia is an original Member of the WTO.  The Multilateral Agreements and 
domestic ordinary laws have the same hierarchical status in Colombia's legal system.  
Colombia is an observer in the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement. 
Colombia has continued to modernize its trade regime, including simplifying and 
computerizing customs procedures.  Colombia applies the WTO Agreement on 
Customs Valuation since 2000. The tariff is Colombia's main trade instrument;  all 
tariffs are ad valorem.  Between 1996-06, the average applied MFN tariff increased 
slightly, from 11.5% to 12%.  Colombia has bound all its tariff lines thus providing 
greater predictability to its trade regime which, however, is reduced by a substantial gap 
between applied and bound tariffs.  The average bound tariff is 43%”. Source: WTO 
Trade Policy Review. 
Costa Rica “Costa Rica is an original Member of the WTO. Costa Rica has taken measures to 
modernize its trade regime including by simplifying and computerizing customs 
procedures and adopting new regulations on customs procedures and valuation.  The 
tariff is Costa Rica's main trade instrument.  All tariffs are ad valorem; at 6.9 per cent, 
the average applied MFN tariff remained almost unchanged during the period under 
review.  The tariff structure shows signs of escalation.  Costa Rica has bound all tariff 
lines, thus providing greater predictability to its trade regime although this is reduced 
by the substantial gap between applied and bound tariffs (the average bound tariff is 
44.1 per cent)”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Dominican 
Republic 
“Dominican Republic has continued with the liberalization of its trade regime.  Among 
other measures, customs procedures were streamlined, tariffs reduced, import 
surcharges and export taxes eliminated. The Dominican Republic attaches priority to 
the multilateral trade agenda.  It is a founding Member of the WTO and plays an active 
role in the Doha Round.  The average applied MFN tariff rate has decreased from 8.6 
per cent in 2002 to 7.5 per cent in 2008.  The share of duty-free tariff lines increased 
markedly during the same period, from around 13 per cent to almost 55 per cent.  This 
reflects the elimination of tariffs applied on many inputs and capital goods not produced 
domestically.  .  The Dominican Republic has bound its entire tariff schedule, mostly at 
40 per cent;  reducing the average gap of around 28 percentage points between bound 
and applied rates would further enhance the predictability of the Dominican Republic's 
trade regime”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Ecuador “The tariff remains one of Ecuador's main trade policy instruments and an important 
source of tax revenue (13.3% of total tax revenue).  As a result of customs tariff reforms 
(including the adoption of the HS 2007 tariff nomenclature) and changes in the type, 
level, and distribution of duty rates, the average applied MFN tariff rate dropped from 
11.4% in 2005 to 9.3% in 2011.  Whereas the average applied MFN tariff for industrial 
imports dropped from 10.6% to 7.6%, that for agricultural products rose from 16.7% to 
19.6%.  Some 53.5% of applied MFN tariff rates are currently in the range of zero to 
5%, up from 38.7% in 2005. The simple average of bound MFN rates (21%) is 
considerably higher than the average applied MFN rate (9.3%)”. Source: WTO Trade 
Policy Review. 
Egypt “A contracting party to the GATT since 1970 and a WTO Member since June 1995, 
Egypt is an active participant in the multilateral trading system (MTS).  Egypt accords 
at least MFN treatment to all WTO Members.  It is seeking to liberalize its trade regime 
on a multilateral, regional, and unilateral basis.  In the current multilateral trade 
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negotiations, Egypt supports meaningful liberalization of the agriculture sector.  It also 
seeks improved market access for non-agricultural goods, but believes that concerns for 
infant industries in developing countries should be accommodated. Egypt has bound 
over 98% of its tariff lines, at rates averaging 37.5% in 2005, down from 45% in 1998.  
Egypt's present applied MFN tariff structure was implemented in September 2004, with 
significant across-the-board cuts and a reduction in the number of tariff bands to twelve.  
As a result, the average applied MFN tariff has fallen from 26.8% in 1998 to 20%.  
Nevertheless, Egypt's tariff system remains complex, with numerous exemptions, and 
concessions. tariff reductions, and reducing in the gap between bound and applied tariff 
rates, would contribute to better resource allocation, enhance predictability”. Source: 
WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Elsalvador “El Salvador has been a Member of the WTO since May 1995 and takes an active part 
in negotiations and in the regular work of the WTO. The trade policy regime of El 
Salvador has been further liberalized since 2003.  Progress has been made in 
modernizing customs, eliminating unnecessary licensing requirements. El Salvador 
does most of its trade with trading partners with which it has preferential agreements. 
All tariffs are bound, at an average rate of 37 per cent, thus affording certainty to 
MFN traders.  In spite of this, and the stability of the tariff regime in practice, certainty 
could be enhanced by reducing bound rates”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Gabon “Gabon is a founding Member of the WTO and grants at least most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) treatment to all its trading partners. It participates in WTO ministerial meetings 
but is neither a party nor an observer to any of the plurilateral agreements concluded 
under the auspices of the WTO.  Its tariff is based on the CEMAC common external 
tariff (CET). All tariff rates are ad valorem with a simple average of 18.2 per cent.  
Agricultural products (WTO definition) are subject to heavier taxation (a simple 
average of 21.9 per cent) than non-agricultural products (excluding petroleum products) 
(17.6 per cent).  Overall, the tariff shows mixed escalation, which is not conducive to 
the establishment of certain industries or to promoting the competitiveness of some 
domestic manufactures in international markets”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Georgia “Georgia has MFN trading relationships with all WTO Members. By the time of its 
accession to the WTO in 2000, Georgia had established the legislative basis for 
competitive markets by liberalizing its trade. The current average applied MFN tariff 
rate is 1.5%, down from 7.2% in 2005, making it one of the lowest worldwide.  The 
number of tariff bands was reduced from sixteen to three (0%, 5%, and 12%) with a 
maximum tariff of 12%.  Nearly 86% of  imported goods enter duty-free compared with 
26% in 2005;  agricultural goods and construction  materials  are the main items taxed 
at the higher rates. Over 98% of tariff lines are ad valorem rates, and 183 lines are 
subject to specific duties. .  Georgia has bound all its tariffs.  The average bound MFN 
rate is 7.5%”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Ghana “Ghana is an original Member of the WTO. Ghana extends at least MFN treatment to 
all its trading partners. Ghana's applied tariff consists of four bands (zero, 5%, 10%, and 
20%).  These ad valorem tariffs apply to 99.8% of total lines, with the remaining lines 
(13 petroleum products) subject to specific tariffs.  In 2007, the average applied MFN 
tariff was 12.7%, down from 14.7% in 2000. MFN rates on agricultural products (WTO 
definition) are generally higher, with an average of 17.5%, while non-agricultural 
products carry an average tariff of 12%”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Guatemala “Trade liberalization plays an important role in Guatemala's trade policy. Guatemala 
has pursued its trade objectives in parallel at the bilateral, regional and multilateral 
levels and gives equal importance to all three levels. Guatemala became a Member of 
the WTO on 1 July 1995. Guatemala's trade regime is essentially an open one. The 
average rate of MFN duty applied fell from 7.0 per cent in 2001 to 5.9 per cent in 2008.  
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The average duty on agricultural products (9.9 per cent) is still relatively higher than 
that on other products (5.3 per cent).  Guatemala bound all its tariffs at an average of 
42.7 per cent.  In this respect, the predictability of Guatemala's trade regime could be 
improved by lowering bound rates to close the gap between bound and applied tariffs”. 
Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Guinea “Guinea's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) recognizes that trade plays a key 
role in combating poverty and that it can make a contribution towards food security.  
The simple average rate is 12 per cent (with a range between zero and 20 per cent).  
Guinea has bound 41 per cent of its tariff lines at ceiling rates, including all agricultural 
products, but only one third of non-agricultural products.  The average bound rate is 
around 39 per cent on agricultural products and 11 per cent on non-agricultural 
products.  On some 10 per cent of the tariff lines, the applied rates exceed the bound 
rates”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Haiti “Haiti became a contracting party to the GATT on 1 January 1950 and has been a 
member of the WTO since 30 January 1996.  It grants most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
treatment to all its trade partners.  It has not signed any plurilateral agreement.  Haiti 
attaches great importance to multilateral trade negotiations in the agricultural and 
services sectors.  Since 1986, Haiti has greatly liberalized its trade regime by abolishing 
the majority of quantitative restrictions on trade.  Tariffs are currently the major trade 
policy instrument and their structure has been simplified to arrive at six rates (zero, 3, 
5, 10, 15 and 57.8 per cent) whose levels have been noticeably lowered”. Source: WTO 
Trade Policy Review. 
Honduras “Honduras is a founding Member of the WTO and attaches great importance to its 
participation in the multilateral trading system.  Honduras grants at least MFN treatment 
to all WTO Members.  The average MFN rate applied was 6 per cent in 2009. 
Agricultural products (WTO definition) were subject to an average tariff of 11.1 per 
cent, while the average tariff for non-agricultural products was 5.1 per cent.  The tariff 
rates range from 0 to 164 per cent, but most are less than 40 per cent.  All tariffs are 
bound:  about 85 per cent of all tariff lines are bound at 35 per cent, with less than 1 per 
cent at higher levels and the rest at levels below 35 per cent”.  Source: WTO Trade 
Policy Review. 
India “India is an original Member of the WTO and provides at least MFN treatment to all 
Members and other trading partners.  The simple average MFN tariff rate declined to 
12% in 2010/11, from 15.1% in 2006/07.  This is reflected in a decrease in both 
agricultural and industrial average tariffs, due to India's shift towards lower tariffs.  The 
average for WTO non-agricultural products (8.9%) is considerably lower than the 
average for WTO agricultural products, which is 33.3%.  In 2010/11, tariffs ranged from 
zero to 150%. The percentage of duty-free lines has increased slightly, from 2.7% to 
3.2% of the total. Non-ad valorem rates apply to 690 tariff lines of which 5 are specific 
rates, while 685 are alternate rates affecting textiles and clothing. India's WTO bound 
tariff levels are much higher than the applied rates, especially for many agricultural 
products.  India is one of the most active users of anti-dumping measures among WTO 
Members”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Indonesia  “Indonesia provides at least MFN treatment to all WTO Members. The tariff has 
remained Indonesia's main trade policy instrument, albeit a relatively small source of 
tax revenue, accounting for a little over 4% of total tax revenue.  The average applied 
MFN tariff is 9.5% (2006), down from 9.9% in 2004 when Indonesia adopted a new 
tariff classification for MFN (non-ASEAN) tariffs.  The average applied MFN tariff is 
9.2% for industrial products and 11.4% for agricultural imports.  More than 75% of 
tariff rates are currently in the range of zero to 10%. Indonesia has remained a relatively 
active user of anti-dumping measures. Indonesia has continued to reduce the number of 
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tariff lines subject to import restrictions, currently 141”. Source: WTO Trade Policy 
Review. 
Jamaica “Jamaica's economy, which is dependent on alumina, tourism, remittances, and its large 
informal sector, is highly trade-oriented.  Exports and imports of goods and services 
have represented on average over 90% of GDP since 2005. Jamaica is an original and 
active Member of the WTO and is a strong supporter of special and differential 
treatment for developing countries within the WTO and the DDA negotiations.  Jamaica 
grants at least MFN treatment to all trading partners. Tariffs and other duties and 
charges remain Jamaica's main trade policy instrument”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy 
Review. 
Jordan “Jordan has been a Member of the WTO since April 2000. It has fully implemented its 
wide-ranging commitments under the GATT, GATS and TRIPS agreements. On the 
regional front, Jordan is an effective Member in the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement 
(GAFTA), providing for full liberalization of trade in goods in the markets of (17) Arab 
countries as of January 2005.  Jordan is the first country in the Middle East to sign an 
FTA with Singapore creating a gateway for business partnerships in the region and 
South Eastern Asia as well, the agreement entered into force in 2005. Further bilateral 
preferential trade agreements and FTAs are being negotiated with Turkey, Canada, and 
MERCOSUR”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Kenya “Kenya is a founding member of the WTO;  it accords at least MFN treatment to all its 
trading partners. Tariffs have become Kenya's main trade policy instrument.  Since the 
previous Review in 1993, Kenya has reduced the overall level of protection of its 
economy.  It has dismantled most non-tariff restrictions. Kenya's trade policy objectives 
include moving towards a more open trade regime, strengthening and increasing 
overseas market access for Kenyan products, especially processed goods, and further 
integration into the world economy.  These policy objectives have been pursued through 
unilateral liberalization, and regional and bilateral trade negotiations. The tariff 
structure has been simplified through the reduction of the number of bands from eight 
in 1994 to five (0, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 25%), and the lowering of maximum ad valorem 
rates from 60% in 1992 to 25% in 1999”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Korea Rep “Korea is an original Member of the WTO.  It grants at least MFN treatment to all its 
trading partners and, as a developing country, it receives the special and differential 
treatment provided for in the WTO Agreements. The customs tariff is Korea's main 
trade policy instruments as well as a major, albeit declining, source of tax revenue. 
Korea has maintained its support for and commitment to the strengthening and 
liberalization of the multilateral trading system and the successful conclusion of the 
Doha Round negotiations.  Nevertheless, Korea has pursued intensively free-trade 
agreements (FTAs) with its major trading partners”. Source: WTO Trade Policy 
Review. 
Kuwait “Kuwait became a GATT signatory in 1963 and has been a WTO Member since 1995.  
Goods imported are subject only to customs tariffs, since Kuwait does not impose VAT, 
excise duties or any other internal tax or charge on either domestically produced or 
imported products.  Kuwait started applying the GCC common external tariff in 2003.  
As a result, the simple average MFN applied tariff declined from 7.7% in 2002 to 4.8% 
in 2011.  On the basis of the WTO definition, tariffs average 5.7% on agricultural 
products and 4.6% on non-agricultural products;  98.6% of all tariff lines are ad 
valorem. All bound rates are at 100%. Of total tax revenue (about 2% of government 
revenue), the customs tariff accounts for more than 60%”. Source: WTO Trade Policy 
Review. 
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Kyrgistan  “The Kyrgyz Republic has substantially liberalized its formal trade regime by reducing 
tariff rates and eliminating most non-tariff barriers. The Kyrgyz Republic grants at least 
most-favoured-nation treatment to all WTO Members. The tariff, the main Kyrgyz trade 
policy instrument, has been rationalized.  The simple average applied MFN rate is 4.9%, 
down from 5.2% in 2005 (8.7% in 1999).  Rate disparities and escalation are relatively 
low.  Only a few rates (1.3%) are non-ad valorem, thereby improving transparency. The 
relatively uniform tariff structure simplifies customs procedures, reduces market 
distortions, and enhances transparency”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Lesetho Same as Bostwana.  
Madgascare “Madagascar is a founding Member of the WTO and grants at least most-favoured-
nation (MFN) treatment to all its trading partners. All Madagascar's tariffs are 
ad valorem (zero, 5, 10 and 20 per cent), with the exception of those on petroleum 
products. Agricultural products (WTO definition) are subject to higher taxation (a 
simple average of 14.5 per cent) than non-agricultural products (12.7 per cent)”. Source: 
WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Malawi “Malawi's tariff bindings average 76.5%, covering 31% of the tariff lines.  The applied 
MFN rate averaged 13.1% in 2009 (compared with a simple average rate of 13.6% in 
2001).  The applied MFN tariff has six bands, with a maximum rate of 25%.  Malawi's 
tariff is complex because of numerous exemption schemes”. Source: WTO Trade Policy 
Review.   
Malaysia “The tariff is the main border measure affecting imports of goods in Malaysia.  The 
simple average applied MFN tariff was 7.4% in 2009;  about 60% of tariff lines were 
duty free. Malaysia continues to consider the WTO a priority in realizing its trade 
objectives.  Various non-tariff border measures are also used as instruments of 
Malaysia's trade and industrial policy.  Import competition is also expected to intensify 
as domestic barriers are dismantled through regional/bilateral FTAs and WTO 
negotiations.  Nonetheless, several long-standing barriers to trade and foreign direct 
investment still constitute potentially important impediments to Malaysia's recovery 
from the crisis”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Mali “The eight countries belonging to the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU), which include Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali, are also members of the 
larger group of 15 countries belonging to the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS). Since the review of their respective trade policies in 2004, Benin, 
Burkina Faso and Mali have pursued their integration and economic reform efforts 
within WAEMU (and ECOWAS as well).   As Members of the WTO, Benin, Burkina 
Faso and Mali grant at least MFN treatment to all their trading partners.  Harmonization 
of tariff bindings in the WTO is under consideration by WAEMU members.  For each 
of the three countries, bindings currently affect around 40 per cent of tariff lines and for 
over 27 per cent of the bound tariff lines, the customs duties applied exceed the bound 
levels, sometimes by as much as 20 percentage points”. Source: WTO Trade Policy 
Review. 
Mauritania “Mauritania is an original member of the WTO and grants at least most-favoured-nation 
treatment to all its trading partners;  it is neither a signatory to, nor an observer in, the 
WTO's plurilateral agreements.  Mauritania has bound almost 40 per cent of its tariffs 
lines in the WTO at ceiling rates.  The average bound tariff is around 20 per cent on 
agricultural products and 38 per cent on non-agricultural products.  Other duties and 
taxes are bound at 0 or 15 per cent. Mauritania is one of the few WTO Members that 
does not grant preferential tariffs to any country.  The applied tariff is entirely 
ad valorem, with a relatively simple four-rate structure (0, 5 per cent, 13 per cent and 
20 per cent)”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
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Mauritius “Mauritius has a relatively diversified economy based on its four traditional pillars:  
sugar, textiles and clothing, tourism, and financial services. Mauritius is an original 
member of the WTO and grants at least MFN treatment to all its trading partners.  It is 
not a signatory to any of the Plurilateral Agreements. As a small-island developing 
country with limited natural resources, Mauritius relies on international trade, and 
participates actively in the multilateral trading system and in various regional 
groupings.  It is an active defender of the interest of developing countries in general, 
and "small vulnerable economies" (SVES) in particular, and considers that improved 
market access without the capacity to produce is meaningless. Mauritius has undertaken 
some major trade-related reforms.  With the aim of transforming Mauritius into a duty-
free island, its maximum tariff rates have been reduced, and the number of duty-free 
lines increased to some 79% of all tariff lines.  This has contributed to lowering the 
simple average MFN tariff (including ad valorem equivalents (AVEs)) from 19.9% in 
2001 to 6.6% in 2007.  The use of specific duties has, however, increased from two 
tariff lines in 2001 to 5.9% of total tariff lines in 2007, with their AVEs varying from 
0.1% to 277.5%.  A VAT of 15% applies to both imports and domestically produced 
goods”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Mexico “Mexico is an original member of the WTO and considers that the multilateral system 
is the principal instrument for liberalizing global trade.  Mexico has lowered its simple 
average MFN tariff, from 16.5 per cent in 2001 to 11.2 per cent in 2007.  Agricultural 
goods still receive higher tariff protection (23 per cent) than other products (9.9 per 
cent).  The applied tariff is complex and tariff dispersion has increased.  Since 2002, 
Mexico has continued with the gradual and unilateral liberalization of its trade regime.  
It has also concluded new free-trade agreements, now conducting 85 per cent of its trade 
with preferential partners.  While preferential agreements have played an important role 
in Mexico's liberalization efforts, they have also altered economic incentives”.  Source: 
WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Mongolia “Mongolia acceded to the WTO on 29 January 1997, and has accepted all multilateral 
agreements. Mongolia's economy is currently on a recovery path, with stable economic 
growth and moderate inflation.  Its multilateral trade policy is focused on its 
commitments, and present negotiations, in the WTO. Since acceding to the WTO in 
January 1997, Mongolia has substantially liberalized its trade regime.  Liberalization 
has, inter alia, involved the reduction of tariff rates and elimination of a number of 
import licensing requirements. Mongolia has not signed any regional or bilateral free-
trade agreements.  It has been involved in various bilateral trade-related arrangements, 
which do not involve preferential treatment. Mongolia are subject to an ad valorem duty 
rate of 5% (compared with a uniform rate of 15% in 1997).  In 2004, the simple average 
applied MFN tariff was 5.0%.  All tariff lines are bound. The average bound rate was 
18.4% in 2004”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Morocco “Morocco is an original Member of the WTO, and grants all its trading partners at least 
MFN treatment.  It has played an active part in the multilateral trade negotiations. 
Morocco has a relatively diversified economy. Morocco is a member of the Arab 
Maghreb Union (UNA) and the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area. Since 2003, It has continued 
to take trade facilitation measures.  Morocco has lowered its customs duties, the simple 
arithmetic average having fallen by 13.2 per cent since 2002 to the current 20.2 per cent. 
Morocco has bound all of its tariff lines solely at ad valorem rates ranging from zero to 
380 per cent, with a simple arithmetic average of 42 per cent (56.9 per cent on 
agricultural products and 39.6 per cent on non-agricultural products)”. Source: WTO 
Trade Policy Review. 
Namibia “Namibia is a member nation of Southern African Customs Union (SACU), (in place 
since 1910), it is the oldest customs union in the world. SACU countries are all original 
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WTO Members. All SACU countries accord at least MFN treatment to all their trading 
partners.  They support the Doha Development Agenda, which they consider as an 
opportunity to address some of the current imbalances existing in the WTO Agreements 
and to improve the conditions of access by their exports into other markets. applied 
customs tariffs, excise duties, customs valuation, rules of origin, and contingency trade 
remedies remain the only domains of trade policy that, so far, are formally harmonized 
throughout SACU. SACU's applied MFN tariff structure has been somewhat simplified, 
and the simple average MFN applied rate declined from 15% in 1997 to 11.4% in 2002. 
MFN applied tariffs are substantially dispersed, and in aggregate, display mixed 
escalation”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Nepal “Nepal started to liberalize its trade and investment regime, unilaterally, in 1992 and 
became the first least developed country (LDC) to join the WTO through the full 
accession process in April 2004. Nepal became the 147th Member of the WTO on 23 
April 2004.  As part of its accession commitments, Nepal bound 99.4% of its tariff lines 
and made extensive commitments under the GATS.  Nepal became the 147th Member 
of the WTO on 23 April 2004.  As part of its accession commitments, Nepal bound 
99.4% of its tariff lines and made extensive commitments under the GATS.  Nepal's 
tariff is relatively simple, as 99.3% of total lines are ad valorem.  Its average applied 
MFN tariff decreased from 13.8% in 2002/03 to 12.2% in 2011/12, while the average 
final bound tariff is 26.3%.  Nepal applies no tariff rate quotas”. Source: WTO Trade 
Policy Review. 
Nicarguay “Nicaragua is an original Member of the WTO. Nicaragua accords at least MFN 
treatment to all WTO Members.  It has been an active participant in the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), having submitted numerous proposals individually or 
together with other WTO Members.  Its main focus in the DDA has been on agricultural 
issues. The simple average of Nicaragua's MFN tariff raised from 4.2 per cent in 1999 
to 5.8 per cent in 2005. Nicaragua has bound all its tariffs, most of them (with 
64 exceptions) at a ceiling rate of 40 per cent. In addition to customs tariffs, Nicaragua 
levies certain additional taxes on imports as well”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Niger “As members of WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union), since 2000 
Niger have applied its CET with four rates (0, 5, 10 and 20 per cent).  The CET is 
currently applied on the basis of the 2007 version of the Harmonized System (HS) and 
all its lines are ad valorem.  The simple average CET, unchanged since the previous 
joint TPR of the two countries in 2003, is 12.1 per cent, or 14.6 per cent on agricultural 
products (WTO definition) and 11.7 per cent on non agricultural products. The trade 
regimes of Niger and Senegal are largely governed by the provisions of the WAEMU.  
Both countries give at least MFN treatment to their trade partners. Niger has 
non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU market”. Source: WTO Trade Policy 
Review. 
Nigeria “Tariffs are the main trade policy instrument, as Nigeria has been aligning its tariff with 
the ECOWAS common external tariff.  As a result, the average applied MFN tariff 
declined from 29% in 2003 to 12% in 2009.  However, the average bound tariff was 
118% in 2009 and only 20% of tariff lines are bound.  Customs procedures have been 
simplified over the last six years with the introduction of improved systems and 
increased automation”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Oman “The WTO Agreements and the GCC Treaty are the main factors underlying Oman's 
trade policy.  Oman deposited its instrument of ratification of accession and became a 
WTO Member on 9 November 2000.  Oman has a relatively simple MFN tariff; all rates 
are ad valorem, and there are no tariff quotas, and no other duties and charges on 
imports. Since 1 January 2003, Oman has been applying the GCC common external 
tariff, which consists of rates of zero (9.4% of all lines) and 5% (88.8%).  ).  Oman's 
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applied average MFN tariff rate is 5.5%, i.e. 9.9% on agriculture (WTO definition), and 
4.6% on non-agricultural products. It has bound 100% of its tariff lines at rates ranging 
up to 200%, and averaging 13.8% i.e. average bound rates of 28% on agricultural 
products, and 11.6% on non-agricultural goods);  this leaves margin for applied tariff 
increases”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Pakistan “Pakistan's economic growth has been impressive since its previous 2002, mainly as a 
result of its relatively open trade and investment regimes. Pakistan is an original WTO 
Member and grants at least MFN treatment to all trading partners.  However, many 
imports from India remain prohibited, although there has been some progressive 
liberalization, and trade with Israel is banned. Overall, trade policy has been focused on 
reducing protection, achieving a more outward-oriented trade regime, obtaining better 
market access for Pakistan's exports, and promoting greater integration into the global 
economy through increased economic efficiency. The tariff is Pakistan's main trade 
policy instrument. The average applied MFN tariff rate was reduced from 20.4% in 
2001/02 to 14.5% in 2007/08.  Nevertheless, in 2006/07 it rose slightly to 15% (owing 
to increases on some 600 industrial items), before dropping to its 2007/08 level (mainly 
as a result of the re-introduction of zero tariffs).  Most bindings exceed applied MFN 
rates and average bound levels are more than four times the average applied rate; this 
reduces predictability, especially in agriculture where gaps are wider”. Source: WTO 
Trade Policy Review. 
Panama “Panama acceded to the WTO in 1997. Panama has participated actively in the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), presenting proposals individually and together with other 
Members. It considers trade liberalization an important policy tool to achieve 
development, but favours a flexible approach to liberalization.  Panama grants at least 
MFN treatment to all its trading partners.  The tariff is Panama's main trade instrument.  
All tariffs are ad valorem.  The average applied MFN tariff is 8.5 per cent. The average 
tariff of 15.1 per cent for agricultural products (WTO definition) is considerably higher 
than for other products (7.3 per cent)”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Paraguay “Paraguay has a very open trade and investment regime.  Applied MFN tariffs are 
relatively low (8.5 per cent on average) and there is little recourse to non-tariff 
measures.  The aim of Paraguay's medium-term trade strategy is to boost the role of 
international trade as an engine for economic growth and to diversify its export base. 
Paraguay's trade policy is strongly influenced by its membership of MERCOSUR. 
Paraguay applies MERCOSUR's Common External Tariff (CET) with exceptions 
concerning 23 per cent of all tariff lines, resulting in an average tariff lower than 
MERCOSUR's average CET.  During the period under review, tariff protection lessened 
slightly, with the arithmetic average of applied MFN rates in 2010 falling to 8.5 per cent 
compared to 8.9 per cent in 2004.  All rates are ad valorem. All tariffs are bound at rates 
ranging from 10 to 35 per cent, giving Paraguay an average bound tariff of 32.4 per 
cent”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Peru “Peru is an original Member of the WTO.  It accords at least MFN treatment to all its 
trading partners.  Peru has not taken part in any of the WTO plurilateral agreements. 
Peru's solid economic performance has been accompanied by a process of liberalization 
and modernization of its trade regime.  The average applied MFN tariff rate decreased, 
from 13.6 per cent in 1999 to 8.2 per cent in April 2007, reflecting tariff reductions on 
capital goods and inputs not produced in Peru. All tariffs are ad valorem”. Source: WTO 
Trade Policy Review. 
Philipines “The Philippines economy has performed well since 2005, based on a relatively open 
trade regime. As a member of ASEAN, the Philippines is committed to deepening 
economic integration among members, including removing obstacles to trade and 
improving trade facilitation.  The Philippines, both unilaterally and through ASEAN, 
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has continued to pursue a policy of negotiating regional trade agreements (RTAs) of 
varying scope with the focus on Asia-Pacific. Trade policy has not undergone major 
changes since 2005. The tariff remains the main policy instrument.  The simple average 
MFN applied tariff (6.4%) is 19.3 percentage points lower than the simple average 
bound rate (25.7%), giving the authorities ample scope to raise applied tariffs. Tariffs 
average 10.2% (10.3% in 2004) on agriculture (WTO definition), and 5.8% on non-
agricultural products (7% in 2004).  All tariff lines, applied and bound, are ad valorem.  
About 40% of tariff lines are unbound”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Poland “Poland is a founding member of the WTO and grants at least most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) treatment to all WTO Members.  It is an observer to the plurilateral Agreement 
on Government Procurement.  The main objective of Poland's trade policies is, overall, 
geared towards increased liberalization.  Poland maintains a multi-stranded approach 
combining multilateral,  regional and bilateral initiatives. Trade liberalization in Poland 
has recently been largely concentrated at the regional level. Poland also has free-trade 
agreements with EFTA member States, other CEFTA parties as well as bilaterally with 
the Baltic States, Turkey, and Israel.  Poland's  MFN tariffs averaged 15.9% 
(unweighted) in 1999, compared with 6% on imports from the EU and other preferential 
sources; 14.1% on imports from developing countries; and 9.9% from least developed 
country suppliers.  Much higher tariffs, averaging 34.6%, apply to imports from non-
WTO countries. Almost 94% of Poland's tariff lines are bound”. Source: WTO Trade 
Policy Review. 
Rawanda “Rwanda is an original Member of the WTO, and grants at least MFN treatment to all 
of its trading partners.  It has not signed any of the WTO plurilateral agreements.  Since 
1994, Rwanda has made significant progress in liberalizing its economy by reducing its 
customs duties and taxes and joining the COMESA free-trade area on 1 January 2004. 
Rwanda is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and is party to the treaty establishing the Economic Community of the 
Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), the trade provisions of which are not always applied.  
Customs duties constitute Rwanda's chief trade policy instrument.  The applied MFN 
tariff comprises only ad valorem duties corresponding to the four rates of the COMESA 
common external tariff (zero per cent, 5 per cent, 15 per cent and 30 per cent).  The 
simple average tariff rate in Rwanda in 2003 was 18 per cent, with a largely escalating 
structure.  The coefficient of variation of approximately 0.6 shows moderate dispersion. 
Average rates remain relatively lower in the agricultural sector (7 per cent) and the 
mining sector (6 per cent) than in the manufacturing sector (19 per cent) when using the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC, Revision 2)”.  Source: WTO 
Trade Policy Review. 
Romania “A contracting party to the GATT since 14 November 1971, Romania became an 
original Member of the WTO on 1 January 1995. It grants at least MFN treatment to all 
its trading partners. Since its last Review, Romania has continued to liberalize its trade 
regime.  It ceased to apply an import surcharge as from 1 January 2001. The tariff is 
Romania's main trade policy instrument; the simple average MFN tariff rate declined 
from 19.8% in 1999 to 17.5% in 2005. Both applied and bound tariffs are entirely ad 
valorem. In aggregate, Romania's applied MFN tariff displays positive escalation from 
first-stage processed products to fully processed products”. Source: WTO Trade Policy 
Review. 
Senegal Niger as above. 
Singapore “Singapore's economy, in terms of international trade and foreign investment remains 
one of the most open, and thus competitive, in the world. Singapore grants at least MFN 
treatment to all its trading partners.  Singapore views the WTO as at the core of its trade 
policy strategy but also considers that trade liberalization efforts undertaken bilaterally 
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and in regionally can accelerate the momentum towards trade liberalization and thus 
form building blocks for the multilateral trading system. Singapore's import regime has 
relatively few border measures.  Singapore's applied MFN tariff is zero, apart from six 
lines for alcoholic beverages, which are subject to specific rates.  Singapore has bound 
some 70% of its tariff lines, at an average rate of 6.9%.  The gap between applied and 
bound MFN rates and the absence of bindings for 30.4% of tariff lines could create a 
degree of unpredictability for traders in the sense that there is scope for the authorities 
to raise tariffs;  however, applied tariffs have not been increased during the review 
period”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Srilanka “Sri Lanka has a fairly open and transparent trade regime, characterized by reliance on 
price-based measures and scant use of non-tariff measures and, in general, relatively 
low tariffs.  Sri Lanka participates in two regional trade agreements:  the South Asian 
Free Trade Area (SAFTA) Agreement, and the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) 
as well as in two bilateral agreements:  the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement 
(ISFTA), and the Pakistan-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (PSFTA). Sri Lanka's trade 
policy has relied mostly on price-based measures rather than on non-tariff measures. Sri 
Lanka introduced major changes to its tariff schedule in 2007 and in 2010.  The simple 
average applied MFN tariff was 11.5% in 2010, up from 9.8% reported in Sri Lanka's 
Review for 2003, but lower than the 12% posted in 2009.  Tariff rates for most products 
range from 0 to 30%, with a few peaks, mainly for tobacco products.  Despite the 
increase in the average rate, the proportion of duty-free lines rose from 10% of the total 
in 2003 to 44.4% in 2010, mainly through the elimination of the 2.5% tariff rate and its 
replacement with duty-free access”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Thailand “For over 30 years Thailand has pursued a policy of export-led development that has 
successfully turned the county into a major exporter of industrial goods and led to rapid 
economic growth, particularly in the 1990s. On average, tariffs are applied at less than 
half their bound levels.  Also unchanged is the complicated tariff structure with different 
ad valorem, specific duty, and alternate duty rates.  Over a quarter of tariff lines are 
unbound. As a member of the ASEAN group, Thailand is committed to deepening 
economic integration among members, including removing obstacles to trade and 
improving trade facilitation”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Togo “Togo took over the status of GATT Contracting Party and is an original Member of 
the WTO.  It grants most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment as a minimum to all its trade 
partners.  It has not signed any of the plurilateral agreements concluded within the WTO 
or the agreements reached since the end of the Uruguay Round. Togo belongs to the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which introduced a common 
external tariff (CET) in 2000.  The introduction of the WAEMU's Common External 
Tariff (CET) in January 2000 reduced Togo's simple average applied MFN tariff rate 
from 16.5 per cent in 1998 to 12.1 per cent in 2005, and this has to a certain extent 
liberalized the trade regime, particularly for non-agricultural products (WTO 
definition)”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Tunesia "Tunisia has been a member of the GATT since 1990, and is an original member of the 
WTO.  It accords at least most favoured nation (MFN) treatment to all its trading 
partners.  Tunisia has not signed any of the plurilateral agreements concluded under 
the WTO. Tunisia has signed several regional preferential trade agreements, including 
the Association Agreement with the European Union, the Agreement on the Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), the Arab-Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement, the 
Free Trade Agreement with EFTA, the Maghreb Arab Union Agreement, and bilateral 
agreements. The heavy MFN tariff protection of the domestic market has changed only 
slightly in the course of the last 10 years.  The simple average of the MFN tariffs applied 
by Tunisia in 2005 is 32 per cent, compared with 33 per cent in 2004 and 31 per cent in 
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1994.  Less than two-thirds of the Tunisian tariff is bound in the WTO, often at ceiling 
rates of as high as 200 per cent, with a global average of 65.5 per cent.  Some 50 applied 
rates are higher than the bindings.  The other duties and taxes are bound for certain 
products”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Turkey “Turkey applies the Customs Union common external tariff (CET) to industrial goods, 
and its applied MFN tariffs for non-agricultural products are low, on average 5%.  
However, this relative openness is not reflected in Turkey's WTO commitments as it 
has left 66.5% of its non-agricultural tariff lines unbound, and the simple average on 
the tariff lines where Turkey has binding commitments is 17.4%.  Turkey's MFN import 
tariffs have not changed significantly overall since 2007.  However, Turkey is an 
important user of anti-dumping measures, with 118 duty measures in force as of August 
2011, compared to 93 at the end of 2007, and 27 at the end of 2002 Turkey also 
participates in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Developing-8 (D-8), the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC)”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Uganda “Uganda is a founder Member of WTO that was established on 1st January 1995 
following the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations.  Uganda continues to support 
WTO efforts that are intended to keep the international economy safe from the 
economic disasters of unilateralism, protectionism and regression, and promote 
multilateralism, free trade and economic development through its framework for 
progressive trade liberalization and the development of rules that govern international 
trade. Uganda is striving to promote trade through regional integration especially 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African 
Community (EAC) and multilateral arrangements such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Since 1987, the Government has been implementing trade and 
structural policy reforms, embracing liberalized systems for input and output markets, 
trade, investments and tax regimes.  These reforms included liberalization of domestic 
and export produce marketing and processing, removal of restrictive tariff and non-
tariff barriers and abolition of taxes on exports”. Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Uruguay “Uruguay is a founding Member of the WTO and an active participant in the multilateral 
trading system.  During the Doha Development Agenda negotiations, Uruguay 
produced many proposals, both individually and with other Members.  Uruguay's trade 
regime is open, with little in the way of non-tariff barriers to trade.  As a small and open 
economy, Uruguay considers that the priority objective of its economic and trade 
policies are to continue opening up to the world even further through regional 
integration, in conformity with multilateral trade rules.  Uruguay has repeatedly 
expressed its keen interest in strengthening the multilateral trading system. Uruguay 
applies the MERCOSUR Common External Tariff (CET), with certain exceptions 
representing approximately 13.5 per cent of tariff headings.  All tariffs are ad valorem.  
Generally speaking, tariff levels remained relatively stable throughout the period under 
review, with a simple average MFN rate of 9.4 per cent in 2011, slightly higher than the 
2005 rate of 9.3 per cent.  The average applied MFN tariff was 9.6 per cent for 
agricultural products (WTO definition) and 9.3 per cent for non-agricultural products”.  
Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Venezuala “Venezuela is an original Member of the WTO and participated in the multilateral 
negotiations on financial services and basic telecommunications.  Venezuela applies the 
Andean Community Common External Tariff, with some exceptions.  The average 
applied MFN tariff in 2001 was 12 per cent, the same level as in 1996.  Including 
variable levies, the average tariff was 12.4 per cent in 2001.  The applied MFN average 
for non-agricultural goods was 11.6 per cent, while the average for agricultural goods 
(WTO definition) was 14.6 per cent”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
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Zambia “The simple average applied MFN tariff of 13.4% is the same as in 2002.  The large 
gap between the average applied rate of 13.4% and the bound rate of 105.7%, and the 
absence of bindings for over 83% of tariff lines, creates a significant degree of 
unpredictability for traders in the sense that there is scope for the authorities to raise 
tariffs. Ad valorem tariffs account for 97.8% of all tariff lines, which lends a high degree 
of transparency to the tariff, although for the remaining 2.2% (up from 1.3% in 2002) 
ad valorem equivalents are not available and may conceal relatively high rates. 
Agriculture  remains the most protected sector with an applied average MFN tariff rates 
of 19.1”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy Review. 
Zimbabwe “Zimbabwe has lowered applied MFN tariff rates unilaterally, with a view to reducing 
production costs.  However, at 15.4%, its simple average applied MFN tariff rate is 
among the highest in the region.  Besides ad valorem tariff rates ranging from zero to 
160%, some 6.1% of all lines carry non-ad valorem tariffs.    Agriculture is the most 
protected sector, with an average applied MFN tariff rate of 25.1%, compared with 
13.9% on non-agricultural products (WTO definitions)”.  Source: WTO Trade Policy 
Review. 
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ADDENDUM E 
FIGURES 
 
AE. 1: Total World Trade position 
 
                       Source: Author’s own collection of data from different Sources187. 
AE. 2: Comparison of Tariff Rates between Developed and Developing Countries. 
 
                      Source: Author’s own collection of data from different Sources. 
AE. 3: Region wise an overview of Tariff rates 
 
                      Source: Author’s own collection of data from different Sources. 
                                                          
187 These include World Development Indicators (2013), World Trade Organization (WTO), Freedom House and 
UNCTAD. 
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AE. 4: Political Regime wise comparison of Tariff rates. 
 
      Source: Author’s own collection of data from different Sources. 
AE. 5: Comparison of Antidumping duties 
 
                    Source: Author’s own collection of data from different Sources. 
         
                     AE. 6: Sectoral analysis of Applied Tariff rates for Developed and 
Developing nations. 
 
         Source: Author’s own collection of data from different Sources. 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
Non-Dem
Dem
0
50
100
150
200
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
DCs
LDCs
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
LDCs DCs World
total_app
Agric_app
Indus _app
217 
 
 
 
AE. 7: Sectoral analysis of Bound Tariff rates for Developed and 
     Developing nations. 
      
 
 
   
 
 
 
                    Source: Author’s own collection of data from different Sources. 
                  AE. 7: Tariff Escalation rates for Developing and Developed nations. 
 
 
                       Source: Author’s own collection of data from different Sources. 
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ADDENDUM-F 
TABLES 
 
AF. 1: Overall Average Analysis of Applied Tariff Rates of Developing nations used in 
                   study. 
Regions Applied Average Tariff Rates GDP-Growth 
Asian Developing countries 11.19 5.16 
American Developing countries 9.81 3.37 
European Developing countries 4.78 5.21 
African Developing countries 15.14 4.38 
Politically Free Nations 9.95 4.07 
Politically Not-Free Nations 13.06 5.01 
Source: Author’s own calculation from World Bank and Freedom House. 
AF. 2: Sectoral Analysis of Applied Tariff Rates of Developing nations used in study. 
                                         MFN  Applied Average Tariff Rates  (comparison by Regions) 
                          1998-2004                           2005-2010 
 All Goods Agricultural Industrial All Goods Agricultural Industrial 
World 10.8 15.3 10.1 9.1 13.0 8.7 
Developing 11.7 16.3 11.0 9.9 13.8 9.6 
Developed 10.7 19.2 9.3 11.0 19.3 10.1 
Source: Author’s own calculation World Bank Database 
AF. 3: Sectoral Analysis of Bound Tariff Rates of Developing nations used in study 
                                         MFN  Bound Tariff Rates  (comparison by Regions) 
                          1998-2004                           2005-2010 
 All Goods Agricultural Industrial All Goods Agricultural Industrial 
World 77.8 108 59.1 38.5 53.3 30.6 
Developing 43.7 60.7 32.4 43.4 58.9 34.2 
Developed 33.9 46.7 31.6 35.1 58.3 31.3 
Source: Author’s own calculation World Bank Database 
AF. 4: Anti-Dumping Measures and Safe guards used by Developing Countries. 
years 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 
AD measures 119 237 138 123 98 47 
SG 1 7 6 4 11 4 
Source: Author’s own calculation from WTO data base 
AF. 5: Tariff Escalation by sectors between Developed and Developing Nations. 
Regions Year Agriculture Industry Capital Transport Consumer 
Goods 
Developed 2005/10 15.2 8.6 5.7 10.8 14.1 
Developing 2005/10 15.5 9.2 8.7 10.3 11.5 
World 2005/10 14.1 8.1 5.7 10.0 12.9 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the data collected from UNCTAD 
 
219 
 
 
 
 
AF. 6: Average Institutional Performance rates for various Developing Regions (2005-2013) 
                                           Institutional Performance Indicators  
 Quality of 
public 
administration 
Structural 
policies cluster 
average 
Trade rating Transparency,  
accountability,  
and corruption  
in the public sector 
Regions     
LAC 
3.111111 
3.805093 
 
4.236111 
 
3.430556 
 
SSA 2.88555 
 
3.222026 
 
3.644666 
 
2.749592 
 
EAP 2.945939 
 
3.251929 
 
3.837917 
 
2.749592 
 
ECA 3.132292 
 
3.756539 
 
4.209028 
 
2.705035 
 
MENA 2.75 
 
3.441667 
 
4.15625 
 
2.625 
 
Arab World 2.625 
 
3.114167 
 
3.65 
 
2.4125 
 
Source: Authors own calculation based on dataset from World Bank IDA 2013, values of scale lies from 1-6. 
Lowest shows poor performance and highest shows good performance.  
LAC: Latin America & Caribbean (developing only) 
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only) 
EAP: East Asia & Pacific (developing only) 
ECA: Europe & Central Asia (developing only) 
MENA: Middle East & North Africa (developing only) 
AF. 7: Institutional Performance Indicators for Democratic Nations about their Political 
Landscape 
Countries Stateness 
(A) 
Strength of 
democracy 
(B) 
Free 
and Fair 
Election 
© 
Party 
System 
(D) 
Interest 
Group 
(E) 
Institutional 
competitiveness 
(F) 
Argentina 9.0 7.55 9 6 7 2.79 
Bangladesh 7.0 5.95 8 6 5 3.08 
Bolivia 8.3 7.10 9 6 7 3.40 
Brazil 8.3 8.15 10 6 8 3.73 
Bulgaria 9.8 8.35 8 6 8 3.38 
Chile 9.8 9.10 9 8 8 4.88 
Costa Rica 10.0 9.30 10 7 9 4.20 
Ecuador 8.0 5.70 6 4 4 3.38 
India 7.8 8.10 9 7 8 3.86 
Indonesia 7.3 7.05 9 7 7 3.97 
Latvia 9.5 8.75 9 7 6 4.08 
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Madagascar 7.3 4.37 2 4 5 3.09 
Malawi 8.3 6.65 6 4 4 3.81 
Malaysia 8.5 5.23 5 7 5 4.85 
Mauritius 9.0 8.55 9 8 8 4.58 
Mexico 7.8 6.80 7 8 7 3.56 
Mongolia 8.5 7.15 8 6 6 3.34 
Panama 8.8 7.35 8 7 7 3.97 
Peru 7.8 6.75 9 4 5 3.36 
Philippines 7.0 6.80 7 5 7 3.76 
Poland 9.8 9.35 10 8 9 4.01 
Romania 9.5 7.90 8 7 7 3.34 
Senegal 7.3 7.12 8 4 5 3.69 
Singapore 10.0 5.55 5 8 5 6.04 
South Africa 7.8 7.50 8 8 8 4.53 
Sri Lanka 7.3 4.57 5 6 5 4.09 
Thailand 6.5 5.05 6 4 5 3.79 
Turkey 7.8 7.55 8 7 8 4.08 
Ukraine 8.8 6.10 6 4 5 2.99 
Uruguay 10.0 9.95 10 10 10 4.62 
Vietnam 9.3 3.57 2 1 3 3.54 
AF. 8: Institutional Performance Indicators for Autocratic Nations about their Political 
Landscape 
Countries Stateness 
(A) 
Strength of 
democracy 
(B) 
Free and 
Fair 
Election 
© 
Party 
System 
(D) 
Interest 
Group 
(E) 
Institutional 
competitiveness 
(F) 
Armenia 6.5 5.35 5 6 6 3.98 
Azerbaijan 7.5 3.92 3 3 4 4.06 
Cameroon 6.3 4.08 3 5 5 3.35 
China 8.8 3.33 1 1 2 4.24 
Colombia 7.3 6.55 6 5 6 3.35 
Egypt 6.0 5.45 7 4 6 3.33 
Ethiopia 6.5 3.37 2 3 3 3.58 
Guatemala 6.3 5.20 6 4 5 3.35 
Iran 6.0 3.13 3 2 2 3.68 
Jordan 6.3 4.10 5 2 5 4.60 
Kazakhstan 8.5 3.85 3 2 4 4.09 
Kenya 7.0 6.55 7 4 7 3.62 
Morocco 6.8 4.00 4 3 4 3.19 
Nepal 5.5 4.63 5 4 5 3.19 
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Oman 7.8 3.32 3 1 3 5.39 
Pakistan 3.8 3.53 6 4 3 3.23 
Qatar 8.0 4.00 2 1 4 5.95 
Russia 7.8 4.40 5 4 4 3.28 
Saudi Arabia 5.5 2.73 1 1 3 5.13 
Tunisia 7.3 5.80 8 4 6 3.85 
Yemen 3.5 3.27 4 4 4 2.80 
Authors’own compilation from BTI database 2014. 
In the above tables, Column A, B, C, D, E are extracted from Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(BTI) which a transformation index of closed economies in to democratic phase. It reports the 
quality of political and economic institutions of world nations specifically developing nations. It 
is composed of two sub-indices: Status index and management index. And Status index consists 
of two pillars: Political transformation index and Economic Transformation index. Status sub 
index shows the democratic progression of nations. While Management index highlights the 
performance of political leaders in these nations. This study is concerned with Political 
transformation of developing economies and then its effect on the economic welfare. It ranges 
from 1-10. ‘1’ shows less desirable condition for the survival of democracy and ‘10’ shows most 
desirable condition for its progression. Column F in the same table has been extracted from Global 
Competitiveness Report. Details of BTI’s sub-indices are as follows: 
Stateness:  1--- least level of stateness 
       10--- maximum level of stateness 
 
Fair Election: 1---unfair elections 
           10--- Free and fair elections 
 
Party System: 1---no Party system 
  10---highly institutionalized party system 
 
Interest Groups: 1---no interest groups 
     10---broad range of interest groups 
 
Strength of democratic institutions: 1---weak democracy 
              10---strong democracy 
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AF. 9: Welfare Estimates Without Rent-Seeking (α0) And With Rent-Seeking (β0) 
Activity For Democratic Nations 
 Constant Welfarism 
(α0) 
Constant Welfarism 
(β0) 
Type of 
system 
Status 
Argentina 
0.3562 
[9.5867] 
2.8071 
-0.0071 
[-10.3899] 
-140.845 Prs Rich 
Bangladesh 
2.6220 
[4.8007] 
0.3813 
 
-4.9987 
[-1.6209] 
-0.2000 Par Poor 
Bolivia 
5.9416 
[3.3537] 
0.1683 
 
-1.1852 
[-5.4156] 
-0.8437 Prs Poor 
Brazil 
0.1480 
[4.3007] 
6.7536 
-12.7918 
[-4.5919] 
-0.0781 Prs Rich 
Bulgaria 
0.5938 
[3.2427] 
1.6840 
0.3481 
[1.9027] 
2.8727 Par Rich 
Chile 
0.9790 
[2.4448] 
1.0213 
 
-4.8438 
[-4.2981] 
-0.2064 Prs Rich 
Costa Rica 
1.2018 
[6.2558] 
0.8320 
 
13.5458^ 
[0.9550] 
0.0738 Prs Rich 
Ecuador 
9.2565 
[2.8500] 
0.1080 
 
5.0066 
[1.8796] 
0.1809 Prs Rich 
India 
0.1205 
[2.9832] 
8.2981 
-80.4642^ 
[-1.6163] 
-0.0124 Par Poor 
Indonesia 
1.6957 
[1.9457] 
0.5897 
 
5555.568 
[5.4781] 
0.0017 Prs Poor 
Latvia 
0.2205 
[3.5857] 
4.5350 
 
-0.1130^ 
[-0.5938] 
-8.8495^ Par Rich 
Madagascar 
0.3974 
[1.8607] 
2.5162 
 
-0.6924 
[-5.4597] 
-1.4442 Prs 
 
Poor 
 
Malawi 
0.4115 
[2.3902] 
2.4297 
 
-14.7962 
[-4.8464] 
-0.0675 Prs Poor 
Malaysia 
0.1284 
[2.0633] 
7.7857 
 
-3.1650 
[-1.9380] 
-0.3159 Par Rich 
Mauritius 
0.3538 
[8.4477] 
2.8262 
 
-13.0890 
[-3.7797] 
-0.0764 Par Rich 
Mexico 
1.0721 
[7.6247] 
0.9327 
 
-1141.763 
-5.5992 
-0.0008 Prs Rich 
Mongolia 
115.5596 
[1.0969] 
0.0086^ 
 
 
0.0137^ 
[0.1303] 
72.9927^ Prs Poor 
Panama 
0.9990 
[2.5625] 
1.001 
 
-2.0541 
[-4.8310] 
-0.4868 Prs Rich 
Peru 
1.4557 
[1.1438] 
0.6869^ 
 
-3.7790 
[-6.1607] 
-0.2646 Prs Rich 
Philippine 
0.1466 
[4.8012] 
6.8195 
 
-16.8216 
[-6.5402] 
-0.0594 Prs Poor 
Poland 
0.2404 
[9.4219] 
4.1589 
 
0.1854 
[10.8116] 
5.3937 Prs Rich 
Romania 
0.2917 
[6.6671] 
3.4276 
 
0.2096 
[6.4442] 
4.7709 Par Rich 
Senegal 
9.9671 
[1.0255] 
0.1003^ 
 
-1.4754 
[-4.8908] 
-0.6777 Prs Poor 
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Singapore 0.0000 infinity 0.0000 infinity Par Rich 
South Africa 
0.1196 
[2.2566] 
8.3545 
 
-3.2452  
[-4.4105] 
-0.3081 
Assembly-
Elected 
President 
Rich 
Srilanka 
1.2549 
[1.1866] 
0.7968^ 
 
-3.5901 
[-2.5821] 
-0.2785 Prs Poor 
Thailand 
0.1721 
[2.3828] 
5.8078 
 
-24.7011 
[-6.4241] 
-0.0404 Par Rich 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.7968 
[3.5616] 
1.2549 
 
-0.8490^ 
[-0.8698] 
-1.1778^ Par Rich 
Turkey 
0.1677 
[4.2234] 
5.9596 
 
-25.2551 
[-5.1086] 
-0.0395 Par Rich 
Ukraine 
0.1230 
[3.1352] 
8.1238 
 
-2.5048 
[-3.4496] 
-0.3992 Prs Poor 
Uruguay 
0.4724 
[6.0871] 
2.1164 
 
-0.5638^ 
[-1.2636] 
-1.7736^ Prs Rich 
Vietnam 
0.6745 
[3.2423] 
1.4824 
 
-9.4709 
[-3.8351] 
-0.1055 
Assembly-
Elected 
President 
Poor 
Venezuela 
0.2432 
[2.8638] 
4.1114 
 
-10.9332 
[-7.9985] 
-0.0914 Prs Rich 
        [ ] shows t-statistics and ‘^’  shows insignificant value. ‘auto’ stands for autocracy, ‘prs’ stands for      
        presidential system and ‘par’ stands for parliamentary system.  
 
AF. 10: Welfare Estimates Without Rent-Seeking (α0) And With Rent Seeking (β0) 
Activity For Autocratic Nations. 
 
Country 
Constant 
Welfarism 
(α0) 
Constant 
Welfarism 
(β0) 
Type of 
system 
Status 
Armenia 
0.7193 
[2.9031] 
1.3901 
 
0.0173 
[1.0601] 
57.8034^ Prs Poor 
Azerbaijan 
0.6386 
[4.4979] 
1.5658 
 
-0.4006 
[-1.6112] 
-2.4963 Prs Rich 
Cameroon 
0.2680 
[4.0909] 
3.7302 
 
-0.4355 
[-2.9119] 
-2.2962 Prs Poor 
China 
 
0.1225 
[2.6366] 
8.1616 
 
-51.2467 
[-3.3532] 
-0.0195 
Assembly-
Elected 
President 
Rich 
Colombia 
0.2231 
[7.7408] 
4.4810 
-5.5408 
[-5.5085] 
-0.1804 Prs Rich 
Egypt 
0.1971 
[3.4287] 
 
5.0719 
 
0.1388^ 
[1.1702] 
7.2046 Prs Rich 
Ethiopia 
27.9513 
[1.2870] 
0.0357^ 
 
-0.9332 
[-3.2834] 
-1.0715 Par Poor 
Guatemala 
0.2317 
[3.1850] 
4.3151 
 
-5.0374 
[-5.8744] 
-0.1985 Prs Poor 
Iran 
0.1119 
[2.1934] 
8.9328 
 
-0.1152 
[-2.5684] 
-8.5005 Prs Rich 
Jordan 
0.6444 
[7.1543] 
1.5515 
 
-0.2145^ 
[-0.5173] 
-4.6620^ Prs Rich 
Kazakhstan 
0.1320 
[2.5505] 
7.5736 
 
-1.1250 
[-2.4749] 
-0.8888 Prs Rich 
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Kenya 
0.2523 
[6.0251] 
3.9625 
 
-0.8894 
[-2.8596] 
-1.1243 Prs Poor 
Korea 
0.1599 
[2.3570] 
6.2538 
 
-23.8928 
[-4.6957] 
-0.0418 Prs Rich 
Kirgizstan 
0.7032 
[4.6191] 
1.4220 
 
-0.5341 
[-2.3552] 
-1.8723 Prs Poor 
Morocco 
0.3894 
[7.0846] 
2.5674 
 
-0.9678 
[-1.6858] 
-1.0332 Prs Poor 
Nepal 
0.9767 
[2.8581] 
1.0237 
 
-121.8753 
[-1.5755] 
-0.0082 Par Poor 
Oman 
6.3322 
[1.5118] 
0.1579^ 
 
-3.3280 
[-2.3900] 
-0.3004 Prs Rich 
Pakistan 
0.1251 
[6.1201] 
7.9893 
 
-3.0030 
[-3.6772] 
-0.333 Prs Poor 
Qatar 
15.8635 
[1.7118] 
0.0630 
 
-8.6422 
[-1.7316] 
-0.1157 Prs Rich 
Russia 
0.1116 
[2.1517] 
8.9564 
 
-48.6191 
[-4.1270] 
-0.0205 Prs Rich 
Saudi Arabia 
1.3220 
[1.8580] 
0.7564 
 
-40.8415 
[-5.7366] 
-0.0244 Prs Rich 
Tunisia 
0.1138 
[2.3899] 
8.7847 
 
-1.0674 
[-2.8431] 
-0.9368 Prs Rich 
Yemen 
7.1541 
[1.5866] 
0.1397^ 
 
-1.5700^ 
[-1.3216] 
-0.6369^ 
Assembly-
Elected 
President 
Poor 
        [ ] shows t-statistics and ‘^’  shows insignificant value. ‘auto’ stands for autocracy, ‘prs’ stands for      
        presidential system and ‘par’ stands for parliamentary system.  
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ADDENDUM-G: 
Derivation of Lobbying Effect by incorporating the role of Intermediate inputs 
Starting from the complete objective function of the government:  
                                                                G = 𝑎𝑊 + ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑖 𝜖 𝐿  
Lobbying net welfare is given by:  
 𝜓(𝑝𝑖) =  𝐶(𝑝)𝑖 
By adding this into the objective function of the government, the following form is obtained: 
𝐺(𝑝) +  ∑(𝑣𝑖(𝑝) − 𝐶𝑖(𝑝)) = 
𝑖
∑ 𝜋𝑖(𝑝) + 𝑎 𝑊(𝑝)
𝑖
 
To maximize the joint surplus through desired tariffs, the following first-order conditions must be 
followed: 
∑
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
+  𝑎
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 0            ∀𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
 
where 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 𝑦𝑖 (1 −  𝜑𝑖𝑖) ∀𝑖 
And  
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= - 𝜑𝑖𝑗 𝑦𝑗  
Hence equilibrium tariff in industry i,  𝑡𝑖  = pi / pi
* - 1 with given ti  is given by the following 
expression which incorporates the effect of Intermediate inputs:  
(
𝑡𝑖
1 + 𝑡𝑖
⁄  ) = 1 𝑎⁄ . (
1
𝑚𝑖.⃓𝑒𝑖⃓ 
(𝑋𝑖 − ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑗 𝑦𝑗 
𝑛
𝑖=0 ))      
Stochastic version of the above final equation is:  
(
𝑡𝑖𝑡
1 + 𝑡𝑖𝑡 
⁄ ) . 𝑒𝑖 . (
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑖𝑡− ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑗 𝑦𝑗 
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖
) =  𝛽0 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡     (D) 
This equation (D) allows for estimation of the country-specific parameter a, measuring the 
welfare-mindedness of governments, taking into suitable account the extent of cross-sectoral 
lobbying competition in the economy. 
 
 
 
 
